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MIXING OIL AND WATER: THE EFFECT OF PREVAILING
WATER LAW DOCTRINES ON OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT*
By

WILLIAM

E.

HOLLAND**

INTRODUCTION

The largest single deposit of fossil energy known to exist in
the world is the oil shale formation underlying 16,000 square
miles of several basin areas in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.'
Known as the Green River Formation, this deposit was laid down
in three lake beds in the Eocene Age. 2 It ranges in thickness from
a few hundred feet to about 7 thousand feet. Even excluding beds
which contain less than 10 gallons of oil per ton of shale, the
formation is estimated to contain more than 2 trillion barrels of
oil. Of this 2 trillion barrels, more than three-quarters of a trillion
3
barrels are in beds containing more than 25 gallons per ton.
Eighty percent of the 25-gallon-per-ton shale is in the Piceance
Creek Basin of Colorado, 15 percent in the Uinta Basin in Utah,
and 5 percent in the Green River Basin in Wyoming. Some samples contain as much as 90 gallons of oil per ton of shale.4 Significant parts of the formation, notably the Sand Wash Basin and
the Washakie Basin, are still largely unappraised.5
The Green River Formation is by no means the only oil shale
deposit in the United States. There are known deposits in 30
states totaling an estimated 72 trillion tons.' Only the Green
* This paper was awarded the grand prize in the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation Scholarship competition for 1974.
**Associate, Kutak Rock Cohen Campbell Garfinkle & Woodward, Omaha, Nebraska; B.S., 1963, University of Nebraska; B.A., 1965, Oxford University; Ph.D., 1971,
Stanford University; J.D., 1974, Stanford University Law School.
See map at Appendix A.
Donnell, Geology and Oil Shale Resources of the Green River Formation,59 COLO.
SCHOOL OF MINES Q., July 1964, at 153.
Id. at 162.
'Id.
Id. See also map at Appendix A.
University of Denver College of Law, Legal Study of Oil Shale on Public Lands,
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River Formation has present commercial significance, as the
other deposits are much lower in grade and quality, generally
assaying below 15 gallons per ton.7 However, there are Alaskan
deposits of unknown extent but locally very rich, with up to 160
gallons per ton.'
Nor are oil shale deposits confined to the United States. In
1958 the Swedish Shale Oil Company, Svenska Skifferolje AB,
estimated world shale deposits at 172 trillion metric tons, representing, by its estimate, 1.2 trillion barrels of oil.9 But since that
study listed U.S. reserves at only 90 billion metric tons or 618
billion barrels, it is clearly conservative. Estimates of world deposits have increased steadily since that time. An estimate in a
study for the Colorado Water Conservation Board placed world
reserves at nearer 500 billion metric tons, or 4 trillion barrels.'s
More recently, the U.S. government has published an estimate of
known world reserves of 900 trillion tons."
Even allowing for considerable error in the estimates, these
figures dwarf proven petroleum reserves, 2 and they dwarf present
rates of consumption. In 1972 the United States consumed approxmately 6 billiqn barrels of petroleum and about 22.6 billion
cubic feet of natural gas, which is the energy equivalent of approximately 4.4 billion barrels of petroleum.13 Thus, if the oil in
April 1969, at 11 (prepared for the Public Land Law Review Commission) [hereinafter
cited as Legal Study].
I National Petroleum Council, Committee on U.S. Energy Outlook, Other Energy
Resources Subcommittee, U.S. Energy Outlook, an Interim Report: An Initial Appraisal
by the Oil Shale Task Group, 1972, at 15 [hereinafter cited as Task Group].
I Donnell, Tailleur & Tourtelot, Alaskan Oil Shale, 62 COLO. SCHOOL OF MINES Q.,
July 1967, at 39, 41.
1 Cameron & Jones, Inc., Water Requirements for Oil Shale 1960-1975, July 1959, at
8-9 (prepared for the Colorado Water Conservation Board) [hereinafter cited as Cameron
& Jones].
Legal Study, supra note 6, at 11.

Id.
There is considerable variation in published estimates of petroleum reserves, however. The Office of Oil and Gas of the Department of the Interior estimated in 1971 that
proven U.S. reserves were 39 billion barrels and reserves in the non-Communist world were
484 billion barrels. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF OIL & GAS, 1971 PETROLEUM
SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD 28-29 (1973). Charles Issawi in a study
for the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates proven U.S. reserves at
200 billion barrels and world reserves at over 2 trillion barrels. C. ISSAWI, OIL, THE MIDDLE
EAST, AND THE WORLD 8 (1971).
13Hearings on the President's Energy Message and S. 1570 Before the Comm. on
Interior and InsularAffairs of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-10,
at 34-35 (1973).
"
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that part of the Green River Formation which contains more than
10 gallons per ton were totally recoverable, it would replace both
petroleum and natural gas for nearly 200 years at 1972 levels of
consumption.
Nevertheless, except for a few pilot projects, almost no shale
oil has been produced in the United States. Apparently the only
commercial production was the operation from 1890 to 1924 of a
small retort by the Catlin Shale Products Company from thin
beds near Elko, Nevada. This firm never earned a profit but did
market fuel oil, lubricating oil, and paraffin wax. 4 Shale oil has
been produced commercially in various parts of the world since
1838, with an estimated world production from 1850 to 1961 of 400
million barrels.' 5 The Russians were mining up to 18 million tons
of shale per year by 1970 from Estonian deposits of about 50
gallons of gasoline per ton richness."' But, despite scattered assertions that the absence of American production can only have been
due to foot-dragging by the major oil companies,' 7 it appears that
there have until recently existed real economic and technological
barriers to production of oil from shale. One example is Russian
production: despite the richness of the deposits, at least through
1965, oil shale was never competitive with crude petroleum.' 8
The technological and economic barriers to shale oil production stem from the fact that the organic minerals in shale are not
fugacious, as are petroleum and natural gas, but are bound to the
rock itself. The organic matter in oil shales is called kerogen. It
can be converted into oil and gas by heating the shale to about
900 degrees Fahrenheit in a process called retorting.' 9 This is
accomplished by either of two basic methods: mining, either underground or open pit, followed by retorting of the mined shale;
or in situ retorting by burning the shale beds in place and extracting and condensing the combustion products. The resulting shale
oil is a black, highly viscous substance that is difficult to pour.
To make it pipelineable, shale oil must be upgraded to remove
wax-forming components; nitrogen and sulfur, in which it is rich,
4 C. WELLES, THE ELUSIVE BONANZA 29-30 (1970).
, Legal Study, supra note 6, at 10.
,1 Cieslewicz, Selected Topics of Recent Estonian-Russian Oil-Shale Research and
Development, 66 CoLO. SCHOOL OF MINES Q., Jan. 1971, at 1, 1-5.
For a compendium of these assertions, see WELLES, supra note 14.
,S Cieslewicz, supra note 16, at 1-7.
, Task Group, supra note 7, at 9.
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can be removed at the same time by conventional techniques. 0
The result is a high grade synthetic crude oil, "syncrude," suitable for refining into products equivalent to those produced from
petroleum.2
The difficulty of separating the oil from the rock has held
back oil shale production to the present time simply because
known methods involved capital costs too great to allow competition with petroleum.2 The recent rise in petroleum prices, if permanent, could remove that barrier. But there is another problem
facing an oil shale industry: a problem that becomes more acute
with time, rather than less-the acquisition of sufficient water.
Both retorting and the upgrading process require considerable
amounts of water. The Green River Formation is the only deposit
in the United States of adequate size, richness, and availability
to have present commercial value. It lies, however, in one of the
more arid parts of the country.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the probable demand
of an oil shale industry for water and the effect which existing
water law doctrines will have on ability to meet that demand.
I.

A.

WATER REQUIREMENTS FOR SHALE OIL PRODUCTION

Nature of Demand

Water is required for three purposes in connection with the
production of shale oil: (1) Processes directly required to produce
shale oil from the rock-mining and retorting or in situ retorting;
(2) upgrading the raw shale oil to pipelineable quality; and (3)
municipal supply for domestic use by employees and for domestic
and other use in necessary supporting economies. The third requirement does not involve water consumed in shale oil production per se, but without which production would be impossible.
There will also be a requirement for water for the further
refinement of the upgraded syncrude. Since that process does not
2

Id. at 10.

21 Id.
2 The Oil Shale Task Group estimates the capital cost, at 1970 prices, of constructing
the minimum plant which could take advantage of desirable economies of scale, at $524
million exclusive of land costs (based on 100,000 barrels per day production). Id. A recent
large-scale pilot project planned by a group of oil companies to develop oil shale on federal
leases in Colorado was suspended in October 1974 after the estimated cost of a complex
capable of producing 46,000 barrels per day rose from $450 million in 1973 to $800 million
in 1974. Cowan, Cost Makes Oil in Shale, Tar Sands Also Distant, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26,
1975, § 4 at 4, col. 3.
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differ significantly from the refinement of petroleum, there will
be no added requirement, and no need for the water to be available in the oil shale region. The upgraded shale oil can be pipelined and refining can be done at any convenient location. And
since at significant rates of production most oil would have to be
exported ultimately in order to find a market, refining is likely
to occur in areas where water is more readily available.
1. Mining, Retorting, Upgrading
The production of crude shale oil by mining and ex situ retorting requires little water-about 10 gallons per barrel.2 Mining
consumption is chiefly for drilling blast-holes and as a dust
palliative. Most retorting processes use water only for bearing
coolant, and a small amount as steam for heating and cleaning.
There is little return flow from these uses."
The largest consumption of water in production of oil from
shale occurs in the upgrading and refining processes. Consumption varies greatly, depending upon the process used. 5 Cameron
and Jones estimated in 1959 that, including necessary electric
power generation, the total water requirement for shale oil production and refining would be 50 to 100 gallons per barrel, depending upon the refining process, with 90 percent of this consumed.2" Thus, if production were 1 million barrels per day, 100
gallons of water per barrel of oil would add up to 36.5 billion
gallons per year, or about 110,000 acre-feet per year, to use the
term by which water supply is normally measured. About 100,000
acre-feet per year would be consumed. Cameron and Jones in
their estimate apparently use an (unstated) intermediate figure
for refinery requirements and then multiply by a factor of 1.5 to
cover errors in estimation. They arrive at a final estimate of
127,000 acre-feet per year diverted, 114,000 acre-feet per year
consumed, on an estimated production of 1.25 million barrels of
oil per day.Y However, it is to be emphasized that this estimate
is based upon the assumption that refining is done locally. It thus
21Cameron

& Jones, supra note 9, at 33.

u Id.

2 Id. at 28.
" Id. Note however that refineries in the Salt Lake City area presently consume only
about 30 gallons of water per barrel of crude petroleum. Gardner & LeBaron, Some
Neighborhood Effects of Oil-Shale Development, 8 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 568, 576 (1968).
" Cameron & Jones, supra note 9, at 33.
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represents a probable maximum requirement.28 As noted above,
there are sound reasons for refinery operations to be conducted
outside the oil shale area where this is possible.
Cameron and Jones do not separately estimate the amount
of water required for local upgrading only, but their estimate of
total water demand including refining does correlate closely with
another published estimate which gives separate upgrading and
refining figures. Raymond D. Sloan, manager of the Humble Oil
shale oil project, stated in addresses to the Colorado River Water
Users Association in 1965 and to the Petroleum Accountants Society of Houston in 1966 that a 2 million-barrel-per-day industry
would consume about 112,000 acre-feet of water per year without
refining, or about 200,000 acre-feet per year if the refining operation is conducted in the oil shale area. 9 Thus, local refining could
be expected to nearly double the local water requirement. Sloan
also stated the figures another way: the water consumed in mining, retorting, and upgrading shale oil is about 1.2 times the
volume of oil produced.30
The most recent estimates of water required for shale oil production are those of the National Petroleum Council's Oil Shale
Task Group, which gives a figure of 16,000 acre-feet per year for each
100,000 barrels per day produced, 31 and those published (from unstated sources) by the U.S. Geological Survey, which gives a range
of from 12,150 to 18,420 acre-feet per year for each 100,000 barrels
per day produced.32 On million barrels per day, The Oil Shale Task
Group estimate would require 160,000 acre-feet per year, the Geological Survey estimates 121,500 to 184,200 acre-feet per year.

Although the Task Group is not specific on this point, the estimate appears to be based upon the quantity diverted, not consumed. It includes only mining, retorting and upgrading, not refining. The estimate is thus some 50 percent higher than Sloan's.
The Final Environmental Statement for the Prototype Oil Shale
Leasing Program in Colorado, however, gives an estimate of
Id. at 31.
Cited in Ely, The Oil Shale Industry's Water Problems, 62 CoLo. SCHOOL OF MINES
Q., July 1967, at 9, 10. See also Moses, Where is the Water Coming From?, 61 COLO.
SCHOOL OF MINES Q., July 1966, at 23.
30

Ely, supra note 29, at 10.

3, Task Group, supra note 7, at 92.
31 G. DAVIS & L. WOOD, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 703, WATER DEMANDS FOR ExPANDING ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 9 (1974).
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consumption of 121,000 to 189,000 acre-feet per year for production of 1 million barrels per day.33
There has been no actual large-scale test of in situ retorting,
so the water requirements are uncertain. Ely 4 states, without
supporting data, that consumption for this process may be as
much as twice that required for mining and retorting. But since
the major consumption is in the upgrading process and not in
retorting,35 the added increment probably will not be significant,
certainly no larger than differences between published estimates
based upon mining and retorting.
2. Municipal
Per capita diversion of water for use in large western Colorado towns is up to 480 gallons per day, including lawn irrigation,
but most towns divert about 300 gallons per capita day, of which
approximately one-third is consumed.36 It has been estimated
that an industry producing 11 million barrels of shale oil per day
will support directly or indirectly a population of about 340,000
people.37 At 300 gallons per capita day, this population would
require diversion of about 100 million gallons of water per day,
or about 100,000 acre-feet per year, with consumption of about
one-third. 8
This estimate is reasonably close to other published figures.
Sloan3 states that a 2 million-barrel-per-day industry will divert
165 thousand acre-feet per year for municipal use and consume
one-third of that diverted.
3. Totals
Summing the requirements for processing and for municipal
use, it appears that for every increment of 1 million barrels per
day of shale oil produced, there must be a diversion of not less
than about 150,000 acre-feet of water per year 4 with about 85,000
acre-feet consumed. Diversion requirements could be as high as
Id.
" Ely, supra note 29, at 10.
' Cameron & Jones, supra note 9, at 34.
38 Id. at 29.
Id. at 34.
Cameron & Jones' estimate is based on a slightly higher per capita use, and anticipates diversion of 115,000 acre-feet per year. Id. at 33.
' Moses, supra note 29.
,0 See note 29 supra & Cameron & Jones, supra note 9, at 33.
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240,000 acre-feet per year, however, with consumption of about
180,000 acre-feet." These two estimates bracket that made in
1953 for the Colorado Water Conservation Board.4 2 The industry
producing 2 million barrels per day would have required a diversion of 455,000 acre-feet per year and consumption of 290,000
acre-feet per year. (In this context it is difficult to fit the estimate
of Ely,4 3 which although based upon Sloan's figures comes out
with a diversion of 750,000 acre-feet and consumption of 500,000
for an industry producing 2 million barrels per day.)
B.

Probable Industry Size

The rate of consumption of water can be expected to be approximately proportional to the rate of production of oil." This
is true both for direct processing uses and for support industries.
The absolute requirements, then, depend upon the size of the
shale oil industry, which in turn depends upon market factors not
yet established. Past guesses about the future of the industry
have not been notable for their accuracy. It was predicted in 1959
that production would reach 1 million barrels per day between
1970 and 1975." 5 A committee composed of representatives of oil
companies, the Bureau of Mines, and the Bureau of Reclamation
based their 1953 estimates of water use on an assumed industry
of 2 million barrels per day." The most recent guess, that of the
Oil Shale Task Group,47 is that commercial production at an assumed "optimum economic single-plant rate" of 100,000 barrels
per day will begin in 1978, and that 400,000 barrels per day will
be reached by 1985. Recent developments in the crude petroleum
market could act as an incentive to even greater production. But
increases in the cost of production appear to have negated the
higher market price at least for the present.
If it is not possible to assess the probable size of even a near" Oil Shale Task Group figures at Task Group, supra note 7, at 92 for mining,
retorting, and upgrading, combined with Cameron & Jones, supranote 9, at 33 for municipal use.
42 Delaney, The Necessity of Water Storage for the Oil Shale Industry, 60 COLO.
SCHOOL OF MINES Q., July 1965, at 111, 113.
Ely, supra note 29, at 16.
" Cameron & Jones, supra note 9, at 27 et seq. & Task Group, supra note 7, at 92.
, Cameron & Jones, supra note 9, at 34.
' Delaney, supra note 42, at 113.
'7 Task Group, supra note 7, at 114-15.
'8 Cowan, supra note 22.
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future industry with any certainty, it is possible to demonstrate
the more important point: an oil shale industry capable of
supplying any significant fraction of national oil demand is going
to require more water than is readily available. It has already
been noted" that 1972 U.S. consumption of petroleum was 6 billion barrels, and natural gas supplied the energy equivalent of
another 4.4 billion barrels. The oil shale industry would have to
produce nearly 2 million barrels per day to supply only 10 percent
of the demand for petroleum alone at this level. Energy consumption in the United States has nearly doubled every 15 years in
recent decades, and it has been projected that it will continue to
do so. 0 Even if the rate of increase slows significantly, total energy demand almost certainly will not decline in the near future.
It is thus safe to predict that if shale oil can compete at all in cost
with petroleum or other energy sources, and if production is not
limited by non-economic factors, it will be produced at a rate
running into the millions of barrels per day. Limitation on water
supply will raise the cost of shale oil to the extent that there is a
market in water; shale oil production will be absolutely limited,
to the extent that water law doctrines inhibit transfer of scarce
water resources.
II.

A.

WATER SUPPLY AND WATER LAWS

Natural Supply

The primary sources of surface water in the oil shale areas
are the Green River in Wyoming, the Green and White Rivers in
Utah, and the White and Colorado Rivers in Colorado.5 The average yearly runoff from the White River basin over a period of 58
years (to 1968) was 458,000 acre-feet.52 That from the Colorado
River main stem to Glenwood Springs, Colorado, is 2 million
acre-feet.53 Runoff from the Green River basin is 3.92 million acrefeet at Green River, Utah.-4 There are also groundwater supplies,
but these are more difficult to measure and are largely uncatalogued. However, in absolute terms it is clear that there is enough
See text accompanying note 13 supra.
See, e.g., Task Group, supra note 7, at xiv, xxiii-xxv.
, See map at Appendix A.
" Cooley, Physical Background-Oil Shale, 59 COLO. SCHOOL OF MINES Q., July 1964,
at 135, 136-38.
Id. at 138.
'
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 1875, CORRELATIVE ESTIMATES OF STREAMFLOW IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN (1970).
"
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water for almost unlimited oil shale development. Natural limits
on water supply are not the problem.
B.

"The Law of the River"

All of the streams in the oil shale region ultimately flow into
the Colorado River above Glen Canyon Dam. They are thus subject to the Colorado River Compact, 55 which allocates the total
flow of the Colorado River among seven western states and Mexico. The primary division is that between the Upper Basin states,
Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico, and the Lower
Basin states, Arizona, California, and Nevada. In 1922 the signers
of the Compact assumed that a flow of 18 million acre-feet annually was available, and they allocated 7.5 million acre-feet to
each of the Basins. The delivery of that amount to the Lower
Basin at Lee Ferry was made a binding committment on the
Upper Basin states:
The states of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river
at Lee Ferry to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acrefeet for any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing
progressive series beginning with the first day of October next succeeding the ratification of this compact."

But over the past 30 years, the actual flow has been little over 13
million acre-feet per year, and about 14 million per year for the
50 years since the Compact was formed.57 The Upper Basin states
have recently agreed among themselves that they can depend
upon a residual amount of about 6.2 million acre-feet. This includes reservoir evaporation of 700,000 acre-feet, leaving a net
supply available for consumptive use of 5.5 million acre-feet.
Also to be considered is the Mexican Water Treaty, ratified
in 1945.11 Article 10 of the Treaty requires the United States to
deliver to Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet annually at the border
(which represents about 1.8 million acre-feet at Lee Ferry because
of evaporation losses)., 0
The Upper States claim, and the Lower States deny, that under the
terms of the Colorado River Compact the Lower Basin tributaries
SCoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §

37-61-101 et seq. (1973).

Id. at art. II1(d).
'7 Hearings on H.R. 4671 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 512 (1965).

5
"

Id.

59 Stat. 1219; Treaty Series 994.
Ely, supra note 29, at 14-15.
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can and should contribute to this burden to an extent which relieves
the Upper Basin of any obligation to deliver additional water at
Lee's Ferry for Mexico. If the Lower Basin position were sustained,
the 6.2 million acre-foot residue on which the Upper States are
counting would shrink to about 5.5 million, but as 700,000 acre-feet
of this must be lost in reservoir evaporation, the residue available
for consumptive use would be about 4.8 million at site of use."1

The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 19482 gives
Arizona 50,000 acre-feet annually from the Upper Basin water
and divides the residue on a percentage basis: Colorado, 51.75
percent; New Mexico, 11.25 percent; Utah, 23 percent; Wyoming,
14 percent. There is thus a separate limit in each state on the
consumption of water, irrespective of consumption in the other
states. Actual amounts available for consumption are approximately 2.8 million acre-feet in Colorado, 1.25 million acre-feet in
Utah, and 0.77 million acre-feet in Wyoming.
C.

Appropriation

The Colorado River Compacts are not the only limitations on
supply in the oil shale areas. Prior users of both surface waters
and groundwater are also protected by the laws. In all three oil
shale states, water is the property, not of the land owner, but of
the public."3 The states allocate water rights by the prior appropriation system, under which the application of water to a beneficial use gives the user a vested right to that amount of water,
subject only to conflicting rights which existed earlier. There are
three areas which are especially important to oil shale development: priority of rights; "diligence"; and transfers of rights.
1. Priority
Except as modified by statute, the elements necessary to
establish an appropriation right in water are an intent to appropriate, actual diversion or capture of water, and application of the
water to a beneficial use. 4 Assuming that the appropriation goes
forward diligently to completion, the date of the right is the date
of the first act evidencing an intent to take water for a beneficial
11Id. at
62

13-14.
43 U.S.C. § 617 (1970).

6

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 37-82-101 (1973);

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 73-1-1 (1953); Wyo.

CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
" See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 130
Colo. 518, 276 P.2d 992 (1954); Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Co., 99 Utah 139, 98 P.2d 695
(1940); State v. Lara'mie Rivers Co., 59 Wyo. 9, 136 P.2d 487 (1943).
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use.65 These doctrines have been modified by statutory filing systems which make most rights a matter of public record. Under
the filing statutes in Utah and Wyoming, the priority date is the
date an application is filed with the state engineer, 6 and rights
may be created only by filing. 7 In Colorado the date of priority
for groundwater appropriations is the date of filing an application
with the state engineer,68 but no filing is required for appropriations of surface water, and the priority date is still that of the first
act leading to beneficial use. 9
The principle of prior appropriation is thus "First in time,
first in right."70 The obvious effect on any industry becoming
established at this late date is that it will find water available
only to the extent that it has not already been appropriated for
another purpose.
According to the Colorado Water Conservation Board, "present, authorized, and committed" projects in 1967 were capable of
consuming 2.4 million acre-feet, and projects pending in Congress
would bring this to 2.7 million.71 About 150,000 acre-feet of this
amount was for oil shale projects. Another 100,000 acre-feet of
consumption for oil shale was among 500,000 acre-feet in various
states of planning. Since no oil shale plant has yet been built,
even the water already committed to oil shale projects could be
72
lost under the "due diligence" requirement.
A more optimistic view of the Colorado situation is taken by
the Oil Shale Task Group.7 3 Based on a 1971 study, the Task
Group assumes that 700,000 acre-feet per year is still uncommitted in Colorado "and possibly one-half of this can be diverted
'74
from the Colorado and/or White Rivers to the oil shale area.
" See, e.g., Four Counties Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River-Water Conservation
Dist., 161 Colo. 416, 425 P.2d 259 (1967); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec.
Power Co., 24 Utah 249, 67 P. 672 (1902); Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 44 P. 845 (1896).
N UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-212 (1957).
'7 UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §41-212 (1957).
Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-109 (1973).
" Id. § 37-92-305.
70 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 396 (1971).
7' Ely, supra note 29, at 14. Moses, supra note 29, at 31 shows the locations of 86,000
acre-feet of consumption committed to oil shale, and lists 64,000 other acre-feet committed to "potential oil shale uses."
7 See text accompanying notes 91-94 infra.
73Task Group, supra note 7, at 92.
74Id.
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However, the report notes that most of this could be taken by
1980 by projects now under investigation for the Department of
the Interior. The report also notes that the uncommitted water
supply in Utah is about 350,000 acre-feet per year at present, and
that in Wyoming from the Green River about 250,000 acre-feet
per year, but that in both states contemplated projects may have
appropriated all of this by 1980. It has been reported that the
Utah Water and Power Board has filed on water from the White
River for the eventual purpose of oil shale development,7 5 but the
amount was not stated, and diligence requirements could affect
the outcome.
It is possible that in some cases unappropriated water exists
where the records indicate there is none, for in all three states it
is "beneficial use" which is the measure of the right, not the
amount stated in an application, or given by decree, in Colorado.76 Thus, if application is made and a permit granted for
diversion of 8 cfs, but only 4 cfs is ever put to use, the right is
only to the use 4 cfs. Upon proof of these facts the "paperright"
may be reduced to that amount, leaving 4 cfs available for use
elsewhere, if it has not already been appropriated by a second
user. The potential for finding water by this means is shown by a
recent Wyoming study which found that acreage actually under
irrigation was only 50 to 60 percent of that allowable under previously adjudicated rights.7 7 However, the same study shows that
paper rights are already so much larger than supply that actual
use at only a fraction of the adjudicated rates uses all available
water.
Conversely, there are some rights, dating from the days before filing was required, that may not be of record.7" These unseen
icebergs lurk in the path of any present-day appropriator who
needs to know what supply he can count on.
One possible means of meeting the problems posed by inflated paper rights and unrecorded real rights is illustrated by a
Colorado statute adopted as part of the Water Right Determina7' Gardner & LeBaron, supra note 26, at 579 n.33.
7 Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. §
73-1-3 (1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-2 (1957).
11McIntire, The DispartityBetween State Water Rights Records and Actual Water
Use Patterns, 5 LAND & WATER L. Rav. 23, 27 (1970).
7s Dewsnup, Assembling Water Rights for a New Use, 17 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST.
613, 628 (1971).
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tion and Administration Act of 1969. 71 The statute" provides that
in every even-numbered year beginning with 1974 the division
engineer of each of the state's seven water divisions shall prepare
a tabulation of rights and priorities in his division. He may declare abandoned any right not fully applied to a beneficial use.
The list is to be published and a copy mailed to every owner of a
right. Protests may be made, and a revised list is then filed with
the state district court. After a period for further protests, the
"water judge" of the court conducts hearings on the filed list and
enters judgment and decrees on the rights. Failure to use a right
for a period of 10 years creates a rebuttable presumption that it
has been abandoned.
This procedure will serve to rescind known rights which are
not being used and to confirm known rights which are being used.
The same purpose is served to some extent by statutes of the
other two states which declare that water rights are voided
through abandonment by non-use for a period of 5 years;8 ' but the
Colorado procedure has the advantage of requiring a continuing
review of the status of all rights. The Colorado procedure could
also void unfiled rights. However, that has not been held to be
the effect of the statute, and it was probably not intended, since
the other provisions of the Act do not require filing in order to
acquire a right to appropriate. 2
In all three states groundwater is subject to appropriation
just as surface water is, although the terms may differ somewhat
from those for surface water because of the different nature of the
supply. Here all three states require permits from the state engineer before appropriation may begin. 3 Both Colorado and Wyoming have statutes allowing administrators to control groundwater use in certain circumstances. In Colorado a state groundwater
commission has authority to determine "designated groundwater
basins" in which immediate regulation of pumping is necessary.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to -02 (1973).
Id. § 37-92-402.
, UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-4 (1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-47 (1957).
82 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-305 (1973). The question of whether such a
voiding of unfiled rights would be a taking of property inconsistent with due process will
not be discussed here.
11Id. § 37-90-107; UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-4 (1953); WvO. STAT. ANN. § 41-122 (Cum.
Supp. 1973). Bullock v. Tracy, 4 Utah 2d 370, 294 P.2d 707 (1956), holds that underground
waters are subject to appropriation on the same terms as surface waters.
'
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Well permits will be granted only if the commission finds that
there is "unappropriated water" and that there will be no unreasonable injury to vested rights."4 Outside these basins, the application for a well permit is filed with the state engineer, who may
issue a permit if he finds that the well will not injure vested
rights. 5 The Wyoming provisions are similar. A state board of
control has power to designate "control areas" in which use is
equal to recharge, or the groundwater level is declining, or conflicts are foreseeable between users, or waste may occur, or in
which any other condition requires protection of the public interest.8 Within the control areas, a permit for appropriation of
underground water may be granted after a public hearing and
a finding by the state engineer that there are unappropriated
waters and that the use will not be detrimental to the public
interest. 7 Outside of the control areas, the state engineer must
grant a permit for any beneficial use unless he finds it not in the
public interest.8 8
"Unappropriated waters" in these statutes is not defined.
The term of course cannot mean any water not already used, since
any well that would not be a dry hole would then have to be
allowed. In Wyoming it probably means waters which may be
withdrawn without drawing down the water table, since any area
in which use is equal to or greater than recharge is included
among the control areas. However, other states have allowed appropriation from non-recharging basins, up to a set rate of drawdown per year.88 Whatever the exact definition of the term, it
seems safe to assume that the massive appropriations needed to
support a large oil shale industry would not be permissible from
an area in which groundwater withdrawal is already so closely
regulated.
It should be noted that the doctrine of priority may apply to
groundwater in a slightly different manner from its meaning with
respect to surface waters. Where surface water is limited, junior
appropriators' supplies are progressively shut off, beginning with
the most recent, until only those more senior appropriators are
4 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
85

§ 37-90-107 (1973).

Id. § 37-90-137.
WYo. STAT. ANN.

§

41-129 (Cum. Supp. 1971).

Id. § 41-140.
"

Id. § 41-142.
E.g., Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966).
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left whose use equals the supply. In the situations described
above where wells are drawing from a groundwater supply, new
wells are allowed until use equals recharge or the allowable drawdown rate, and no new wells are subsequently allowed. Thus there
are only "senior appropriators" and no juniors. Nevertheless,
where over-appropriation has already occurred, the administrator
may limit pumping by junior appropriators to protect senior
rights.90
2. "Diligence"
The filing of applications for water will not necessarily secure
a water supply even if water remains unappropriated. Applications which are not diligently pursued will not give rise to a right
to water. In the absence of statute "due diligence" is an issue of
fact, and the meaning of the term in any given case is therefore
determined through the judicial process. Filing statutes have affected this procedure to some extent in all three states.
In Colorado, since there is no filing requirement for rights in
surface water and all rights are decreed in special court adjudications, 1 diligence with respect to those rights is still a question for
the courts. With respect to well permits within designated
groundwater basins, the groundwater commission grants conditional permits to appropriate, which become final upon completion of construction if all conditions are complied with.92 There is
no express time limit placed upon construction, but it is apparently envisaged that such a limit will be one of the conditions set.
Permits for wells outside the designated groundwater basins expire 1 year after issuance if beneficial use has not occurred, but
the permit may be renewed for not more than 1 additional year.93
Thus, for groundwater the court's finding is replaced by the administrator's discretion; and in most cases that discretion is
strictly limited: most groundwater appropriations cannot date
back more than 2 years before actual use.
Since the lead time needed to establish an oil shale production facility is at least 2 years,94 and since most associated munici" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-111 (1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-132 (Cum. Supp.
1973).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-302 to -305 (1973).
12Id. §§ 37-90-107, 108.
,3Id. § 37-90-137.
" The Oil Shale Task Group assumed engineering and construction would require 3
years. Task Group, supra note 7, at 121.
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pal uses must develop over an even longer period, it is clear that
groundwater supplies for oil shale cannot be reserved in advance
in Colorado. Whether judicial definitions of diligence or administrative discretion offer any greater hope will be discussed below.
In both Utah and Wyoming an application must be filed with
the state engineer before any right of appropriation will arise.
Both states also set a limit on the time within which actual use
must occur after application to the engineer, but the effect in
both instances is to leave the real limit to the discretion of the
engineer.
In Utah the initial time limit is set by the engineer, apparently in his discretion, as the statute offers no criteria for his
guidance; and he may extend the time "on proper showing of
diligence or reasonable cause for delay" for up to 50 years from
the date of application! 5 In Wyoming, construction of works for
surface appropriations must be completed within 5 years, or any
shorter time set by the engineer, 8 and for appropriations for underground water use must begin within 3 years. 7 However, the
engineer may grant unlimited extensions "for good cause
shown." 8
The statutory grants of discretion are not unlimited, and
they should not be construed as granting power to extend time
indefinitely as a means of reserving water, whether for oil shale
development or any other use. The original purpose behind the
prior appropriation doctrine was to prevent reservation of water
which could not be put to immediate use. 9 The Utah statute's
reference to "diligence" indicates an intent to maintain the courtdeveloped standard, which in one much-quoted case was said to
consist of
that constancy or steadiness of purpose or labor which is usual with
men engaged in like enterprises, and who desire a speedy accomplishment of their designs,-such assiduity in the prosecution of the
enterprise as will manifest to the world a bona fide intention to
complete it within a reasonable time.' °°
"
"

UTAH CODE
WYO. STAT.

ANN. § 73-3-12 (1953).
ANN. § 4-206 (Cum. Supp. 1973).

Id. § 41-142.
Ild. § 41-206.
, See Dewsnup, supra note 78, at 616.
Ophir Silver Mining Co. v. Carpenter, 4 Nev. 534, 546, 97 Am. Dec. 550, 555 (1869).
"
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Whatever the exact limits of the engineer's discretion may be in
either state, they probably could not be held to extend to cases
in which an oil shale lessee had filed for water on a lease which
he was maintaining by payments but by no labor which would
actually advance production of shale oil. In the convincing Utah
case of Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Association,""1
the Utah Supreme Court held that the state engineer could not
grant further extensions of time to an appropriator whose only
showing was that his project was feasible, where nothing had been
done to put it into effect for nearly 40 years after the initial filing,
not because of construction difficulties but because of delay in
financing. The court stated that such "procedural stagnation"
should not be allowed to prevent others from using water. (The
fact that extensions had been granted for nearly 40 years is not
an indication that developers can or do actually reserve water for
such periods. The existence of a permit in such circumstances
might only give the holder a false sense of security: a large-scale
appropriation for oil shale might go unchallenged for years if it
existed only on paper, but it would almost certainly be challenged
by holders of conflicting rights if attempts were made to put it
into effect. The question then is whether it could survive court
review. Carbon Canal Co. indicates that it could not.)
3. Transfer of Rights
Where unappropriated waters cannot be found, water may be
acquired by acquisition of existing appropriation rights. All appropriation states consider water rights at least in theory to be
property and therefore saleable and. transferable by other
means.' 2 Rights may be transferred in all three of the oil shale
states, at least in some circumstances.' 0 3 Most transfers may be
expected to be by purchase. Other means, such as loans and
exchanges are possible, just as they would be with any other
property right; but administrative approval may be required.' 4
10119 Utah 2d 6, 425 P.2d 405 (1967).
1*0Trelease, Changes and Transfers of Water Rights, 13 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST.
507 (1967).
"IsSee, e.g., Arnett v. Linhart, 21 Colo. 188, 40 P. 355 (1895); Salt Lake City v.
McFarland, 1 Utah 2d 257, 265 P.2d 626 (1954); Hunziker v. Knowlton, 78 Wyo. 241, 322
P.2d 141 (1958).
I0NSee CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-83-105 (1973) (authorizing loans for a limited time
upon notice to water commissioner); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-5 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (authorizing state engineer to approve petitions for exchanges).
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However, since oil shale needs are year-round and permanent,
loans are not likely to be much used; and exchanges involve no
problems fundamentally different from those raised by purchase.
Therefore only purchases will be discussed in detail here.
The importance of water to the economy of arid states
quickly led to its transfer being hedged about with legal and
administrative precautions, so that under existing doctrines
transfer is subject to a number of difficulties. The major barriers
are those involving protection of junior appropriators, seasonal
rights, appurtenance of water rights to land, and preferred uses.
a. Protection of JuniorAppropriators
One hurdle which the states have erected in the path of a
would-be purchaser in an attempt to protect other users is a
requirement of administrative approval of certain transfers. Utah
statutes require approval of the state engineer for any permanent
change in the place of diversion or use, though not for a change
in the use itself if the location remains unchanged. 05 Nearly all
water rights purchased for oil shale use must involve a change of
place of use, if not of diversion, since existing uses in the oil shale
areas (except perhaps existing municipal uses, which are unlikely
to be purchaseable) are unlikely to apply a large enough quantity
of water in the desired area. Wyoming statutes require permission
of the state board of control for any change in the use or place of

use. 106
Alongside the administrative protections there exists a judicial doctrine that vested water rights must be protected in any
transfer. The problem arises in the following manner. Few uses
of water consume all the water which is diverted. The unconsumed portion which returns to the stream is called "return
flow." This flow is then subject to appropriation by other users.
Thus, if an irrigator diverts 8 cfs, of which 4 cfs finds its way back
to the stream, that 4 cfs will augment the flow downstream and
can be diverted a second time. The downstream appropriator
acquires a right to this 4 cfs, and his right must be protected. If
the upstream irrigation right is sold to an industrial user, still
with the same place of use, who diverts the same 8 cfs but consumes 7 cfs, the downstream user is damaged by the loss of 3 cfs
...UTAH CODE ANN.
'0' WYO. STAT. ANN.

§ 73-3-3 (1953).
§§ 41-4, 4.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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to which he has a vested right.
The same problem may arise with a change in place of use.
If on the same stream there is a third appropriator, upstream
from our irrigator and possessing a right junior to his, when the
stream flow is only 8 cfs, the upstream junior cannot consume any
water because the irrigator has a right to divert all 8 cfs. But if
flow is above 8 cfs, the upstream junior may divert (within the
extent of his right) whatever amount will return a flow of 8 cfs to
the stream. If the upstream junior has a right to divert 16 cfs, of
which he consumes half, and the stream flow is 16 cfs, he can
divert his full amount without interfering with the senior right.
But if the senior right is transferred upstream from this second
junior, and the flow remains 16 cfs, diversion of 8 cfs under the
senior right with a return flow of 4 cfs will leave only 12 cfs in the
stream, and the second junior will be injured.' 7
In order to protect the junior appropriators in such situations, transfer of the senior right is prevented. Courts have ameliorated the limitation by allowing transfers of part of the right,
to the extent that no other user would be harmed. The same
result is directed by statute in Utah, where the state engineer is
directed to approve changes in part, if that may be done without
impairing vested rights. 0 8 Thus in Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co.' 09
an irrigator owned an adjudicated right to divert 16 cfs during the
irrigation season. He sold this right to the City of Fort Collins for
municipal use, and the city converted the right to a storage right.
Upon protest by other users, the court found that the irrigator
had never diverted more than 8 cfs, and furthermore that he
diverted a maximum of 360 acre-feet per year for a use which was
25 percent efficient (75 percent return flow), with a resulting
consumption of 95 acre-feet per year. The city, however, returned
only 50 percent of its diversions to the stream. The city's right was
therefore reduced to a maximum of 8 cfs rate of flow, and a total
yearly flow of 19 acre-feet, to achieve a consumption of 95 acrefeet. This flow could be diverted and stored only during the period
April 15 to October 15, the period in which the irrigation right
could be used. The seller, then, was found to have owned only
07

For a case discussing both of these changes (and disallowing them), see Vogel v.

Minnesota Canal & Reservoir Co., 47 Colo. 534, 107 P. 1108 (1910).
"' UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-3 (1953).
1 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962).
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one-half of his paper right, and the purchaser was able to divert
only one-half of that.
Purchase of existing rights for oil shale development is likely
to involve both of the problems which the City of Fort Collins
faced in Chaffee Ditch. The major problem is that most existing
rights in the oil shale areas are for irrigation, a low-efficiency use
with return flows of 75 to 90 percent. Oil shale production is a
much more efficient use. Most estimates are that over 60 percent
of total diversions will be consumed; and direct processing and
upgrading uses will consume 90 percent of the water diverted to
them."10 An oil shale processor with 90 percent efficiency buying
rights from irrigators who had 10 percent efficiency would have
to purchase rights to 90 cfs in order to divert only 10 cfs! (The
irrigator would return 9 cfs and consume 1 out of every 10 diverted. But the oil shale processor will consume 9 and return only
1. Since he must return the full 9 cfs for every 1 he diverts, he
must purchase 9 times the amount he actually requires and divert
only 1 of the 9. The others he must send down the stream.) The
only possible way to avert this difficulty is for the oil shale processor to purchase the right of every user who has appropriated any
part of the return flow from the water rights he has purchased,
except those uses which do not add up to more than his own direct
return flow. This will probably significantly affect the price he
must pay. The price of prior rights can be expected to be somewhere between their value for irrigation and that for oil shale
processing. The latter is presumably higher, or there will be no
sale. But if the processor need purchase only a few rights, the
price can be expected to be nearer the value for irrigation, since
the purchaser can always go elsewhere if one irrigator will not sell.
If the processor must purchase a large fraction of the existing
rights in order to acquire a sufficient supply, the price can be
expected to approach the value of water in his use, i.e., the price
which would raise the total price of shale oil above the market
level, since every seller knows that the buyer will probably be
forced to deal with him eventually. The fact that the buyer need
not purchase 100 percent of the rights keeps this from being a
classic "holdout" problem; but if the buyer needs any significant
proportion of the total flow of the stream, sufficient concerted
action can easily arise to affect the price he must pay for rights.
11See

text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
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b. Seasonal Rights and Storage
Oil shale developers seeking to purchase existing rights will
also face the other difficulty illustrated in Chaffee Ditch: many
existing water rights are seasonal."' Purchase of these rights gives
the purchaser a right to divert water only during the period allowed under the original use.
Oil shale is not a seasonal industry. The high capital investment required would make it uneconomical to shut down production during periods of low water availability. Thus it would be
necessary to follow the procedure of the City of Fort Collins in
Chaffee Ditch and smooth out the supply by storing water during
the irrigation season and using it during the remainder of the
year. In theory, this does not present any insuperable difficulties.
In all three states a storage right is an appropriative right, to be
acquired like any other; and conversion of existing rights to storage can be done while retaining the original priority dates. 2
However, acquisition of storage rights as well as other water rights
has already been going forward for many years, with the result
that the most economically-feasible storage sites have already
been put to use, and also with the result that off-season flows in
many cases have already been fully appropriated for storage for
irrigation.'
Some storage rights have been acquired by oil companies for
oil shale uses,"' and the companies probably will be able to share
storage in public works reservoirs in other instances,"1 especially
since public works reservoirs typically include a large allocation
for unspecified municipal and industrial uses."'
"IA basic part of the appropriation right is the period of use. E.g., Cache La Poudre
Res. Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 25 Colo. 161, 53 P. 331 (1898); Hardy v. Beaver
County Irrig. Co., 65 Utah 28, 234 P. 524 (1924).
"I Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. §
73-3-2 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-26 to -46 (1957).
"I This has occurred, for example, on the Sevier River in Utah, where year round
storage rights take the entire flow of the stream for use during the irrigation season.
Dewsnup, supra note 78, at 623.
1
Cooley, supra note 52, at 138.
Balcomb, Availability of Water for Oil Shale Development, 63 COLO. SCHOOL OF
MINES Q., Oct. 1968, at 109; Delaney, supra note 42.
"'0See the projects listed by Balcomb, supra note 114; Delaney, supra note 42; Moses,
supra note 29.
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c.

Appurtenant to Land

It was established early throughout most of the West that
appropriative rights to water were appurtenant to the land upon
which the water was used." 7 However, the general rule now is
that, whether or not the right is "appurtenant" in theory, it may
be transferred separately from the land. The rule has long been
established in Colorado since the case of Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs."' In Utah water rights appurtenant to land have
been made separately conveyable by statute."9 In Wyoming the
situation is somewhat more complicated. A Wyoming statute still
declares that "water rights cannot be detached from the lands,
place or purpose for which they are acquired, without loss of
priority."'"" In unadulterated form such a statute would obviously
make it impossible to develop oil shale production by means of
purchased rights to water. Nonetheless, enough statutory exceptions have crept in over the years that separate conveyance of
water rights for oil shale should be possible. Storage rights are
now excepted from the appurtenance requirement, 2 ' as are rights
which are changed to an "industrial" use or other preferred use.',2
Thus the transfer contemplated-purchase of irrigation rights for
use in oil shale processing or allied municipal uses-should present no problem. One example of such a change was the purchase
of four irrigation rights for use in a taconite mill in Wyoming:
The water supply for the mill was to be drawn from Rock Creek, and
a small reservoir was constructed above the mill site. Water could
be stored in this reservoir without too much interference with the
rights of other appropriators on Rock Creek, but Rock Creek is a
tributary of the Sweetwater, upon which a large number of ranchers
depend, and the Sweetwater is itself a tributary of the North Platte,
which is fully appropriated. The steel company purchased four irrigation water rights totaling approximately ten cubic feet per second
from ranchers on the Sweetwater above the confluence with Rock
Creek. The method of operation is to store Rock Creek water in the
reservoir during the period when these water rights would have originally permitted the withdrawal from the Sweetwater. The ditches
"'

1 W. HurCHINS, supra note 70, at 454-55.
16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313 (1891).

...

UTAH CODE ANN.

I" Wyo.STAT. ANN.
12

§ 73-1-10 (1953).
§ 41-2 (1957).

Id. § 41-37.

122

Id. §§ 41-2, -3.

'"

Trelease, supra note 102, at 517-18.
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on the formerly irrigated land are closed so that the ten feet formerly
diverted are left in the stream to replace the water being retained
by the dam on Rock Creek. Analysis discloses that the nature of the
use has changed from an agricultural to an industrial use; the place
of use was changed from the land on the Sweetwater to the mill on
Rock Creek, the point of diversion was changed from the Sweetwater
to Rock Creek; the method of use was changed from direct use to
storage, and the source was changed from the main stem of the
stream to a tributary.'2

d. Referred Uses
A final barrier to acquisition of water for oil shale development may be raised by state laws giving preference to certain
uses. A "preferred use" in effect represents a legislative or, in
some cases, a constitutional decision that such a use is more
valuable than any other. Such decisions were typically made so
long ago that there is no discernible relationship to present-day
economic values, if indeed economic value was considered at all.
The Colorado state constitution contains a clause giving
preference to domestic uses of water, followed in order by agricultural uses and then manufacturing.'2 4 However, the Colorado
Supreme Court has held that in the event a junior appropriator
with a preferred use exercises his "right" over a senior inferior
use, he must pay "just compensation. ' ' 25 This requirement,
which is not expressed in the constitution, effectively negates the
preference, since an economically less valuable preferred use will
not displace a more valuable but "inferior" use.
The situation is different in Utah. That state gives preference
by statute to domestic uses first and second to agriculture.' 6 This
statute once required that just compensation be paid if an inferior
right was taken for a preferred use, but that provision was deleted
in 1903.' The statute has not been construed by the state supreme court, although that court has said that the legislature
considered these two uses to be the most beneficial to which water
could be applied.' 2 8 Thus it could be possible for an oil shale
producer in Utah to find its water supply appropriated out from
under it for relatively valueless agricultural uses. It might be that
124COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
' Town of Sterling
,2'UTAH CODE ANN.

v. Pawnee Ditch Ext. Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908).
§ 73-3-21 (1953).

1v Ch. 100, § 54 [1903] Utah Laws.
I Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943).
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legislative action would swiftly follow any such appropriation;
but legislative action beforehand would do much to ease the
minds of potential investors in oil shale development.
Wyoming also has some statutory preferred uses which take
priority over all others and for which others may be condemned;
but "just compensation" must be paid. 29' The provision, like that
of the Colorado constitution, is therefore innocuous. Furthermore, the order of preference in Wyoming is (1) Drinking water
"for both man and beast;" (2) municipal; (3) railway use, laundry, bathing, refrigeration, and steam power plants; and (4) industrial uses.'13 The last could presumably be construed to include oil shale production, just as it included taconite ore processing in the Rock Creek-Sweetwater change described above; and
much of the water requirement for shale oil production will be for
expanded municipal uses and other of the preferred uses. Therefore the Wyoming preference system should if anything be beneficial to a shale oil industry.
D.

Water Delivery Rights

One escape which has been suggested from the complications
involved in the transfer of appropriative rights is the purchase of
water delivery rights. 3 ' These are not appropriative rights, but
simply contract rights, analogous to the right of a homeowner to
receive domestic water from a municipal water company. Various
forms of mutual, public, and privately-owned commercial water
supply enterprises exist throughout the West. 3 ' They are alike in
that the enterprise has a supply of water which it delivers to
individual subscribers or stockholders. What the user has is a
right to receive delivery of a share of the supply as long as he pays
his water rent or owns a share of stock, while the "appropriative
right" belongs to the enterprise as a whole. In the simplest case,
the enterprise will own only one appropriation right, the water
from which is divided among its users in proportion to their payments. The enterprise could conceivably hold a number of separate rights, in which case each user would receive a prorated share
of each right.
"'

Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-4 (1957).

"=

Id. § 41-3.

"' E.g., Dewsnup, supra note 78, at 619-27.
"3 See 1 W. HUTCHiNS, supra note 70, at 550 et seq.
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Transfers within such enterprises take place regularly, either
by sale of an individual delivery right for a particular year or by
sale of "shares" in the enterprise.3 3 The main advantage of such
transfers is that they avoid the need to consider junior rights,
since transfers within the limits of the enterprise will ordinarily
cancel one another out.
If, for example, a transfer of X's share to Y downstream, by changing the point of diversion, reduces the return flow in the area
between X and Y but increases it below Y, the only consequence is
that the intervening farmers will receive additional water to replace
the missing return flow from X, while farmers below Y will receive
their entitlement from the augmented return flow.'34

This is not true where total return flow is diminished, such
as when either percent consumption increases, or transfer is outside the normal return-flow limits of the enterprise.3 5 It has already been noted that both of these conditions are likely to be
present where irrigation rights are sold for oil shale uses. In such
a case, appropriators outside the enterprise will be affected, and
the transfer will raise all the problems involved in transfer of the
appropriation right itself. The transfer may appear simplified in
that consolidation of the numerous delivery rights under one
enterprise-appropriation has already reduced the number of appropriators involved, and water taken from holders of delivery
rights can be compensated by cash payments handled through
the established management of the enterprise. But where the
return flow from the enterprise as a whole has already been appropriated by a number of other users, the advantages may be more
theoretical than real.
E.

Federal Reserved Rights

In addition to appropriation rights, the other major class of
water rights in the Western states is the federal reserved rights
to water on lands which have been withdrawn from the public
domain. The federal government owns 72 percent of the oil shale
lands, containing an estimated 80 percent of the shale oil. 3' It has
I- Dewsnup, supra note 78, at 623 nn.16 & 17 described such transfers occurring in
the operation of mutual water companies on the Sevier River in Utah, with prices for
yearly water varying from $2 to $20 per acre-foot depending upon demand.
1' C. Meyers & R. Posner, Market Transfers of Water Rights, 1971, at 35-36 (Review
Draft of National Water Commission Legal Study No. 4, Final Report) [hereinafter cited
as Meyers & Posner].
"
Id. at 36.
"'
Legal Study, supra note 6, at 11.
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been suggested that federal reserved rights will provide water for
development of federal shale. If this does not occur, the other face
of this Jekyll-and-Hyde doctrine could threaten the water supply
of any oil shale development on either federal or private lands.
1. History and Extent of the Right
The extent of the federal reserved right to water has been
stated as follows:
[W]hen the public lands of the United States were set aside as
national forests, national parks, and the like, there was reserved for
each enclave enough of the then unappropriated water appurtenant
to the lands reserved to effectuate whatever purpose the reserved
lands were set aside to serve, and this constitutes a water right with
a priority of the date the lands were reserved.' 37

The doctrine orginated with Indian water rights,'38 and to
date almost the only applications of any importance have been
for Indian reservations,3 3 but it is widely hoped or feared that it
will have an effect well beyond its beginnings. Such hopes and
fears must be strengthened by the allusion of the U.S. Supreme
Court to "naval petroleum and oil shale reserves which, if ever
developed, would require water to accomplish the federal purpose
140
for which the reservations were made."'
In the case which established the right, Winters v. United
States,'4' the Supreme Court held that an Indian tribe whose
reservation was established by treaty with the United States was
the beneficiary of an implicit right to withdraw from streams
upon the reservation sufficient water to sustain them in the way
of life contemplated by the treaty. This water is exempt from
appropriation under state laws and is subject only to the rights
of appropriators whose use predated the treaty.
In Arizona v. California4 ' the Court extended the reserved
right to Indian reservations created by Executive Order and to
other federal reservations. The Court upheld the Master's conclu"I'Corker, Federal-State Relations in Water Rights Adjudication and
Administration, 17

ROCKY

MT.MINERAL L. INST. 579, 582 (1972).

W'
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
"' The major cases are discussed in Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to
the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST. 631 (1971).
40 United States v. District Court in and for Water Division No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529
(1971).
207 U.S. 564 (1908).
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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sion as to quantity of water reserved for Indian use: "He found
that the water was intended to satisfy the future as well as the
present needs of the Indian Reservations and ruled that enough
water was reserved to irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage
on the reservations.'1 3 And the Court upheld his finding that
there was intended to be reserved "water sufficient for the future
requirements of the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the
Havasu Lake Wildlife Refuge, the Imperial National Wildlife
Refuge and the Gila National Forest."''
While it has been said that the "practicably irrigable
acreage" standard of Arizona v. Californiasettles once and for all
the question of the scope of Indian water rights,'45 it of course
cannot do so for other reservations where irrigation will never be
carried on, such as game refuges and national forests. The Court
did not bind itself to that standard, but merely upheld the Master's finding on intent at the time of the reservation. The holding
is consistent with the dictum in United States v. District Court
in and for Water Division No.5, 46 which looks to the original
purpose of the reservation to determine the use for which water
may be taken. We must thus fall back upon the "purpose of the
reservation" as the only true guide. With respect to oil shale the
relevant question becomes whether development of oil shale
could be considered within the purposes of the reservation upon
which the water is to be used.
2. Nature of Reservation
Federal reservations of land have been made for a number of
purposes throughout the Western states. Arizona v. California
considered not only Indian reservations, but also a national recreation area, two wildlife refuges, and a national forest. Another
court "7 has considered reserved rights for a military reservation;
and the Supreme Court has suggested that the doctrine applies
Id. at 600.
' Id. at 601.
Bloom, Indian "Paramount"Rights to Water Use, 16 RoCKY MT. MINERAL L. INST.
669, 683 (1971).
401 U.S. 527 (1971).
'
Nevada ex rel. Shamburger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958). A
naval ammunition depot was created by executive order. The order made no mention of
water rights, but the court held that the United States need not secure a state permit to
drill a well even though there would be interference with the water supply of a nearby
"

town.
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to naval oil and petroleum reserves. There are also important
withdrawals of land for grazing districts, reclamation districts,
public springs and waterholes, stock driveways, coal, and for clas48
sification of lands.'
Although there appears to be no reason why water could not
be reserved in connection with any of the above, some of these
withdrawals-grazing, stock driveways, wildlife refuges-appear
to offer no reasonable argument that mining or oil shale development was envisaged as a purpose of their creation. The same may
be said of public springs and waterholes, specifically withdrawn
for the purpose of insuring public access to stock watering places.
Use of the water for oil shale production would be contrary to that
purpose.
Similarly, withdrawals of military reservations may give rise
to a right to waters for use by military personnel or for servicerelated purposes,'49 but probably not for oil shale development. If,
for example, a bombing range is created, it is difficult to infer an
intent to develop minerals on that site.
Several kinds of withdrawals of land do offer an argument
that water was reserved for mineral development.
a. National Forests
National forests are the most important federal land reservation in terms of area or of water availability. Forest service lands,
including national parks, yield approximately 59 percent of total
annual runoff from the 11 coterminous western states. 150 In Colorado they contribute 94 percent of the total natural runoff.' 5' Oil
shale lands occur within national forests in all three oil shale
states. ,52
Creation of national forests was authorized by Congress in
1891,' Sa and in 1897 an act was passed limiting their creation to
the following purposes:
Legal Study, supra note 6, at 78-84.
'4, Nevada ex rel. Shamburger v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958). The

only purpose stated in the withdrawal order in that case was "for the development of and
use as an ammunition depot."
5 PUBLIc LAND L. REV. COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 141 (1970).
C. Wheatley, Jr., Study of the Development, Management and Use of Water
Resources on the Public Lands, 1969, at 405 (prepared for the U.S. Pub. Land L. Rev.
Comm'n.).
Legal Study, supra note 6, at 83.
'
16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970).
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[To improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for
the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to
154
furnish a continuous supply of timber ....

It seems doubtful that "the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows" could by itself be construed to indicate an
intent to reserve water. Some use for the water is surely necessary. If the only use for water, the only purpose in "securing
favorable conditions of water flows," is to raise timber, the phrase
is redundant. Statutes are normally construed to avoid redundancy. And the structure of the language clearly makes "water
flows" an alternative purpose to protection of the forests, not a
subcomponent.
It may be that uses for the water which would give meaning
to the phrase "securing favorable conditions of water flows" are
those found in the further provisions of the 1897 Act:
All waters within the boundaries of national forests may be used for
domestic, mining, milling, or irrigation purposes, under the laws of
the State wherein such national forests are situated, or under the
laws of the United States and the rules and regulations established
thereunder. 5 '

If this section does state uses for which "favorable conditions of
water flows" are to be preserved, then mineral development is one
of the purposes for which a forest may have been reserved, in the
absence of any specific provision to the contrary in the Executive
Order creating each forest. Traditionally, Forest Service policy
has been to allow mining.
On the other hand the phrase "securing favorable conditions
of water flows" could refer to water flows outside the forest as well
as within. (For example, it could be argued that the purpose of
having the forest is to preserve the watershed rather than reserving the water supply to preserve the forest.) In that case, one
could not infer an intent to reserve water for mineral development.
There is no clear choice between these possible readings of
the statute. But the fact that the Congress which enacted a statute delimiting the purposes for which national forests could be
created also stated that water within them could be used for
Id. § 475.
" Id. § 481.
154
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mineral development is at least some evidence that water was
intended to be reserved for that use.
b. Naval Oil Shale Reserves
The lands withdrawn expressly as oil shale reserves are in a
different category with respect to reserved water rights. Here
there can be no doubt that the purpose of the reservation was to
insure that oil from shale would be available in time of need.
Even though the withdrawal order itself does not mention water,
it is clear that water is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
reservation. The Secretary of the Navy is authorized to explore,
prospect, conserve, develop, use, and operate naval petroleum
reserves in his discretion, including
the production of ...

oil shale and products thereof whenever and

to the extent that the Secretary . . . finds that it is needed for

national defense and the production is authorized by a joint resolution of Congress."

Oil Shale Reserves No. 1, in Colorado, and No. 2, in Utah,
were created by Executive Order of December 6, 1916. Reserve
No. 3, in Colorado, was established by Executive Order of September 27, 1924. These are traversed by the Colorado, Green and
White Rivers. The dictum of Justice Douglas in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Water Division No. 5 strongly supports the
conclusion that any appropriation from those rivers subsequent
to December 6, 1916, is subject to being taken for development
of the oil shale reserves under the federal government's reserved
water right.
c. Oil Shale Lands Withdrawn from Leasing
One of the most interesting questions of reserved rights arises
in connection with the withdrawal by Executive Order of all oil
shale lands from leasing or other disposal. The Executive Order
stated:
Under authority and pursuant to the provisions of the act of
Congress approved June 25, 1910 .
amended by the act of August 24, 1912, .

.
.

. [the Pickett Act], as
. it is hereby ordered that

subject to valid existing rights the deposits of oil shale, and lands
containing such deposits owned by the United States, be, and the
same are hereby, temporarily withdrawn from lease or other disposal
and reserved for the purposes of investigation, examination, and
classification.
IN 10 U.S.C. § 7422 (1970).
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This order shall continue until revoked by the President or by
act of Congress. 7

This "temporary" withdrawal has never been revoked. Its purposes are clearly stated: investigation, examination, and classification. There is no mention of water, and, more significantly,
none of oil shale development. The language of the order cannot
support a construction that development was intended, and it
cannot be inferred from the mere act of withdrawal as is possible
for the naval oil shale reserves. One does not withdraw lands from
disposal in order to develop them unless one intends to do the
developing oneself; and there is no evidence that federal development of oil shale has ever been seriously considered, except for
the lands reserved for defense purposes.
The expressed purposes of the withdrawal are not such as to
require large quantities of water. "Minerals classification involves core drilling, surface examination, and surface mapping."1' 5 8 Thus the argument that all federal oil shale lands carry
with them their own protected water supply, intriguing though it
may be, must fail.
d. Indian Reservations
Development of oil shale or indeed any industry on Indian
lands could bring the reserved rights question back where it
began. There is one Indian reservation on oil shale lands, the
Uintah and Ouray Reservation in Utah,'59 created under an Act
of Congress in 1864,6 ° for "the permanent settlement and exclusive occupation" of the tribes, who were moved there from preexisting reservations in other areas. The Act also appropriated
$30,000 "for the purpose of making agricultural improvements"
on the reservation, "for the comfort of the Indians who may inhabit the same." In 1902 legislation was passed to allow specific
amounts of land to be alloted to each tribe member. The remaining unalloted lands were restored to the public domain. 6 ' In 1934
Congress enacted legislation allowing the Secretary of the Interior
to withdraw the unalloted lands once again and restore them to
7 Exec. Order No. 5327, 29 Fed. Reg. 6655 (1916).
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR BULL. No. 537, THE CLASSIFICATION OF PUBLIC LANDS 50
(1913).
Legal Study, supra note 6, at 84-85.
Act of May 5, 1864, ch. 77, 13 Stat. 63.
Act of May 27, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-125, 32 Stat. 245, 263.
'5'
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the reservation, subject to valid intervening private rights and
claims.' Under this Act, the Secretary withdrew lands in Colorado and Utah which included much of the oil shale in those
states. Ultimately restoration of all lands in Colorado was blocked
by Congress, but 217,000 acres of land in Utah were restored to
tribal ownership in 1945. This reservation now represents the
largest single tract of oil shale lands outside the Bureau of Land
Management, which controls the public domain lands.'63
The erratic history of withdrawal leaves the date, if not the
extent, of federal reserved rights on the reservation somewhat
uncertain. Is the date of the right 1864, 1934, or 1945? The first,
obviously, would predate most other water rights in existence.
However, restoration was by the Act of 1934 made "subject to
intervening rights." The reference may have been to intervening
rights in land, but it cannot be limited to those, since the federal
right to water dates only from the uninterrupted reservation of
the land. At least, there has been no suggestion that a second
reservation may relate back to the date of an earlier one; and the
Supreme Court's decree in Arizona v. California suggested that
where lands had been made part of an Indian reservation on
different dates, the priority date of the reserved water right on
each part was the date of that accession of land." 4
Whatever the date of the federal reserved right on the reservation, it obviously will predate some other rights, and the question will therefore arise whether that right applies to water used
for oil shale development.
The question must be answered by the same "purpose of the
reservation" test that applies to other withdrawn lands and was
applied to the Indian reservations in Arizona v. California.65 It
will be recalled that in that case the right was measured by "irrigable acreage," but that in applying that measure the Supreme
62 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970). The same act allowed the Secretary of the Interior to
make regulations for forestry and livestock grazing but said nothing about mineral development except that it reopened the Papago Reservation in Arizona to mineral entry of all
kinds, subject to lease payments to the Indians. No such provision was made with respect
to the oil shale lands of the Uintah Reservation, which had been withdrawn as part of the
general oil shale withdrawal. There is thus no affirmative showing that Congress considered mineral development likely on the Uintah Reservation, but there is some evidence
that it had in mind the possibility of general mineral development on Indian reservations.
...Legal Study, supra note 6, at 84.
"-1 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
165
Id.
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Court merely upheld the finding of the Master that withdrawal
of the lands was intended to reserve water only for irrigation.
Arizona contended that the quantity reserved should be measured by the Indians' "reasonably foreseeable needs."'' 6 The
Court rejected this argument, which it said,
in fact, means by the number of Indians. How many Indians there
will be and what their future needs will be can only be guessed. We
have concluded, as did the Master, that the only feasible and fair
way by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured
is irrigable acreage.' 7

Although the Court rejected a measure that was based upon
the number of Indians, it did not say that some other measure
based upon the originally contemplated use of the land would be
rejected. A different measure than irrigable acreage thus could,
and should, be used to measure Indian reserved water rights
where it appears that the intent at the time of reservation was to
have water for some purpose other than irrigation.
It probably will not be possible to conclude, as at least one
writer has done,' 68 that Indians may assert reserved rights to
water for industrial purposes. There may be exceptional cases,
but normally industrial development would not have been foreseen at the time of withdrawal of the reservation.
If there are exceptions, the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
may be one of them. It cannot be seriously argued that oil shale
development was foreseen and intended as a way of life on the
reservation in 1864. The original act creating the reservation appears to have contemplated that the Indians would live by agriculture. But if part of the reservation dates to 1934 or 1945, the
argument with respect to that part is less one-sided. The potential for development of oil shale was well known by 1934. The
withdrawal of federal oil shale lands from leasing had occurred 4
years earlier. Development of oil on Indian lands had already
occurred in Oklahoma.' 9 A respectable argument could be made
that lands reserved in 1934 or thereafter carried with them the
rights to water for development by means other than irrigation,
including the development of oil shale.
"I Id. at 600.
167

Id.

"I W. Veeder, Winters Doctrine Rights in the Missouri River Basin, 1965 (unpublished manuscript) cited in Bloom, supra note 145, at 691 & n.25.
"' See, e.g., Parker v. Riley, 250 U.S. 66 (1919), concerning Indian homestead rights
in oil and gas leases granted by Indians.
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CONCLUSION

Oil shale production at a rate which amounts to a significant
part of national demand for oil will require more water than will
remain in the unappropriated supply of the oil shale regions by
the time large-scale production can begin. This means that transfers of existing rights will be necessary to allow production on that
scale.
Existing water law doctrines of the oil shale states raise numerous barriers to the easy transfer of water rights. These could
significantly lower oil shale production by raising the cost of
water or barring transfer completely. Production could also be
delayed by making it necessary to resort to court procedures in
order to transfer water rights.
A few of the barriers can be easily lowered. For example, the
Utah statute making agriculture a preferred right could be revoked, or a statute passed requiring compensation for the right
taken if a preferred right is exercised. Other barriers will be more
difficult to raze. The protection of junior rights under the appropriation system cannot be easily reversed once those rights have
been granted. It has been suggested 7 ° that a purchaser should be
granted rights in his own return flow, since there would then be
no other appropriator who could object to further transfers of the
right, and the cost of transfers would thus be lowered. This is
quite correct. But the suggested change would do nothing to ease
the first transfer where the return flow is already fully or partially
appropriated.
It has also been suggested' 7 ' that procedures should be established for forced mutualization of a water supply (similar to
forced unitization of an oil field) and for auction rather than costfree appropriation of unappropriated waters. These procedures
could significantly ease the difficulty, and hence the cost, of
transferring rights. Without some such radical overhaul of the
water laws, water for oil shale may prove difficult to obtain.
The doctrine of federal reserved rights offers hope that a
water supply sufficient for shale oil production can be obtained
at least on certain lands-certainly on the naval oil shale reserves, and possibly on national forests and the Uintah and Ouray
Ito
171

Meyers & Posner, supra note 133, at 27-32.
Id. at viii-ix, 37-38, 42-43.
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Indian Reservation. But the doctrine is a two-edged sword. If it
offers hope of development in those locations, it threatens development in others by cutting off private water rights which could
be used for shale development on other lands.
At the very least, the federal reserved right should not be
asserted without compensation for established rights, even where
those rights are in theory subject to the federal right. Where water
is already appropriated, there will be heavy political pressure not
to take it from established users. An attempt to assert the right
without compensation, especially for use by major oil companies,
could lead to congressional reaction including abrogation of the
right. Compensation might be money well invested. In effect it
would amount to a means of achieving transfers of water at market value, without the additional costs imposed by the barriers
to transfer in the appropriation system. That would not be the
worst of results.

OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT AND WATER LAW
Appendiix A

EXPLANATION

Area underlain by the Green
River Formation in which the

ofl shale is unaotorarsed
low grade

or

Area underlain by oil shale
more than 10 feet thick, which
yields 25 gallons or more oil
per ton of shale

Source Geological Survey Corcular 52J

Distribution of Oil Shale in the Green River Formation, Colorado, Utah and
Wyoming.
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Appendix B

NOTE
PRICE FIXING ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: FREE SPEECH
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CONFLICTS WITH SPENDING
LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED IN THE FEDERAL ELECTION
CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF

1974

INTRODUCTION

In the years 1972 to 1974, the political institutions of the
United States sustained the greatest scandal in our country's 200
years of existence. Watergate brought out all that is bad in political campaign financing: Individual donors' giving large sums of
money to win influence of ambassadorships;' a former cabinet
member's serving as a bag man, collecting illegal contributions
from corporations fearful of retaliation if no donation were given;2
large, unneeded sums of money's sitting in diverse bank accounts
and private safes, eventually used to finance break-ins and hush
payments. 3 It was these aspects of political fundraising, as well
as others, that led one prominent Illinois fundraiser to the conclusion that "fundraising is a seamy, tawdry business, but it must
be done." 4
As the costs of campaigns continue to rise, the necessity for
fundraising becomes more apparent. In 1968, approximately $300
million was spent on all elections held in the United States,' while
in 1972, the figure rose to $400 million! The 1972 primary and
general election candidates for the House and Senate spent
$77,255,078 for the period of April 7 through December 31.1 The
See TIME, April 16, 1973, at 8.
See Hearings Before the Select Committee on PresidentialCampaign Activities of
the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5494-521 (1973).
1 See SUBMISSION OF RECORDED PRESIDENTIAL CONVERSATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON 188-207 (1974)
(March 31, 1973, meeting between Richard Nixon and John Dean) (transcripts of White
House tapes).
I Conversation with Angelo G. Geocaris, fundraiser for Illinois Governor Daniel
Walker, winter 1973.
H. ALEXANDER, POLITICAL FINANCING 38 (1972).
Hearings on S.372 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 219 (1973) (statement by H. E. Alexander)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
' Common Cause Press Release, "Total Campaign Finances in the 1972 Congressional
Races," Report No. 1, Sept. 13, 1973, on file with the Denver Law Journal.
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Senate Commerce Committee in 1971 declared that one purpose
of campaign reform was to "halt the spiraling cost of campaigning
for public office." ' Campaign spending seemed to be getting out
of control.
These figures, however, need to be put in some perspective.
The $300 million spent in 1968 represented less than one-tenth of
one percent of all money spent by the government, and came to
about $1.50 per citizen to elect over 500,000 political officials.'
Proctor and Gamble in that same year spent $270 million on
advertising alone. 0 These figures led Herbert Alexander, Director
of the Citizens' Research Foundation and long-time advocate of
campaign reform, to conclude that rather than being over priced,
politics is underfinanced:
$400 million is just a fraction of one percent of the amounts spent
by governments at all levels, and that is what politics is all about,
gaining control of governments to decide policies on, among other
things, how tax money will be spent."

While seemingly large amounts of money are spent in political campaigns, one must consider these costs in light of the educational function a campaign serves. The Committee report on
the 1974 bill proposing spending ceilings cited a Harvard study
suggesting that rather than too much, not enough money is being
spent to educate the electorate.
Watergate and related events tend to place the issue in the context
of preventing excessive spending and controlling "corruption." The
idea is that the less money spent, the less needs to be raised, and
thus the purer the process. Completely neglected in this statement
of the issue is the need for campaigns to serve the broader public
purposes and currently proposed spending limits just would not permit this to be done. U

But the American people see otherwise. In a Gallup Poll
taken in November 1972, those interviewed expressed an overwhelming desire to place limits on the amount of money in campaign coffers. 3 Two years later, the people had what they wanted.
s S. REP. No. 92-96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1971).

H. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 38-39.
10Id.at 39.
I
12

1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 219.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1974).

Washington Post, Nov. 30, 1972, § A, at 2, col. 4. In response to the question,
"Would you favor or oppose a law which would put a limit on the total amount of money

which can be spent for or by a candidate in his campaign for public office?", the response

CAMPAIGN SPENDING LIMITATIONS

The Congress overwhelmingly passed the Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974's (the Campaign Act of 1974), and
it was signed into law on October 15, 1974. The key effects of this
new law are to:
(1) establish ceilings on the amounts an individual may contribute
to any one campaign for federal office;
(2) establish a $25,000 ceiling on the aggregate amount anyone
may contribute to federal campaigns in any one election year;
(3) establish a ceiling on the amount of personal funds a candidate
for federal office may himself contribute to or spend on his own
campaign;
(4) establish limitations on campaign expenditures for congressional and presidential campaigns; and
(5) provide for voluntary public financing of presidential primary
and general elections. 5

The first four provisions may well conflict with the first
amendment guarantees of freedom of speech in that each would,
to some degree, restrict the freedom of expression of both the
candidates and the electorate. The fourth provision, the establishment of limitations on campaign expenditures, however,
seems to be the most constitutionally infirm, both on its face and
in its application.
While many in Congress expressed sincere reservations about
ceilings on expenditures,'" few voted against the bill the day it
passed. This paradox is the natural consequence of a political
process "filled with arbitrary compromises and responsive as in
some degree it must be to . . .short run pressures . .'.1.7One
short-run pressure which must have been on the minds of the
members of Congress when the final vote was taken was the unwas: Favor, 71%; oppose, 18%; no opinion, 11%. Id.
" The Campaign Act of 1974 passed the Senate by a vote of 60 to 16. 120 CONG. REC.

S.18,455 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974). It was passed by the House by a vote of 365 to 24. Id. at
H.R. 10,344-45 (Oct. 10, 1974).
,1Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 U.S.C.A.).
" See generally 120 CONG. REc. (daily ed. March 26, 27, 29; April 1-5, 8-11, 1974) (S.
3044 considered and passed by the Senate); Id. (Aug. 7, 8, 1974) (H.R. 16,090 considered
and passed by the House); Id. (Oct. 8, 1974) (Senate considered and passed the Conference

Rep.); Id. (Oct. 10, 1974) (House considered and passed the Conference Rep.); 1973
Hearings, supra note 6; Hearings on H.R. 7612 [and] S. 372 Before the Subcomm. on
Elections of the Comm. on House Administration, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Supp. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 7612 (Supp.)].
11Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations,40 U. CINN. L. REv.
199, 220 (1971).
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pleasant and politically unpopular task of having to explain to
their constituents a vote against reform legislation in a campaign
year dominated by corruption.
In this as in other instances, legislators' votes may result
from the pressures of Gallup Polls, constituent demands, and
national scandal rather than from consideration of more enduring
values, such as constitutional considerations. Senator James
Buckley lent support to this belief when he stated on the floor of
the Senate that the constitutional aspects of the Campaign Act
of 1974 were almost totally ignored by the Congress. 8 One reason
the constitutional aspects are not accorded their due respect in
the halls of Congress may be the result of "a feeling that because
the Supreme Court has the ultimate say on most constitutional
issues, other institutions of government, not to mention citizen
observers, need not concern themselves with the constitutionality
of legislative action."' 9
This note is directed generally at the issues a court of law
must consider in passing upon the constitutionality of placing
limitations on campaign expenditures, with specific references to
the ceilings provided for in the 1974 Act. The discussion is limited
to congressional ceilings; consideration of the issues behind ceilings on presidential campaigns is omitted.
I.

A.

SPENDING LIMITATIONS AND FREE SPEECH

Speech in a Political Setting

The Campaign Act of 1974 provides for expenditure ceilings
on the amounts of money which may be spent for political campaigning in both Senate and House races." The Act also contains
120 CONG. REc. S. 5707 (daily ed. April 10, 1974).
'g H. PENNIMAN

& R.

WINTER,

CAMPAIGN FINANCES:

Two

ViEws OF THE POLITICAL AND

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 59 (1971).

18 U.S.C.A. § 608(c)(1)(C)-(E) (Supp. 1,1975).
(c)(1) No candidate shall make expenditures in excess of(C) in the case of any campaign for nomination for election by a candidate for the office of Senator or by a candidate for the office of Representative
from a State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater of(i) 8 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State
or
(ii) $100,000;
(D) in the case of any campaign for election by a candidate for the
office of Senator or by a candidate for the office of Representative from a
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a provision excluding from the ceilings those costs, up to 20 per. cent of the appropriate spending ceiling, incurred in the course
of raising funds.' Thus, for example, a candidate for the House
from a state having more than one representative, may spend in
each election $84,000, i.e., the $70,000 ceiling plus an additional
20 percent, or $14,000, if at least $14,000 of a candidate's expenditures have been incurred in the course of raising funds. There is,
in addition, a provision in the law which ties the ceiling level to
22
any rise in the cost of living.
While the ultimate effects of a limitation on campaign expenditures may be the subject of much dispute and diverse opinion, one effect of the new law seems very clear: It results in an
infringement of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the first
2
amendment. 1
State which is entitled to only one Representative, the greater of(i) 12 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State
or

V

(ii) $150,000;
(E) $70,000, in the case of any campaign for nomination for election,
or for election, by a candidate for the office of Representative in any other
State ....
18 U.S.C.A. § 591(f)(4)(H)(Supp. I, 1975).
(f) "expenditure"- ....
(4) does not include(H) any costs incurred by a candidate in connection with the solicitation of contributions by such candidate, except that this clause shall not
apply with respect to costs incurred by a candidate in excess of an amount
equal to 20 percent of the expenditure limitation applicable to such candidate under section 608(c) of this title ....

Id.
, Id. § 608(d)(1):
At the beginning of each calendar year (commencing in 1976), as there
become available necessary data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the
Department of Labor, the Secretary of Labor shall certify to the Commission
and publish in the Federal Register the per centum difference between the
price index for the 12 months preceding the beginning of such calendar year
and the price index for the base period. Each limitation established by
subsection (c) and subsection (f) shall be increased by such per centum
difference. Each amount so increased shall be the amount in effect for such
calendar year.
120 CONG. REc. S. 5703 (daily ed. April 10, 1974) (remarks by Senator Buckley).
See also R. WINTER, CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND POLITICAL FREEDOM (1973); Fleishman,
Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The Constitutionalityof the
Federal Election CampaignAct of 1971, 51 N. CAROLINA L. REv. 387 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Fleishman]; Rosenthal, Campaign Financingand the Constitution, 9 HARv. J.
LEGis. 359 (1972).
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One reason that free speech is so greatly affected by ceilings
on spending can be found in the changing nature of campaigns.
A soapbox campaign, as an effective means of communicating
with a large percentage of the population, has long since become
obsolete. In today's complex society, wide-spread communication
of a candidate's views and positions requires substantial expenditures of money for media, literature, mailings, and organization.
To the degree that a spending ceiling limits these activities, a
candidate's free speech-his right to communicate with the voters-has been abridged. Professor Ralph Winter has advanced
the proposition that if free speech does nothing else, it protects
"explicit political activity;" 4 he argues that a ceiling on spending
is merely an attempt to limit this protected activity. 5
The Washington State Supreme Court has recently struck
down a state statute which established ceilings on campaign expenditures." While relying on the principle of vagueness in reaching its determination of unconstitutionality, the court found a
serious first amendment infringement in that a ceiling
is fatally defective because it can operate to prohibit absolutely
plaintiff and others from exercising their constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech. The defendants argue that the section
merely imposes a regulation on the amount of money which can be
spent in communicating. However . . . [t]o communicate effec-

tively with the mass of voters, one cannot be limited to verbal communication person-to-person, but must use the media in one form
or another.n

There is also support for the argument that expenditure ceilings prohibiting one from
making an individual contribution may violate one's freedom of association. See 120
CONG. REc. S.18,537 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974) (remarks of Senator Buckley). Professor
Winter has said:
Contributions to a candidate permits individuals to pool their resources and
voice their message far more effectively than if each spoke singly. This is
critically important because it permits citizens to join a potential organization and propagate their views beyond their voting districts.
R. WIrTR, supra note 23, at 64. While the Constitution makes no mention of freedom of
association, it has evolved as an important element of the first amendment. The Supreme
Court stated in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), that "[iut is beyond debate
that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30 (1968).
2,H. PENNIMAN & R. WINTER, supra note 19, at 60.
25

Id.

" Bare v. Gorton, 84 Wash. 2d 380, 526 P.2d 379 (1974).
"

Id. at 385, 526 P.2d at 382.
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In order to evaluate the degree to which the free exercise of
speech is affected, it is necessary to put the infringed right in its
proper milieu. This law is not aimed at speech which can be
characterized as obscene, loud or raucous, inciteful, or inimical
to the concepts of our democratic process. Rather, the type of
speech curtailed by campaign spending ceilings forms the very
basis of the responsive, democratic form of government which we
have enjoyed since the founding of the nation. This speech is "the
rock on which our government stands." 8
The Campaign Act of 1974 is a legislative attempt to establish a limit on the amount of speech which may be undertaken
during the course of a campaign for federal office. The words of
Justice Black in Mills v. Alabama" have an unmistakable relevance to this attempt by the Congress to limit campaign debate:
Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First
Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs. This of course included the discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which
government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters
relating to political processes. 0

All hard fought campaigns for the U. S. Congress embrace discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, and the
manner in which government is or should be operated.
It is generally accepted that free speech is not guaranteed to
all speaking. 3 However, when one speaks to the issues upon
which voters must decide, speech should be afforded its greatest
protection, for one of the purposes of the first amendment
is to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with
which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal. When a free
man is voting, it is not enough that the truth is known by someone
else . . . .The voters must have it, all of them. The primary purpose of the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall as
far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common
life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from them. 2
2 A. MELEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 91 (1948).

- 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
' Id. at 219.
s'Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
32 A. MEIKLEJoHN, supra note 28, at 88-89.
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The Supreme Court has recognized in numerous landmark
cases that the high degree of protection assigned political speech
is the necessary consequence of any self-government." This is
true not simply for the benefit of those expounding diverse ideas,
nor for the benefit of candidates debating the crucial issues of any
one campaign. Rather, the freedom of speech in a political setting
is afforded the greatest protection for the benefit of those who
must decide how to cast their votes each and every time an election is held. The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of receiving information as the corollary to the first amendment right to freedom of speech, and has made constant references to this right. 4 Throughout the discussion of the constitutionality of spending limitations on campaigns, the right of the
people to receive adequate information on which to base their
votes must not be forgotten."
In turning to the role of the Court in passing upon the constitutionality of the Campaign Act of 1974, it is well to keep in mind
the words of Justice Brennan in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. 3 Like that case, any case in which the Court considers
the constitutionality of the spending ceilings will be considered
"against the background of a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open .... ''37
B. The Court's Approach to Infringements on Speech
It has been a long-acknowledged principle of law that although the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no

law

. . .

abridging the freedom of speech," 3 this is not itself an

absolute prohibition against laws which may for various reasons
infringe on this freedom.3 9 The Court has from time to time estabSee Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949).
' See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141 (1943).
See Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7
HARV. Ctv. RIGHTs-CIV. Lia. L. REv., 214, 225-29 (1972).
3,376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 270.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
31

See Adderly.v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951);
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lished various tests by which it can judge the alleged infringements to determine their constitutionality. Three tests have
emerged as a guide for the Court: (1) the local community standards test;" (2) the clear and present danger test;" and -(3) the
"balancing test."'" Each test is more or less designed as a test of
a particular type of infringement in a specific context. The local
community standard test has been applied to speech attacked as
obscene;"3 the clear and present danger test has been used in the
"regulation of subversive activity and of the publication of matter
thought to obstruct justice;"' 44 and the balancing test has been
applied "primarily in the case of regulations not intended directly
to condemn the content of speech but incidentally limiting its
exercise.""
It is clear that the establishment of ceilings on expenditures
does not fit within the context of the local community standard
test. The applicability of the clear and present danger test is
inappropriate because excessive spending in campaigns could
hardly be considered as subversive activity "believed to endanger
the safety of the Nation."4 This is particularly true in light of the
Court's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 7 which further limited
this test to advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and [which] is likely to incite or produce such
action.""' The imminency required by Brandenburg is absent in
the case of excessive campaign expenditures.
It is the balancing test which is most likely to be applied by
the Court in reaching a determination of the constitutionality of
spending ceilings, for, at least ostensibly, the purpose of Congress
in enacting the ceiling was not to limit the content, but to limit
the unnecessary and excessive exercise of campaign speech." One
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
" Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
42 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11 (1965).
45

Id.

,6 Id. at 8.
,7 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
41 Id. at 447.
," But see text accompanying notes 121-38 infra.
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must, therefore, scrutinize the balancing test itself, in relation to
the ceilings established in the Campaign Act of 1974, to arrive at
a conclusion as to the constitutionality of the ceiling.
C.

The Balancing Test

Very simply stated, the balancing test is a weighing of the
interests sacrificed against the value to society of the goals sought
to be achieved by a particular act of Congress." In the case of
ceilings on campaign spending, the interests sacrificed are first
amendment freedoms in a political setting. These must be balanced against the government's interest in the preservation of the
purity of the electoral process. In United States v. O'Brien,5
Chief Justice Warren summarized the nature of the requisite governmental interest as well as the degree of balancing necessary for
legislative infringements on protected freedoms to survive the
scrutiny of the Court:
To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must
appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong.
Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
52
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Under this test, a legislative infringement on first amendment
freedoms is likely to be upheld only if four elements are satisfied:
(1) there is constitutional power to legislate; (2) an important or
substantial interest is furthered; (3) the interest is unrelated to
suppression of speech; and (4) the restriction on first amendment
freedoms is incidental and no greater than is essential to promote
the interest. Congressional power to regulate campaign spending,
the first element of the O'Brien test, is clearly granted in article
I, section four of the Constitution 53 and is also implied in the
'

Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 372.

51391 U.S. 367 (1968).
12 Id. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 4(1).
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Commerce Clause. Therefore no discussion of this element will be
undertaken."

1. Furtherance of a Substantial Interest
The second element of the test enumerated in O'Brien is that
to justify legislative infringement on speech, an important or substantial interest must be promoted. Prevention of numerous evils
has been advanced as the government's interest in campaign reform generally, and in ceilings specifically. The rationale for reform can generally be resolved into three catagories: (1) fear that
the high cost of campaigns will lead to a dependence on a small
number of large contributors; (2) fear that the inequalities which
result from one candidate's having far greater financial resources
will lead to a highly unbalanced presentation of candidates' views
and qualities before the American electorate, and that competition among candidates will be distorted by inequality of opportunity to communicate with the voters; and (3) fear that spiraling
campaign costs will deter many well qualified people from seeking office. 5 While a limitation on expenditures may appear to
meet these evils head on and thus accomplish the goals, a closer
evaluation reveals that a ceiling may not inhibit them at all.
a. Candidates' Dependence on Large Contributors
It has been suggested that a limit on spending can reduce the
financial liabilities of candidates who must raise large sums of
money to campaign for public office. 8 This line of reasoning is
predicated on the belief that the more money a candidate spends,
the more likely it is that the candidate will turn to large donors.
While certainly true in a good many instances, this is by no
means the universal case. The Tenth Congressional District of
Illinois was the site of one of the closest as well as the most
expensive House race in 1974.11 Yet the entire amount spent was

11

See A. ROSENTHAL, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE: SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 12-15 (1972). See also, United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
5 See Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 360.
Note, Campaign Spending Regulation: Failure of the FirstStep, 8 HARv. J. LEGIs.
640, 646 (1971).
11 Both candidates, according to reports filed with the Clerk of the House of Representatives, spent a combined total of $537,474. Common Cause Press Release, April 11,
1975, on file with the Denver Law Journal.The winner received 51.3 percent of the vote.
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financed by contributions limited to $3,000 per contributor.1
Abner Mikva, the Democrat and ultimate victor, received close
to half of his funds in contributions of under $100. 59
While one need not always resort to large donors as one's
spending increases, the influence of large donors would not necessarily be removed by the establishment of an expenditure ceiling.
Were there no attempt to limit the size of contributions, 0 one
could still receive the entire ceiling amount from large donors.
Thus it is a reduction in the level of individual contributions, not
the establishment of ceilings on expenditures, that will serve to
eliminate the potentially corruptive effects of large donations.
Additionally, in establishing a maximum ceiling of $168,000
in a race for the House,"1 it is possible, even with a provision
limiting individual contributions to $1,000 or less, that some individuals wishing to donate to the candidate of their choice may be
barred by a prior attainment of the ceiling limit by the candidate.
This potential turning away of donors is exactly the opposite of
what is desired. According to Representative James Cleveland,
"Often the act of contributing is the most direct opportunity open
to the individual, beyond the act of voting, to express his will. We
should preserve this, expand it, and give even greater leverage to
the small individual contributor.""2 Studies show us that only 14
percent of the voters have even been asked to contribute, and only
9 percent have ever done So.13 If the ranks of contributors are to
- Both Mikva and Young adhered to a self-imposed limit of $3,000 per contributor.
The Campaign Act of 1974 effectively limits the individual to a contribution total of
$2,000-$1,000 in the primary, and $1,000 in the general election. See note 60 infra.
1,Interview with Jack Marco, former campaign manager for Representative Abner
Mikva, in Skokie, Ill., March 24, 1975.
The Campaign Act of 1974 does provide for a ceiling on contributions:
(b)(1) Except as otherwise provided by paragraphs (2) and (3), no
person shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000.
(5) The limitations imposed by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection shall apply separately with respect to each election, except that all
elections held in any calendar year for the office of President of the United
States (except a general election for such office).shall be considered to be one
election.
18 U.S.C.A. § 608(b)(1) & (5) (Supp. I, 1975).
" The candidate is allowed $84,000 for the primary and $84,000 for the general election. See notes 20 & 21 supra.
02 Hearings on H.R. 7612 (Supp.), at 3.
Id. at 9 (statement by Representative H. Johnson). See generally 1973 Hearings,
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expand in number, the law must provide greater incentives for
small individual contributions, not prohibitions against them.
The central point is this: Very few people could suggest that
a candidate had developed financial liabilities no matter how
much he spends, providing that the money came from the right
places and in small enough amounts." A ceiling will neither ensure that the source is beyond reproach, nor that the amounts
given are small.
b. Inequality of Financial Resources and Unbalanced
Presentation
A second interest of reform legislation is the elimination of
inequalities of opportunity to communicate with the voters in
order to assure a balanced presentation of all sides of every issue,
and to prevent a candidate with greater resources from drowning
out the voice of his opponent with massive media, mailings, or
organization.
It becomes apparent that ceilings on expenditures fail to
achieve the desired result. Those who have the greatest difficulty
in projecting their views and qualifications before the voters, and
who are supposedly the ones who would benefit the most from a
limitation on spending, are third party candidates and those with
meager financial resources, poor name recognition, or poor issue
identification. Professor Martin Redish discusses the plight of the
resourceless candidates who cannot afford to put their views
across to the electorate:
[S]pending limitations ...

fail to aid poorer third parties or finan-

cially lacking candidates in a manner which advances the fundamental goals of the first amendment. For such limitations in no way
help these individuals familiarize the public with their names and
policies. At most, all the spending ceilings can hope to do is to keep
the voters as unfamiliar with the candidates who have access to
large financial support as they are with the less wealthy. In the
words of one commentator, "the most important effect of money in
a political campaign is not that the candidate with the most money
will win, but that the candidate with the lesser amount of money
will not be able to present his case to undecided voters."'"
supra note 6, at 109-26 (testimony of Senator G. McGovern).
" 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 61.

Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv.

900, 919 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
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It is immediately obvious that a ceiling will not provide the
poorer candidate with postage for district-wide mailings or
cheaper rates for television spots. Instead, the only effect will be
to curtail the amount of information voters will be able to receive
from the more wealthy candidates. From this perspective, a ceiling acts more as a penalty on wealth than as an aid to those most
in need; money is effectively taken from the purse of the rich, but
is not in any way distributed to the poor. The uninformed become
less informed.
To meet the goal of an educated electorate one needs to
develop the concept of a floor, not a ceiling. 6 Reform legislation
should provide a certain minimum resource level for bonafide
candidates so as to guarantee that even the less wealthy or less
well known candidates can achieve a minimum of name recognition and publicity. Such a proposal will be examined below. 7
The use of a ceiling as a device to prevent one candidate from
drowning out his opponent has found adherents in the halls of
Congress, where incumbents have expressed alarm at the possibility that a wealthy candidate may enter a race, pour thousands
of dollars into a media campaign, and thereby effectively neutralize the advantage of name recognition which an incumbent enjoys. 8 An argument can be made that extravagant media campaigns can drown out opponents. It may also be contended that
such campaigns cheapen the electoral selection process by promoting images and impressions rather than issues and programs,
thereby lessening the educational role of a campaign. There are
grave questions, however, as to a ceiling on expenditures as a
means to rectify these evils.
In drafting the first amendment, our Founding Fathers must
have placed a great deal of faith in the people to sift through all
the campaign rhetoric that might pass their way. The dreaded
effects of a media campaign on a voter should be considered in
light of a basic faith in the American electorate.
This concern over information which "insults" the voter or "overwhelms" him represents a basic lack of faith in the ability of the
individual to sort out the logical from the illogical, the important

S7

On the subject of floors, see Fleishman at 479; 1973 Hearings,supra note 6, at 224.
See notes 116-20 infra, and accompanying text.
See generally 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 95-98 (testimony of Representative

Murphy).
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from the frivolous. Whether such a lack of faith is justified is open
to question. But the fact remains that the first amendment, and
indeed the whole concept of self-government, are premised on the
concept that the individual does have this ability (whether he
chooses to use it or not), and until that concept is rejected, any
governmental efforts to protect the public from confusing or irrational information in the political sphere must be considered inconsistent with the policy of the first amendment. The theory of the
"marketplace of ideas" is that irrational information will merely
spotlight by contrast the rational or correct course. 6

If a media campaign is to be rejected, it should be rejected
by the people who are subjected to it, not by a legislative act
which infringes on first amendment rights. Evidence does support
the theory that voters will reject a campaign which they consider
to contain excessive media.
A 1974 post-election survey in the Tenth Congressional District of Illinois revealed one voter who did indeed "reject" what
she thought to be excessive advertising. 70 The Mikva campaign,
as its only attempt at broadcast media advertising during the
1974 elections, developed a radio spot in which the interest group
ratings of the two candidates were compared. The same advertisement was run several times a day for several weeks. In the
post-election survey, the respondent, a Democrat, gave this as her
reason for voting as she did:
Well, I think Mikva (the Democrat) is the most qualified. I have
always liked him and voted for him in 1972. But it's funny, I got so
sick of hearing that damn commercial about the ratings that I voted
for Young. You probably think that's stupid, don't you?7"

While it is apparent that this woman rejected what she considered to be excessive advertising, consideration should also be
given to the voter who seldom listened to the two stations on
which the advertisement was broadcast, and heard it for the first
time only days before the election. It is true that if someone hears
a commerical 30 times and receives the entire message the first 3
times they hear it, the last 27 times may be wasted. 2 This is not
true, however, for those individuals who hear it for the first time
" Redish, supra note 65, at 911 (footnotes omitted).
" This survey, in which the author took part, was designed to give the Mikva cam-

paign some indication of the effectiveness of various campaign activities.
"' Telephone interview in Evanston, Ill., Nov. 12, 1974. The respondents were asked
to name two or three reasons why they voted as they did.
72 Redish, supra note 65, at 913.
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on the 16th, 25th, or 30th time it is broadcast. There were surely
a good many individuals in the Tenth District who never once
heard that "damn commercial about the ratings," as well as
many who heard it once or twice, but not enough to recall the
content. A spending ceiling may prevent more individuals from
hearing such campaign advertisements. Therefore, not merely the
right of a candidate to broadcast his views, but also the first
amendment right of the voters to hear these broadcasts is at
stake.
Finally, an attempt to equalize opportunity to be heard in
the campaign forum falsely assumes "that someone-presumably
Congress-knows how much information is the right amount
.... ,,7There is, however, inherent in any attempt by the Congress to establish a ceiling the following "Catch-22."
There are two competing factors which must be taken into
account in setting the ceiling, and in the final analysis, they are
mutually exclusive. First, unless the ceiling is set fairly high, few
challengers will be able to mount a successful campaign against
an incumbent. The advantages of incumbency, in terms of name
recognition, constituent service, and the advantages that inhere
in most all elective offices, are formidable obstacles to overcome."
Second, to be balanced against this need for a high ceiling is the
need for a ceiling low enough to ensure that a candidate of limited
means will not be outspent by too great a margin. If the ceiling
adopted by Congress in the Campaign Act of 1974 is supposed to
meet this goal, it has missed its mark, for the ceiling established
is far too high to aid most of the resourceless candidates. The
average amounts raised by incumbents and challengers in House
contests in 1972 were $58,359 and $31,355 respectively." The average raised by incumbents actually falls short by $25,641 of what
candidates may now spend in the primary alone. An additional
$84,000 may then be spent in the general election. To the average
challenger who was able to scrape up only $31,355 in 1972, it will
be small comfort to realize that the incumbent is limited to a
mere $168,000 in his combined 1976 primary and general election
campaign.
Fleishman at 455.
7,See text accompanying notes 160-75, infra.
Rohde, PublicFinancing of Federal Election Campaigns, 6 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS
L. Rav. 43 (1974).
"
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The ceiling that has been set for the House races-$84,000
each for the primary and the general campaigns-is clearly too
high to aid a candidate with limited resources. This ceiling may
also be too low to enable an effective challenge against an incumbent.78 This leads to the conclusion that:
[I]f one really believes the people are so easily fooled and so in need
of protection, there is no end to the campaign tactics eligible for
regulation and no end to the need to increase the power of those not
fooling the public. Indeed, the most disquieting aspect of the drive
to regulate campaign money is that so many of its adherents view
themselves as possessing a monopoly of political truth."

c.

Deterrence of Potential Candidates

Finally, there is the question of deterrence: Will able candidates be deterred from running for office by large campaign costs?
The most important aspect in an analysis of this question relates
to the availability of funds, and to the factors which determine
to whom campaign donations go. The traditional argument is
that money flows to incumbents,78 not to challengers. If this is in
fact true, then challengers may well be deterred from entering a
race. In the 1972 House races, incumbents were able to outraise
their challengers by a margin of almost two to one. On the Senate side the inequality was even greater, incumbents raising
$525,809 and challengers only $243,070.10 Common Cause has
gone so far as to declare that we have a party of neither Democrats nor Republicans, but "an Incumbency party which operates
a monopoly."'"
There is, however, an alternative theory to suggest to whom
money flows and why. Professor Fleishman suggests that the
amount of money raised is an indication of a candidate's support,
rather than the means of his obtaining support." The hypothesis
is that the more likely to win a candidate appears, the more
support he will have and the more money he will attract, whether
an incumbent or a challenger. The reverse would also be true: The
"'

See text accompanying notes 147-50, 157-59, infra.
R. WINTER, supra note 23, at 12.
7' This is the conclusion reached by Common Cause after an extensive analysis of
1972 campaign spending. 31 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3130 (1973).
"' Rohde, supra note 75.
a Id. at 44.
1,Common Cause, supra note 7, "Common Cause Releases Study of 1972 Congres,7

sional Campaign Finances."
82 Fleishman at 459.
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less likely to win one appears the less support he will receive.
Senator Baker addressed himself to the relationship between raising money and getting votes:
It seems to me that during this hearing, we need to keep clearly
in mind the fact that in the American elective process, the campaign, the effort to have a broad base of voter support is only narrowly more intensive than the campaign to have a broad base of
financial support which I think subsequently negates the idea that
the public should be or is cynical about the large sums of money that
are spent."

There is some statistical support for the hypothesis that the
likelihood of winning attracts money. Thirteen of the 40 challengers for House seats who were successful in 1974 also ran in 1972.
The average amount spent by those 13 candidates in their first
bid for election was $59,218, while the expenditures by the same
challengers averaged $112,483 in 1974.84 This dramatic 90 percent
increase could be the result of the increased perception on the
part of the voters supporting the challengers (or opposing their
opponents) that the possibility of a victory was better in 1974
than in 1972. The candidate, once perceived as a likely winner,
would attract greater resources and thus be able to spend more
money. Statistics on the 1972 House races released by Common
Cause are also consistent with the theory that it is the "winnability factor"85 which determines the flow of money. These statistics
show that the closer the race, the higher and more equal are the
expenditures. 8
Winning percentage
(Range)

Number of
Candidates

Winner's
expenditures
(Average)

70% to 90%
65% to 70%
60% to 65%
55% to 60%
up to 55%

97
66
91
60
66

$ 38,729
42,212
55,065
73,616
107,378

Loser's
expenditures
(Average)
$

7,479
16,060
30,483
54,600
101,166

[19.3%]
[38%]
[55.3%]
[74.2%]
[94.2%]

As the bracketed numbers clearly indicate, as the victory margin
1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 58.
All 1974 figures are computed on the basis of figures found in Common Cause Press
Release, April 11, 1975, on file with the Denver Law Journal. The 1972 figures are computed from statistics provided by Common Cause. 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3131-37
(1973).
" See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 3.
' Common Cause, supra note 7, House Appendix A.
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narrows, the ratio of the loser's expenditures to the winner's rises
remarkably.
There is, however, one other important statistic to which
Common Cause did not address itself. In the 66 races in which
the winner received less than 55 percent of the vote, 40 involved
incumbents. In those 40 races, challengers actually outraised incumbents $106,865 to $95,849.7 This refutes the idea that money
flows to incumbents only. It may suggest that in a closely contested race, one which will be decided by less than 10 percent of
the vote, incumbents may have little or no advantage in raising
funds. The chance of winning in these contests is equally split;
both candidates are seen as possible winners.
Although there is currently a lack of research on the effects
of money in political campaigns 8 and definite conclusions are
impossible to draw, there certainly is some basis for the hypothesis that winnability determines the flow of money. Average incumbents outraise their challengers by a margin of two to one. In
closely contested races the ratio approaches one to one until in
the very closest races, challengers outraise their incumbent opponents. The conclusion may be drawn that it is the winnability
factor which most likely enhances the ability to raise funds and
thereby dictates an inequality of opportunity to communicate a
candidate's views. A candidate's resources may be insufficient
because people generally prefer to contribute to those who will
win, and "there is nothing either illegal or improper in the simple
fact that they prefer to support likely winners rather than losers."89
To achieve the goal of equalizing opportunities to communicate by equalizing availability of funds, a ceiling must be such
as will increase a candidate's winnability factor, for unless one's
chances of winning appear good a candidate will be unable to
raise sufficient funds. But, again, the "Catch-22" applies. A ceiling which is set low, while possibly equalizing expenditure levels
by limiting the amount an incumbent may spend, would not
permit challengers to spend sufficient amounts to overcome the
" This is computed on the basis of figures provided by Common Cause. See note 84
supra. In 1974 there were 81 races in which the winner recieved less than 55 percent of
the vote. The incumbents in these 81 races outraised their challengers by an average of
$90,113 to $79,243, yet 37 of the 81 incumbents were outspent. Id.
' See 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 220 (statement by H.E. Alexander).
" Fleishman at 462.
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advantages of incumbency. A ceiling that is set high, while allowing challengers to spend enough money, would do nothing to increase a challenger's winnability factor, that is to convince the
voters that the chances of a challenger's victory are good. A ceiling established at some level in between may effectively remove
the advantages of a low and a high ceiling, leaving only the disadvantages of both.
While the necessity of fund raising certainly serves as a deterrent to some prospective candidates, this deterrence may produce some beneficial results. The oft-quoted log-cabin dream in
our country-that anyone can grow up to be President-may be
true, but it does not mean that everyone deserves to be President,
a Representative, or a Senator or that the road to public office is
an easy one. A campaign must necessarily serve as a screening
process,90 a proving ground where those with insufficient qualifications, or perhaps without sufficient roots in the community or
respect from their peers, will be weeded out.
In summary, a ceiling on expenditures will do nothing to
ensure that a candidate of limited wealth or resources can achieve
even minimum recognition or exposure. Rather, a ceiling serves
only to curtail the outflow to the voters of information about the
candidate who has money or the support to raise it. Additionally,
the deterrent effect of current campaign spending levels may not
be as great a factor as a first glance suggests. If it is winnability
that determines where money goes, a candidate for the House or
Senate, if of high caliber and possessing a good base of community support, should then be a financially attractive candidate
to those sharing his political philosophy. On the other hand, if one
is up against a candidate with high name recognition or popular
appeal, or against one entrenched in office, then it is a low winnability factor, not the cost of campaigning, which would deter one
from running. Under such circumstances, spending ceilings are
not likely to motivate anyone to run who is not already so
inclined. It would be difficult if not impossible to defeat such an
incumbent with equal spending limits. Finally, it is very difficult
to develop a spending ceiling that will be low enough to ensure
one with little financial support a minimum of recognition and
at the same time high enough to enable challengers to mount an
effective campaign against incumbents.
11See

R. WNIN1R, supra note 23, at 5.
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2. Governmental Interest Unrelated to Suppression of
Speech
The third element of the Court's test as set forth by Warren
in O'Brien is that the governmental interest promoted by legislation must be unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Deliberations on the Campaign Act of 197411 reveal a legitimate concern
on the part of Senators and Representatives that the spiraling
costs of political campaigns may endanger the purity of the electoral process. On the other hand, there is also evident a strong
awareness of the possibility that spending limits will serve to
protect the interests of incumbents in power. 2 The incredible lack
of concern for the rights of free speech among a body of lawmakers, many of whom are lawyers, leads one to suspect that the
effect of reducing speech may have been more than an incidental
by-product of a desire to preserve the purity of the electoral process. Senator Buckley, referring to the actions of his colleagues,
pointed out that:
The fear of overly persuasive campaigns, particularly when expressed by incumbent members of Congress, strikes dangerously
close to prohibited suppression of speech because of its content. It
must certainly give the Supreme Court pause when they see officeholders with vested interests in remaining officeholders passing legislation that restricts the ability of potential opponents and average
citizens alike to alter the political makeup of the Congress."

In light of the above, the motive of Congress in passing this legislation deserves particular attention.
The Court has taken the approach that it will seldom view
its judicial function as appropriate to an investigation of what
was on the minds of lawmakers while framing legislation. 4 In
deferring to the judgment of Congress, the Court has emphasized
that where Congress brings a "specially informed legislative competence" to its decisionmaking, then it is "Congress' prerogative
to weigh these competing considerations." 5 Legislative competence should be well developed in the field of campaigns. The
" See generally note 16 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 102 and 105, infra. See also Part H infra.
" 120 CONG. REC. S. 18,537 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1974) (remarks of Senator Buckley).
" See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Daniel v. Family Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
" Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655-56 (1966) (relating to literacy requirements for voting) (footnote omitted).
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Court's view is that the people's recourse to bad law and the
products of ill-conceived motive lies with the ballot box, not with
judicial determinations: "The forum for correction of illconsidered legislation is a responsive legislature."' ,
However, while stating that inquiries into congressional motives and purposes are hazardous,97 the Court does on occasion
entertain an evaluation of congressional purpose behind legislation." One instance in which a legislative purpose and motive
may receive at least a modicum of scrutiny is suggested by
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15."1 There the Court
said:
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "rational" classifications in other types of enactments are based on an
assumption that the institutions of state government are so structured as to represent fairly all the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of this basic assumption,
the assumption can no longer serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality. 00

This analysis suggests that the basis of the Court's lack of inquiry
into congressional motive is the assumption that the voters will
serve to check the actions of a responsive legislature should bad
laws be passed or congressional motives be suspect. If a spending
ceiling will reduce the responsiveness of the legislature, the rationale for not scrutinizing congressional motive-the responsiveness of the legislature-is no longer applicable. The crucial question is whether spending ceilings do affect the responsiveness of
the Congress. Ceilings may well serve to perpetuate incumbents
in office by not allowing challengers to spend sufficient funds to
attain a possible victory.' 1' If this were in fact the result of ceilings, then the responsiveness of the Congress would be greatly
impaired and therefore congressional motive should be considered by the Court.
Congress was well aware of the potential effects spending
ceilings would have on future campaigns. Representative Armstrong put it very clearly before the House:
Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
,7 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
" Id. at 385-86.
'
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
"

Id. at 628.
See text accompanying notes 147-50, 157-59 infra.
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Finally, we all know-and I think most of us know in our
hearts-this is a sweetheart incumbent bill. This is a bill which is
going to make it harder than ever to defeat an incumbent of either
party. It sets the kind of limits that makes it almost impossible for
an unknown to become known, and thereby heightens existing advantages which incumbents enjoy.
In view of the overall poor record of the Congress of the United
States, it seems to me the last thing we need to do is to give further
advantages to the incumbent Members of Congress. Let us defeat
this bill and get on to some true reform which is so badly needed.102

Representative Armstrong's comments were followed by those of
Representative Treen, who again asked whether challengers,
under the limits set by the bill, could effectively challenge incum0 3 These
bents."
legitimate constitutional questions raised in the
bill were then summarily dismissed by Representative Wayne
Hayes, who characterized the preceding speech as "90 percent
baloney."" 4
Senator Buckley vigorously opposed the spending limits as
set, denouncing them as being highly protective of incumbents:
It is my firm belief that a certain amount of money must be
spent by a challenger just to offset the incumbent's advantage ....
If this assumption is correct, the uniform spending limits...
can only aid incumbents because they make it impossible for a
challenger to spend the money necessary to overcome the incumbent's advantage. It is this feature . . . that makes it both fair and
accurate to characterize the bill as the Incumbent Protection Act of
1974.1"'

Considering these statements and Congress' relative lack of
concern regarding the constitutional questions inherent in any
spending ceiling, the Court, fearing that the responsiveness of the
Congress may in some degree be reduced, should take a close look
at congressional motive to see whether, as Senator Buckley
phrased it, the Congress has come "dangerously close to prohibited suppression of speech because of its content."''0
3. Restrictions on Speech Merely Incidental and Necessary
to Promote the Governmental Interest
"
103

120
Id.

CONG.

REc. H.R. 7900 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1974).

' Id. at H.R. 7901. One cannot tell to whom Representative Hayes was referring
(Armstrong or Treen or both), or which part of the speech was the 10 percent not constituting "baloney."
1 Id. at S. 4938 (daily ed. April 1, 1974).
30 Supra note 93.
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The final element of Chief Justice Warren's test in O'Brien
is that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest" to be protected.' 7
While it has been suggested throughout this note that there
are open to Congress more effective alternatives to accomplish
the goals sought to be achieved by spending ceilings, there is no
actual requirement by the Court that less drastic alternatives to
achieve certain goals be available before an unconstitutional infringement on free speech will be struck down.' However, if there
are less drastic means of achieving these goals, then it is less
likely that these ceilings will be allowed to stand. The Court has
said:
In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The
breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. 1 1

There are less drastic means to achieve political equality on
the campaign trail. To combat the ability of the large donors to
gain influence with federal officials there are several approaches
available. First, there is the alternative of a ceiling on the
amounts an individual may contribute to any one campaign. This
is the approach taken by Congress in the Campaign Act of 1974.
The amount which an individual may contribute to any one
federal candidate is now limited to $1,000 per election"" and
"[n]o individual shall make contributions aggregating more
than $25,000 in any calendar year." '' Although beyond the scope
of this note, there are many of the same constitutional problems
391 U.S. at 377.
'" United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967):
It is not our function to examine the validity of that congressional judgment.
Neither is it our function to determine whether [a particular program]
exhausts the possible alternatives to the statute under review. We are concerned solely with determining whether the statute before us has exceeded
the bounds imposed by the Constitution when First Amendment rights are
at stake. The task of writing legislation which will stay within those bounds
has been committed to Congress.
0 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
"'
See note 60 supra.
18 U.S.C.A. § 608(b)(3).

1975
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inherent in limitations on contributions as there are in expenditure ceilings. The effects, though, are surely not as great.' 2
Another less drastic means to achieve this goal would be to
impose a heavy tax on any contributions over a certain limit. The
revenues could be placed in the Presidential Election Campaign
Fund" 3 or earmarked to defray the costs of the Federal Election
Commission, established to administer the Campaign Act of
1974."11 In addition, the size of the present tax credit/deduction
could be increased so as to encourage a greater number of small
donors."S

To help ensure at least a modicum of equality in campaign
opportunities, the concept of a floor rather than a ceiling should
be carefully investigated:
To counteract the advantages of incumbency or of wealth, we
need not enact questionable ceilings, but rather look toward establishing floors. By floors are meant minimal levels of access to the
electorate for all legally qualified candidates."'

The most attractive feature of floors is that they entail no restrictions on first amendment rights." 7
To promote the concept of a floor at least one campaign
reformer has advocated free mailing privileges or public subsidies
to ensure minimal exposure to challengers." 8 The bill, which was
passed by the Senate and sent into conference, did in fact contain
a public financing provision for House and Senate races, as well
as for presidential contests."' The use of the frank (free mailing
privileges) by candidates is hardly a novel concept, yet the reluctance of incumbents to share their free mailing privileges with
,,2 For a general discussion of the constitutional issues involved in limitations on
contributions, see A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 54, at 12-29.
"' See Ir.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 9006(a). This fund is to be used to finance presidential campaigns, starting with the 1976 elections. Id. §§ 9001-06.
2 U.S.C.A. § 437c (Supp. I, 1975).
I, One may currently elect either a tax deduction or a tax credit. A tax deduction of
$50, or $100 for those filing a joint return, is allowed. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 218. Or
one may take a tax credit of one-half of all political contributions, with a maximum credit
of $12.50, or $25.00 for those filing a joint return. Id. § 41.
1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 224 (statement by H. E. Alexander).
Fleishman at 479.
,,8 1973 Hearings, supra note 6, at 224 (statement by H. E. Alexander).
"'

"7

' See S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 502(c)(1)(A) & (B)(1974). These public financing
provisions for House and Senate campaigns were removed from the Senate bill in Conference Committee.
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challengers, plus the high cost of such a proposal' appear to have
blocked any attempt to get this idea through Congress.
Although requiring a far greater financial commitment by
the federal government, these alternatives would accomplish the
same goals as those sought to be achieved by expenditure ceilings.
They would result in less, if any, infringement on first amendment rights. It would appear that because there are alternatives
available to Congress, a ceiling on expenditures would not meet
the fourth criterion of the Court's test in O'Brien.
This evaluation of the component elements of the Court's
test of the constitutionality of restrictions on free speech, as applied to the spending ceilings on political campaigns, leaves grave
questions as to whether a limitation on expenditures will pass the
test of constitutionality when brought before a court of law. Limitations appear not only to fall far short of achieving the goals they
were designed to promote, but also to infringe protected freedoms
far more heavily than would alternatives available to the Congress.
D.

Prior Restraint

In none of the many cases sustaining the right of Congress
to regulate federal elections has a congressional attempt to limit
the amount or content of political speech been sustained.' 2' It is
hard to see why the Court would start a new precedent in a case
involving the constitutionality of the Campaign Act of 1974. It
has been suggested that spending ceilings would infringe primarily the amount rather than the content of speech and that the
balancing test would be appropriate to weigh the constitutionality of the law.'2 In Konigsberg v. State Bar1 3 Justice Harlan
discussed governmental attempts to limit the unfettered exercise
as opposed to the content of speech:
[Gleneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content
of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not
been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment
forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found
justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequis"
"2'
2

See 120 CONG. REc. S. 5080 (daily ed. April 2, 1974).
Fleishman at 449-50 and cases cited therein.
Comment, Free Speech Implications of Campaign Expenditure Ceilings, 7 HARV.

Civ. RiGrrs-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 214, 224 (1972).
1- 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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ite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of
the governmental interest involved."

It is possible that a spending ceiling on campaign expenditures
has the effect of limiting the content, not just the exercise, of
speech. If this is true, then the balancing test may not be the
appropriate test of constitutionality. Limiting the content of
speech may constitute a prior restraint on freedom of expression.
Arguably, a candidate who is prohibited in advance by a
ceiling on expenditures from spending more than a specified
amount of money is a victim of prior restraints on his freedom of
expression. This is particularly true in that certain types of campaign activities, such as the distribution of literature, are recog5
nized by the Court as vital elements of the right to free speech.
It may be true that a ceiling on spending would primarily limit
the amount as opposed to the content of speech. However, the
small percentage of the time that a ceiling would limit the content of speech raises the most serious constitutional questions and
poses a grave threat to our electoral process.
An election is by definition limited in time-it ends on election day. No speech, charge, countercharge, or response can have
any effect on a voter once the "X" is made or the lever pulled.
Anything worth saying by a candidate must be expressed prior to
the time the people vote. A spending ceiling could substantially
alter the nature of this process of campaign interaction. A candidate who had spent his limit could not turn to television or radio
to answer a last minute charge by his opponent, nor could he buy
time to air his response to, or opinion of, an event of major significance occurring just prior to election day. The speech that would
be barred is no ordinary speech, "For speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self2
government."1
In Mills v. Alabama' the Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute the effect of which was similar to that which may result
from a ceiling on expenditures. Alabama had passed a law which
barred electioneering on election day. One of the daily newspapers ran an endorsement of a candidate in its election day issue
124

Id. at 50-51.

'
'

Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).

l

384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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and was prosecuted for violation of the statute. The Court, after
discussing the importance of free speech in the political arena,
went on to say:
The state statute leaves people free to hurl their campaign charges
up to the last minute of the day before election. The law . . . then
goes on to make it a crime to answer those "last-minute" charges
on election day, the only time they can be effectively answered.',"

It seems unlikely the Court would strike the Alabama statute, yet
let a spending ceiling stand when the very same evil condemned
in Mills may be generated by limitations on expenditures.
To punish a candidate for poor budgeting by cutting off his
means to communicate with the voters is a severe penalty. Such
a penalty punishes not only the candidate but, more importantly,
the public at large. Under the first amendment, the voters have
a very precious and essential right to hear a candidate's response
to a charge, or his reaction to an event.'29 This right is not based
on whether the candidate has spent his limit. The Court has
stated that:
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First
Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The
right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to
utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the
right to read . . . . Without those peripheral rights the specific
rights would be less secure.'"

One cannot, under the burden of a ceiling, punish the overspender without punishing the public also.
The effect of a ceiling may also be to induce a candidate to
develop a strategy whereby he attempts to deplete the resources
of his opposition in order to push him toward the limit. It is far
more difficult to undo damage of a timely, unfounded charge than
to make the charge in the first place. A candidate's inability to
meet a charge from his opponent is hardly desirable.
In two recent cases courts have been unwilling to uphold a
prior restraint on speech. In its decision involving a suit by the
government to enjoin publication of the "Pentagon Papers,"' 3 ' the
Supreme Court faced the issue of prior restraint. The justification
'12 Id.
25

''
'3,

at 220.
See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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for the desired restraint on publication was the national security
of the country, which the government feared would be compromised if the "papers" were published.'3 2 In ruling against the
United States, the Court held that the government had not met
the requisite burden of justification for the restraint. 33 The rule
had been stated in an earlier case that, "[a]ny system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.' ' 3
A recent California case3 5 involved an injunction against further publication by a candidate for public office of allegedly libelous newspaper excerpts, or of any versions of the excerpts, about
his opponent. Recognizing that prior restraints are only permissible under extraordinary circumstances, such as to prevent disclosure of military secrets in time of war or "to prevent the utterance
of words that may have the effect of force,"'' 3 the California Supreme Court ruled that the prior restraint imposed on the plaintiff candidate could not be upheld, even though the issue involved
37
a restraint of libelous material.
Once a prior restraint is established, the party defending the
restraint has the burden of overcoming the "heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity.' ' 3 The fact that a ceiling on
expenditures may act as a prior restraint on speech is one of the
most forceful arguments against the constitutionality of ceilings
as a method of campaign reform. There is little to suggest that a
ceiling on campaign expenditures, which can act as a prior restraint, can withstand the heavy presumption against its validity.
II. SPENDING LIMrrs AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A. The Advantages of Incumbency
One effect of spending limitations is that challengers may no
longer be able to spend more money in a congressional race than
their incumbent opponents. It is the contention of this note that
,"2Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
'm Id. at 714.
114 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 37 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See also Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). One advocating prior restraints "carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." Id. at 419.
' Wilson v. Los Angeles County Superior Court, 43 U.S.L.W. 2379 (Cal. March 4,
1975).
In Id.
137 Id.

"I Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
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equal spending limitations for incumbents and challengers may
in effect deny the latter the equal protection of the laws inherent
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment.'39 This aspect
of the new law presents another serious danger to our political
system. Unfortunately, because full disclosure of campaign contributions did not go into effect until April of 1972,140 no comprehensive conclusions can be drawn in regard to the amount of
spending necessary to defeat incumbents. However, preliminary
conclusions, based on the 1972 and 1974 congressional races, reveal some ominous statistics for challengers hoping to unseat current officeholders and lend support to the argument that a spending ceiling may have grossly unequal effects on incumbents and
challengers.
During the last half century, incumbent Senators and Representatives have been successful in more than 80 and 90 percent
of their campaigns respectively. 4' Between 1956 and 1972, House
incumbents won 3,350 of 3,551 races, for a winning percentage of
94.34. Senate incumbents fared slightly worse, winning 222 of 261
or 84.67 percent.' The 1972 House elections marked the third
straight election in which over 95 percent of incumbents were
victorious,"' while in the 1972 Senate races only 6 incumbents
met defeat. The primary and general elections of 1974, a "disaster
year" for incumbents, saw over 87 percent of House incumbents
re-elected, while 85 percent of the incumbent Senators were successful."' Figures such as these led one commentator to write,
"There is a tendency to believe that, aside from isolated instances
where an over-riding issue is present, there is little excuse for
defeat."" 5
Based on the impressive percentage of incumbents' victories,
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 406, 86 Stat. 20.
This Act became effective 60 days after its passage on February 7, 1972.
141 120 CONG. REc. S. 4938 (daily ed. April 1, 1974) (remarks of Senator Buckley).
142Hearings on H.R. 7612 at 2 (Supp.) (statement by Representative Cleveland).
31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3130 (1973).
"' For the 1974 congressional election results see 32 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. (Nov. 9,
1974). In 1974, 48 incumbents were defeated in races for the House; 8 in the primaries, 40
in the general election. Forty-four incumbents elected not to run. On the Senate side, four
incumbents were defeated, two in the primaries and two in the general election. Seven
incumbents chose not to run for re-election. Id.
145 120 CONG. REc. S. 4938 (daily ed. April 1, 1974) (quote by Charles Clapp in remarks
of Senator Buckley).
14
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one would suspect that the American people view the current
legislature and its performance with high regard. But Senator
Buckley points out that the reverse is true:
Recent poll figures force one to the conclusion that the Congress
is not exactly held in the highest esteem by the American people.
In fact, as most of us are aware a number of pundits have observed
that we are presently less popular even than the President [Nixon]
with a collective approval rating of but 21 percent.'46

According to Common Cause, great sums of money are required to defeat such disapproved legislators.'47 In the November
1972 races for the House, only 10 incumbents were defeated, and
8 of the 10 were outspent by their challengers.'48 It took an average
of $125,52111 to defeat these incumbents. On the Senate side,
only six incumbents were defeated, and four of the six were outspent. 5 0
The 1974 House elections proved to be an anomaly in the
recent trend. Although over 95 percent of all incumbent Representatives to run for re-election were successful in each of the
three preceeding elections,' 5 ' the percentage dropped below 90
percent in 1974. '52 The number of incumbents losing their seats
in 1974 nearly quadrupled in respect to the number who lost in
each of the three preceeding elections. This startling increase in
the number of unsuccessful incumbents is in large part a result
of the Watergate scandal and the effect the revelations of political
corruption had on the minds of the voters. 53
As a result of Watergate, 1974 was a relatively easy year for
challengers, particularly Democratic ones. This being the case,
one can hypothesize that although challengers have to spend
large amounts of money and in many cases outspend their oppo..I
Id. (remarks of Senator Buckley).
...Common Cause, supra note 7, "Common Cause Releases Study of 1972 Congressional Campaign Finances."
,4 See 31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3130-37 (1973).
"' Common Cause, supra note 7, House Appendix B. It is not possible, on the basis
of the 1972 or 1974 spending figures, to apportion a certain percentage of total expenditures by a candidate to the general election and a certain percentage to the primary.
Reporting was not required for each election separately.
110
31 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., supra note 148.
151 See note 143 supra.
52 See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
" To attribute this "high" turnover to the state of the economy ignores the fact that
of the 40 incumbents to lose, 36 were Republicans and only 4 were Democrats. 32 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REP. 3066 (1974).
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nents to be successful, the spending in 1974 need not have been
as high as in 1972 because incumbency in certain districts in 1974
was more a disadvantage than an advantage.'5 4 It would also follow that knowing the disadvantage they faced, incumbents would
be less likely to allow themselves to be outspent. This apparently
was the case.' 55 Spending figures for the 1974 campaigns support
the above hypothesis, that given the over-riding issue of Watergate, challengers needed less money to be successful. Based on an
evaluation of the 1974 spending reports filed by the candidates
and committees, an average of $100,468 was spent by the challengers who were successful in the 1974 general election, as compared to $125,521 in 1972.11 Additionally, of the 40 incumbents
defeated in the November 1974 elections, 22, or 55 percent, were
outspent as compared to 80 percent in 1972.11
While neither the average amount spent by successful challengers, nor the percentage of challengers outspending their opponents, was as high in 1974 as in 1972, even considering the impact
of the Watergate affair the 1974 figures are consistent with the
theory that the average challenger must be prepared to spend a
large amount of money, as well as to outspend his opponent, if
the chances of victory are to be good. When only 12 to 13 percent
of the incumbents to run for re-election are defeated5 8 and over
one-half of that 12 percent are outspent, 59 the ability to outspend
must be regarded as an important factor.
On the basis of the successful record established by incumbents over the last half century, and of the expenditure statistics
for congressional races in the 1972 and 1974 elections, a strong
argument can be advanced that equal expenditure limitations are
inherently unequal in their impact on incumbents and challengers.
15, Four of the 36 Republicans who lost were members of the House Judiciary Committee and had consistently supported the President during the television impeachment
hearings. They were: David Dennis, Joseph Maraziti, Wiley Mayne, and Charles Sandman. Id. But see id. at 3066, stating that three, Dennis, Mayne, and Sandman, faced
problems before the impeachment inquiry began.
"' In 1972 the 40 incumbents who lost in 1974 spent on the average $69,199. Faced
with serious opposition in 1974, their average expenditures rose to $101,173. See note 84
supra.

156 Id.

157Id.
's'
See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
"'
See text accompanying note 157 supra.
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If it is not, as polls suggest, a high regard by the American
people that returns large percentages of incumbents to Washington each election, there must be other factors. Most of these can
be found in the nature of elective offices. Senators and Representatives are elected to serve their constituencies and the American
people. To fulfill this role, they must have at their disposal resources such as staff allowances, office expenses, access to media,
and the frank. Staff allowances of $204,000 are allowed to congressional officeholders.610 An incumbent thus has at his disposal
expert advice and a continuous source of research into matters of
public concern. The challenger must often start from scratch in
research on issues and development of alternative policies, and
this may require the hiring of staff assistants at his own expense.
In addition, incumbents are entitled to have several district offices from which to provide constituent services. By far the majority of work conducted in a district office involves case work,' 6'
solving problems for constituents. Casework involves people, and
people mean votes. Even a courteous reply to a letter written to
a congressman can so impress the constituent that it ensures the
62
incumbent a vote.1
Access to the media is also an important advantage inherent
in incumbency.' 3 While incumbents do not have the networks at
their control, a well-seasoned politician can certainly manipulate
press coverage by introduction or sponsorship of key legislation,
delivery of major policy addresses or statements on critical
events, or the announcement of a press conference. While the
challenger may attempt all the above except the introduction and
sponsorship of legislation, his words are not official words, and are
not apt to be accorded the same weight given those of an incumbent.
Perhaps the greatest advantage enjoyed by incumbents is the
'' Interview with Genie Ermoyan, Administrative Assistant to Representative Abner
Mikva, in Washington, D.C., Mar. 18, 1975.
"I Estimates indicate that from 60 to 75 percent of the work in a district office

involves casework. Telephone interviews with Jack Marco and Pearl Alperstein, District
Managers for Representatives Abner Mikva and Tim Wirth, respectively, April 12, 1975.
"2 While canvassing a neighborhood in October 1974, the author talked to an elderly
lady who had been so impressed by the official reply she had received from her congressman that she had framed it. Her vote had been sewn up by this letter.
" See 120 CONG. Rc. H.R. 10,337 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1974) (remarks of Representative Treen).
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frank-the ability to send official mail postage free.' 4 Free mailing is vital to the functioning of a congressional office, and if used
with an eye toward re-election can be used to gather a very broad
base of support by convincing voters that their representative is
working hard and is doing as much for them as possible. The
frank is used in essentially two ways: First, in the normal day to
day correspondence of an office; and second, to send district-wide
newsletters or questionnaires to the residents of a district. Members of the House enjoy one further advantage in their districtwide mailings-each letter need not be individually addressed,
but may be sent under the label "Postal Patron, 'X' Congressional District."'' 5 The advantage this affords a mass mailer may
only be properly appreciated by recognizing the many hours spent
hand addressing or typing and sticking on labels. The cost savings
of the "Postal Patron" privilege can be enormous.' 6 In addition,
if a candidate exceeds his allowance for printing costs in mailing
franked mail, he may claim as a tax deduction the excess expenditure.6 7 To duplicate the output of franked mail by an incumbent
could cost a challenger over $200,000.16s
Nothing that has been said regarding the postal advantages
or office and staff expenses is in any way intended to suggest these
perquisites of elective office are excessive or unnecessary. Rather,
the availability and wide use of these privileges are essential to
the proper functioning of an office. What needs to be recognized,
however, particularly by those who establish the ceilings on campaign expenditures, is that these advantages do exist and that
they must be taken into account when imposing restrictions on
expenditures. This must be recognized for one important reason:
In practice, there is a very thin line between what can be considered official business and that which borders on electioneering.
Liberal use of the above privileges may increase substantially the
inherent inequalities which exist between incumbents and challengers.
See 39 U.S.C. § 3210 (1970).
39 U.S.C.A. § 3210(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1975).
"I A cost of $29 per 1,000 letters was quoted by American Products, a Chicago firm,
for the addressing and processing required for mass mailings. Thus, if a congressional
district has 168,000 households, as in the Tenth District of Illinois, the cost would be
$4,872 just for the addressing and processing. Citizens Committee for Abner J. Mikva
Press Release, July 18, 1974, on file with the Denver Law Journal.
,6 Fleishman at 469.
,' See note 166 supra.
"14
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The use of the frank is for all practical purposes limited only
by the conscience and ethical standards of those in office,' 89 a fact
which may appear frightening in light of the events of recent
years. It has been suggested that an excessive use of the frank will
be singled out by the voters, and therefore one must not abuse
the privilege for fear of retaliation at the polls.7 0 Experience dictates that this is not always the case, perhaps because it can be
very hard for a voter to perceive the widespread effects a monthly
newsletter can have. In Colorado's Second Congressional District,
Democratic challenger Tim Wirth tried to make an issue of his
opponent's use of the frank, but without success."' In the Tenth
Congressional District in Illinois, district-wide mailings were
being sent out at a rate of almost one a month by the incumbent
Representative, with three arriving at every home in the district
within a 4-week period in the summer months preceding the election of 1974. Yet in a survey taken in that district, one of the most
affluent and well educated in the country,' the people expressed
almost no concern with this recurring use of the frank,'73 so the
challenger dropped the issue. This indicates that if the frank is
effectively used, it is almost without practical limitation.
Representative Bill Frenzel introduced into the
CongressionalRecord some illuminating statistics regarding the
frank."' According to these statistics, the timing of franked mail,
as indicated by activity in the congressional folding room, is significant. The work piles up every September and October of even
numbered years-the congressional election years. In September
and October of 1968, 1970, and 1972, there was twice as much
work in the folding room as in those same months in the years of
1967, 1969, and 1971. Further, in October of 1968, 1970, and 1972,
the folding room averaged about 85 percent more work than it did
in the average month of those years.'75 One reason for this increase
is clear: As the congressional session comes to an end, the mem0
170

H.

PENNtMAN & R. WiTNER, supra note 19, at 17.

Id.

"' Interview with Representative Tim Wirth in Denver, Feb. 13, 1975.

N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1974, § 6 (magazine), at 75.
m Respondents were asked to characterize as "fair" or "unfair" the following statement: "Sam Young has spent a lot of taxpayers' money sending out a newsletter each
month." The result was: Fair, 20%; Unfair, 67%; and Not Sure, 13% (Poll conducted by
Peter Hart Research Associates, for Abner J. Mikva, Aug. and Sept., 1974).
"1 120 CONG. REc. H.R. 8424 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1974).
Id.
'7'
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bers of Congress send their final reports back to their constituencies, ' complete with pictures of themselves and expressions of
appreciations for being allowed to serve them during the preceeding two years. This is not necessarily improper, but, again, it is
something that should be taken into account in establishing the
level of ceilings. It obviously was not in the 1974 Act.
It is not sufficient to discount these advantages of incumbency by saying, as one congressman has said, that, "People do
not vote for incumbents unless they are doing a decent job.'
It may be because many incumbents do only a "decent job"
that the Congress receives such low ratings in the polls.
Representative Treen has said:
[I]f one is going to defeat an incumbent, he has got to expose the
incumbent's record.
That means that we have got to go to massive newspaper, radio
and television coverage to talk about the record. He cannot do that
on the spending limits we have in this bill.'78

As indicated by a majority of the races where incumbents were
defeated in 1972 and 1974, "exposing the record" usually requires
outspending the officeholder.' 79
In an effort to neutralize the tremendous advantages of incumbency, Senator Buckley introduced during the debate on the
proposed ceilings an amendment to provide a challenger with a
spending ceiling of 130 percent of the amount which could be
spent by the incumbents.1 80 His amendment, tabled in April of
1974 when first introduced, was later reintroduced and defeated
by a vote of 17 to 61 just prior to the passage of the bill by the
Senate.' 8
Statistics show that a large percentage of incumbents who
lose are outspent, an event which, as a result of the ceilings established in the Campaign Act of 1974, may never happen again; an
176Id.

Id. at H. 7848 (Aug. 7, 1974) (remarks of Representative Pike).
,7'
Id. at H. 7900-01 (Aug. 8, 1974).

,7See text accompanying notes 148, 150, & 157 supra.
"8 120 CONG. REc. S. 4937 (daily ed. April 1, 1974).
(c) No candidate who is not an incumbent may make expenditures in
connection with his campaign for nomination for election, or for election, to
any Federal office in excess of 130 percent of the amount of expenditures
which an incumbent candidate may make . .

Id.

Id. at S. 18,537 (Oct. 8, 1974).

..
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incumbent willing and able to spend his limit cannot be outspent
by a challenger seeking to overcome the advantages which inhere
to incumbents. An officeholder in this situation has a large edge
in his race for re-election. And contrary to the renowned hare, he
is unlikely to take a nap off to the side of the trail.
B. Equal Protection of the Laws and the Application of
Spending Ceilings
The U.S. Constitution provides that no state may "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."' 8 2 Although this prohibition applies only to the states, it is
well settled that the equal protection clause is applicable to the
federal government through the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, when "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process."' 83
A maximum ceiling of $84,000 on the expenditures of each
candidate for each election creates on its face no "suspect categories" or "invidious discrimination." No one candidate is put into
a classification different than another, and each is allowed equal
spending. This is not, however, enough to satisfy the requirements of due process. The Supreme Court, in its decision in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins's4 looked beyond the mere "on its face" test of the
fourteenth amendment and went into the effects of the law as it
was applied. It is now settled that although no classifications
exist on the face of a statute, unjustifiable discrimination resulting from the application of a law may be "as invidious a discrimination as if [the statute] had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment."'" 5 The heavy burden which
equal spending ceilings impose on the campaign effort of almost
any challenger could constitute such discrimination.
The discrimination promoted by spending ceilings would be
even greater in the case of third-party candidates.'" Generally a
third party has no grass roots organization as do the Republicans
or Democrats, organizations whose expenditures for general activ...U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

' Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
'' 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
"s Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964); Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
," See Redish, supra note 65, at 919.
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ities, though clearly inhering to the benefit of a candidate of its
own party, may not come within the purview of the ceiling." 7 The
classic example of the advantages of party organization is the
case of a Democratic candidate running for election in the City
of Chicago. While such a candidate has the benefit of one of the
most unbeatable precinct organizations in the country, he would
have to report, for all the benefit he received from the grass roots
Democratic organization, not a penny of expenditure. To suggest
that equal limitations do not discriminate in such a situation is
pure folly. And while the argument can be made that a ceiling
does not prevent a third party from establishing an organization,
this is often impractical in that an organization is more likely to
form around a winner, rather than to develop to form a winner.
The potential effect of inhibiting the growth of third parties has
8
been condemned by the Court in Williams v. Rhodes.""
Another discriminatory effect of spending ceilings exists
where an incumbent is challenged in the primary, particularly in
one-party districts, where the primary is in effect the election.
The number of such districts is not insignificant. In the 1974
general elections, 46 races-over 10 percent of all races for the
House-were unopposed.' Unlike a challenger to an incumbent
of the opposing party in a two-party district, a challenger in a
one-party district does not have a primary and an additional
primary allotment of $84,000 with which to build his name recognition, present his programs, and develop the grass roots organi"' This "loophole" exists because activities such as a voter registration drive, a canvass to determine party preference, and an election day "get out the vote" campaign
(which is based on the results of the canvass-one only brings to the polls those who are
sure to vote "properly") if conducted by a party organization inhere to the benefit of every
candidate of the party conducting the activities, from federal candidates down to the local
dog catcher. These activities may not, in fact, be authorized by a particular candidate,
even though he would receive the benefits of them. If, on the other hand, any one or all of
the above activities are carried out on behalf of a federal candidate, then those expenditures would go toward a candidate's ceiling.
(B) an expenditure is made on behalf of a candidate . . . if it is made
by(i) an authorized committee or any other agent of the candidate
for the purposes of making any expenditure; or
(ii) any person authorized or requested by the candidate, an
authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of the candidate,
to make the expenditure.
18 U.S.C.A. § 608(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1, 1975).
IU 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968). See also Redish, supra note 65, at 919.
" See 32 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3084-91 (1974).
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zation necessary for the election day contest with the incumbent.
Rather, these challengers have a maximum of only $84,000 at
their disposal with which to overcome the advantages of incumbency and to carry out their campaign activities. The ceilings
imposed in the Campaign Act of 1974 hardly reflect the difficulty
of such a challenge.
A final form of possible discrimination resulting from spending ceilings is that inherent in setting universal limits throughout
the entire country, without taking into account local variances in
cost of such vital campaign expenses as radio and television
time.'90 A 30-second prime time television spot can vary from $200
in Phoenix to $4,600 in New York City.'9 ' By enacting the same
ceilings for New York as for Phoenix, the people in the City of
New York will be given far less opportunity to see and know their
candidates than will the voters in Phoenix.' 2 While this discriminatory aspect is most exemplified by media costs, the same is no
doubt true, though to a lesser extent, of printing costs, newspaper
advertising, and salaries. The difficulty of arriving at a fair ceiling
for each region of the country presents another difficulty in enacting spending ceilings.
The discriminatory effects of spending ceilings on campaigns
thus fall into three categories: (1) A challenger may not be able
to overcome the natural advantage of incumbency should an incumbent decide to spend the limit; (2) third-party candidates are
discriminated against in that they generally lack the organizations available to major party candidates; and (3) challengers to
incumbents in primaries face the disadvantage of having to defeat an incumbent with only $84,000 of expenditures.
Equal ceilings for challengers and incumbents will, in many
cases, make it very difficult for a less well known challenger to
present himself and his platform effectively before the electorate.
If the Court should find that the limitations on free speech which
result from ceilings on campaign expenditures fall hardest in
their application upon the challenger, then this discriminatory
effect can only be justified by some "compelling state interest"
sought to be achieved by the legislation.'13 Although the purity of
,0 See Fleishman at 467. See generally Hearings on H.R. 7612 at 4 (Supp.).
"' H. PENNumN & R. WhiTER, supra note 19, at 14.

,12
See Note, supra note 56, at 661.
"' The "compelling state interest" standard is applied where a fundamental interest
is involved. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
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the electoral process is an important concern, it cannot be said
that this interest will necessarily be enhanced by ceilings placed
on spending. The previous evaluation of the governmental interest promoted by these ceilings' 4 should leave doubts in many
minds as to whether any interest-other than that of incumbents-is really promoted by limits on campaign spending.
CONCLUSION

Reform of campaign funding is long overdue. Money has
been and will continue to be the root of corruption and impropriety among elected officials. Until steps are taken which will
assure the American public that political contributions are not
given in order to extract political favors or gain political clout, the
aura of suspicion which surrounds campaign contributions will
continue to hang precariously over the American political process. Unfortunately, a problem which is so easily identified is not
so readily cured.
The governmental interest in re-establishing some purity in
our electoral process is as powerful an interest as can be conceived
in our democratic society. If the method by which our leaders are
chosen is tainted with potential or actual abuse, then the decisions these officials render must be suspect. Yet no matter how
great the evil created and no matter how powerful the interest to
be served, the solution relied upon must be consistent with the
principles established in the Constitution. Absent constitutional
problems, relatively simple answers might suffice. In the case of
campaign reform, however, the first amendment requires a complex solution. A spending ceiling is an example of a simple answer, one which ignores the first and fifth amendments as well as
political reality.
Suit has already been filed challenging the Campaign Act of
1974,111 and one of the numerous causes of action is aimed at the
ceiling on expenditures as a violation of the right to free speech
and due process.' The purity of the electoral process is thus in
the hands of the judiciary. In the long run, this purity might be
better served by the elimination of a spending ceiling as a means
to achieve it.
Robert W Drake
, See text accompanying notes 55-90 supra.
121 CONG. REc. S. 2014-20 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1975). The suit has been filed in the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by Senator James
Buckley and former Senator Eugene McCarthy.
I Id. at 2018.

NOTE
LEGAL ETHICS-REPRESENTATION OF DIFFERING

INTERESTS BY HUSBAND AND WIFE: APPEARANCES OF
IMPROPRIETY AND UNAVOIDABLE

CONFLICTS OF

INTEREST?
INTRODUCTION

One of the most noticeable changes in law schools in recent
years has been the increase in the number of women enrolled.' In
the beginning of the 1963 academic year, 1,883 women were en2
rolled in law schools approved by the American Bar Association,
constituting 3.8 percent of the total enrollment. In the fall of 1968,
there were 3,704 women enrolled,3 or 5.9 percent. By the 1973-74
school year, the number of women had grown to 16,760,1 15.8
percent.
One effect of the increased number of women in law schools
is that more and more lawyers are married to other lawyers.
Where lawyer-spouses are not associated in the practice of law,
questions have arisen about the propriety of a lawyer's accepting
employment on behalf of a client whose interests differ from those
of a client represented by the lawyer's spouse or by that spouse's
firm. These questions have been considered in ethics opinions
issued by the bar associations of four states: Arizona,5 Colorado,'
Illinois,7 and Virginia.' The Arizona and Illinois opinions are limRuud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment is Portia, 60 A.B.A.J. 182 (1974).
Id. at 183.
Id.
'Id.
ARIZONA ETHIcs COMM., OPINION No. 73-6 (Reconsideration of OPINION No. 71-27)
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6].
, Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Opinion No. 52, 3 COLO. LAWYER, Apr. 1974,
at 55 [hereinafter cited as COLORADO OPINION No. 52]. Opinion 52 was adopted on February 9, 1974. Since its adoption, the ethics committee has voted to reconsider the opinion's
holdings, but until a new opinion is issued the present one is considered in effect.
ILLINOIS STATE BAR Ass'N, PROFESSIONAL ETmcs OPINION No. 311 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as ILLINOIS OPINION No. 311].
1 Letter from R. J. Lilliard, Chairman, Legal Ethics Committee, The Virginia State
Bar, to a Grafton, Virginia, lawyer, Nov. 12, 1974, on file with Professor Cathy S. Krendl,
University of Denver College of Law [hereinafter cited as Virginia opinion].
In addition to the ethics opinions on this subject, the Nevada Supreme Court rules
forbid representation of conflicting interests by attorneys related in a number of different
ways, including "consanguinity within the third degree." NEV. SuP. CT. R. 170. Although
"consanguinity" does not include the marriage relationship, it is probable that any restriction of representation of conflicting interests by spouses in Nevada would be achieved by
amendment of this court rule, and not by an ethics opinion.
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ited to fact situations involving criminal cases; they hold that it
is improper for one spouse to seek to represent a defendant prosecuted by the other spouse or by another member of the public
office which employs the spouse.'
The Virginia opinion was in response to an inquiry concerning the propriety of a lawyer's representing one party to a divorce
action when the other party is represented by the firm which
employs the lawyer's spouse.' 0 Because of wide interest in the
subject, however, the Virginia Legal Ethics Committee, in addition to addressing the question posed, discussed additional situations, both those involving direct representation by lawyer-spouse
against lawyer-spouse and those involving representation of opposing interests by the spouses' firms." The committee concluded
that representation in which one spouse is actively involved
against the other spouse or the other spouse's firm is not ethically
permissible." So long as neither spouse is directly involved, according to the committee, representation of opposing clients by
3
the two firms is permissible.'
Colorado's opinion is similar to that adopted in Virginia,
except that it includes consideration of the propriety of a lawyer's
representation of a defendant in a criminal case prosecuted by a
district attorney's office which employs that lawyer's spouse."
The opinion's conclusion coincides with that of the Virginia Legal
Ethics Committee: It is not proper for a lawyer to accept employment by a client whose interests differ from those of a client of
the lawyer's spouse or a member of the spouse's firm; 5 it is proper
for the firms to represent clients with differing interests so long
as neither spouse participates in the representation."
One result of the ethical questions raised by the representation of the opposing sides of pending legal matters by spouses
might be a reluctance on the part of law firms to hire any applicant for a job if the applicant's spouse is employed by, or seeking
law-related employment with, another law firm in the same comARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 1; ILLINOIS OPINION No. 311 at 1.
"

12

Virginia opinion at 1.
Id. at 2.

Id.

13 Id.

COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 55.
is Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
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munity. That such a reaction by employers is a reality is indicated by a rule adopted by the Committee on Placement at Harvard Law School stating that employers who use the school's
placement office for interviews may not refuse to hire an applicant merely because the applicant's spouse is or will be a lawyer
in the same town.'7
The Committee concluded... that the likelihood of unprofessional conduct . .. is insufficient in these situations to justify the
substantial hardship worked on married couples by a policy of refusing to hire a lawyer whose spouse works for another firm in town.' 8

Where a law firm's recruiting policy is supported by an ethics
committee opinion, married couples face a greater likelihood that
one or both of them will have difficulty finding employment in
the same community. 9 For instance, if one spouse obtains a position with a state or local prosecuting office, the other may find it
impossible to work in criminal defense matters, at least in that
jurisdiction. Or, if both spouses are interested in, for example,
commercial law, and seek employment with firms specializing in
that area, they may face great unwillingness on the part of such
firms to risk the possibility of creating a conflict of interest between themselves and other firms which they frequently encounter in litigation. The married lawyers may find that they must
choose to work in greatly dissimilar fields of law, or to live where
each may work in a different city, or to enter practice in the same
firm, their own or an established one without a policy against
hiring close relatives. "Substantial hardship" seems an apt description of such results.
Even if the lawyer-spouses are able to find employment with
different law firms, ethics opinions like those described previously may present clients of their firms with difficult circumstances. For instance, if a lawyer represents a bank in making a
construction loan to a client represented by the lawyer's spouse,
may granting of the loan be made contingent upon the borrower's
obtaining different counsel in order to avoid possible charges of
conflict of interests? If the borrower does retain a different lawyer solely to complete the loan transaction, how may the new
,1Memorandum from Ass't. Dean Russell A. Simpson, Law School of Harvard University, to Interviewers Regarding Placement Office Rule 5, September 30, 1974, on file
at Harvard [hereinafter cited as Simpson Memorandum].
1 Id.
"

See text accompanying notes 125-26, infra.
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lawyer comply with the lender's request for a statement by the
borrower's general counsel (presumably the first firm) that the
transaction will not be jeopardized by any of the other business
dealings of the borrower?
In addition to the impact of these opinions on lawyers and
clients, adoption and enforcement of such opinions at this time
may subject bar associations to criticism because the effect of the
opinions may be harsher on women's prospects for employment
than men's. Such criticism might note that, in general, wives
complete their career education after their husbands."0 Thus, generally the husbands are employed as lawyers before an actual
conflict arises, and it is the wives who must face the restrictions
on hiring which stem from the marriage relationship. The Arizona
Ethics Committee took note of this pattern in Arizona Opinion
73-6, a reconsideration of an earlier, more restrictive opinion.',
The committee reconsidered the first opinion at the request of the
Board of Governors of the Arizona Bar Association, and the request was prompted, at least in part, by recognition that "the
restrictive position therein taken may adversely affect the employment opportunities of women lawyers who are increasing in
number and who have never had an easy time of it in our profession.'"'
The harshness of the opinions considered here on married
lawyers is accentuated by the fact that few similar restrictions are
placed on lawyers related to each other in different ways (for
"

See THE

CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN

(1973). This study of American graduate and professional students
found a marked difference in the age distribution of men and women; in particular, about
one-fourth of the women students were married, divorced, or separated and 35 or older.
Id. at 83-4. Data in the study indicated that more than one-half of the married women
IN HIGHER EDUCATION

graduate students, as opposed to only one-fourth of the married men, had spouses attending graduate school or who had attained a graduate degree, suggesting "that women who
are married to graduate students or to men who have attained a graduate degree are
especially likely to seek graduate education." Id. at 85. In the case of medical students,
the Commission reported that more than one-half of women who obtain M.D. degrees are
married to physicians. Id. at 24, citing Powers, Parmelle, & Wiesenfelder, PracticePatterns of Women and Men Physicians, 44 J. MED.ED. 481, 482 (1969). Although no similar
study could be found involving women law students, it seems reasonable to assume that
a significant number of women now receiving the J.D. degree are married to lawyers.

11ARIZONA

ETmics COMMrrTEE, OPINION No.

71-27 (1971). This opinion concluded that,

where a husband was regularly employed and engaged in prosecuting criminal cases, his
wife could not accept and defend cases prosecuted by the husband or any other member
of his office, and neither could any other member of the wife's firm.
"ARZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 4.
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example, parent-child), or on their firms.2 3 Certainly, one must
not minimize the importance of avoiding the harm to the profession and the public which could result from representation of
opposing clients by lawyers married to each other. However, in
view of the consequences described above, it is necessary to scrutinize carefully ethics opinions in this area to determine if their
objectives of giving valid guidance to lawyers in such situations
may be achieved without such a harsh impact.
Because the Colorado and Virginia ethics committees have
considered inter-spousal conflicts most broadly, this analysis will
primarily focus on these two opinions. Consideration will be given
to whether the opinions offer a consistent and logical application
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,24 and whether they
violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S.
Constitution. Finally, alternative approaches will be suggested
for dealing with possible conflicts of interests between lawyerspouses, approaches more in harmony with the Code and with the
Constitution.
I. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Colorado's Opinion 52 is based on three hypothetical fact
situations involving Lawyer A and Lawyer B, husband and wife
not associated in the practice of law.25 In the first situation, Lawyer A seeks to represent a client whose interests differ from those
23 See, 0. MARU, DIGEST OF BAR AsSOCIATION ETHics OPINIONS (1970), under index
heading "Conflict of interests, relatives." E.g., where son is a substitute justice in civil
and police courts, whether his father-partner may practice in those courts is a local
problem which must be considered on the merits of each case. Id. 4440 (The Virginia
State Bar). Many opinions have held it proper for a father to defend in a criminal case
prosecuted by his son. E.g., id. 1047 (Kansas Bar Ass'n);
1434 (The Missouri Bar);
3103, 3171, 3332 (North Carolina State Bar).
After Opinion 73-6 was issued, the Arizona ethics committee considered the case of
an attorney whose father-in-law was a member of a zoning board which passed a regulation being challenged by a client of the son-in-law's firm. The committee ruled that so
long as the relationship between the lawyer and the board member was disclosed to the
client and the client consented it was proper for the firm to accept the employment.
ARIZONA ETHics CoMM., OPINION No. 73-19 (1973).
The main thrust of this particular point is the integrity and the honesty
of the lawyer involved, to himself and to his client. So long as there is
complete disclosure and acceptance by the client, there is no harm done.
Id. at 4.
24 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABA

CODE].

COLORADO OPINON No. 52 at 55.
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of a client represented by Lawyer B.1 In the second situation,
Lawyer A seeks to defend a client prosecuted by a district attorney's office which employs Lawyer B. 7 In the third, Lawyer C, a
member of Lawyer A's firm, seeks to represent a client with interests different from those of a client represented by Lawyer D, a
member of Lawyer B's firm.28
The Virginia ethics opinion also considers three hypothetical
situations: 1) Lawyer-spouse against lawyer-spouse, each actively
involved in the same case; 2) lawyer-spouse actively participating
in a case against lawyer-spouse's firm; 3) lawyer-spouse's firm
against lawyer-spouse's firm, neither spouse directly involved.'
The second and third situations are applications of the principle
of "vicarious disqualification, ' ' 30 a concept also considered in
Opinion 52's third fact situation. 3' Although the Virginia opinion
does not specifically discuss the question of representation in a
criminal case, as does the Colorado opinion, 32 that question is
really only a more specialized version of the spouse-againstspouse and spouse- against-spouse's-firm questions decided by
the Virginia committee.33
In analyzing the two opinions, this section will discuss the
committees' treatment of the direct confrontation of lawyerspouse against lawyer-spouse, and the extension of the principles
developed therein to representation by one spouse's firm against
the other spouse's firm. Finally, additional problems which arise
when one spouse is employed by a public prosecutor's office will
be analyzed with reference to the opinions from Arizona and Illinois.
A.

Lawyer-spouse Against Lawyer-spouse

In considering whether there is a conflict of interest when
husband and wife represent clients with differing interests, the
Id. In the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility the phrase "differing interests" is
defined as including any interest that will have an adverse effect on the judgment or
loyalty of a lawyer to a client, "whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other
interest." ABA CODE, Definitions.
" COLORADO OPINION
2a

No. 52 at 55.

Id.

Virginia opinion at 2.
" See ABA CODE Disciplinary Rule [hereinafter DR] 5-101, and authorities cited
therein, n. 29; DR 5-105(D).
"1 COLORADO OPINION
32 Id.

No. 52 at 55, 57.

at 55, 56.

Virginia opinion at 2.
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Colorado Bar Association's Ethics Committee looks at what it
considers "the realities of the marital relationship and the possibility at least that the domestic and professional responsibilities
of lawyers A and B may be on a collision course when they represent conflicting interests. 3 4 Given the possibility of such a conflict, the committee finds the situation covered by the following
provision of the Code:
Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer
shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected
by his own financial, business, property or personal interests. 3

In spite of the provision for consent in DR 5-101(A), the
ethics committee decides that consent may not be given to the
representation of conflicting interests by husband and wife because it "gives rise to such an appearance of impropriety . . .
that such representation should be scrupulously avoided. ' 3 To
support its position that consent is not available to allow employment of lawyers in matters which may conflict with their personal
interests, the committee quotes the following statements from
Drinker's treatise on legal ethics:
The Canon does not sanction representation of conflicting interests where such consent is given, but merely forbids it except in such
cases. The American Bar Association has acquiesced in numerous
decisions of its Ethics Committee construing the exception as not
exclusive and consent is unavailable where the public interest is
involved. There are, also, certain cases in which such representation
is improper or at least unwise even with consent. 7

It is worth noting, however, that the Drinker statement cited
comes from a discussion of the consent exception to Canon 6 of
the old Canons of Professional Ethics,"8 which differs significantly
from the comparable sections of the Code. 9 Canon 6 began with
a requirement that, before accepting employment, a lawyer disclose any interests or relationships he has to the parties or subject
matter of the employment. It then continued, "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
COLORADO OPINION

No. 52 at 55.

ABA CODE DR 5-101(A) (footnote omitted).
COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 56.
Id., quoting H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 120 (1953).
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETncs No. 6 [hereinafter cited as CANON 6].
n ABA CODE DR 5-101; DR 5-105.
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of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."4 Thus,
the Drinker excerpt which appears in Opinion 52 refers to representation of opposing interests by one lawyer, the situation considered in present disciplinary rule 5-105.1' This excerpt does not
refer to the consent exception to representation of an interest
which conflicts with the lawyer's personal interests, now covered
in disciplinary rule 5-101(A). 4 Furthermore, immediately following the excerpt cited in Opinion 52, the Drinker text continues:
There are, however, not infrequently cases in which it is highly
desirable and to the advantage of everyone concerned that the same
lawyer should, at the desire of both parties, represent them both. 3

Professor Drinker continues:
In order that mutual consent be effective, full disclosure must,
of course, be made and the effect of the dual relationship fully explained to both parties. Also, all parties concerned must consent, a
majority not being enough."

There are, of course, situations in which a lawyer's personal
interests would conflict so strongly with those of his client that
representation would be improper even with the client's consent.45
However, in Opinion 52 the ethics committee decides that consent can be made unavailable to allow direct representation of
opposing clients by lawyer-spouses simply because of appearances of impropriety which might result. To support this limitation of consent, the committee refers to the Code requirement
that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of profesCANON 6.
ABA CODE DR 5-105(C).
12
3

Id., DR 5-101(A).
DRINKER, supra note 37, citing Strong v. International B.L. & I. Union, 82 Ill. App.

426, 431 (1898); Eisemann v. Hazard, 218 N.Y. 155, 159, 112 N.E. 722, 723 (1916); Taylor
v. Vail, 80 Vt. 152, 161, 66 A. 820, 823 (1907).
" DRINKER, supra note 37, at 121 (footnotes omitted).
4S Charles R. Frederickson, Chairman of the Colorado Bar Association's Ethics Com-

mittee, has stated that the committee assumed consent by the parties in the following
hypothetical situation when considering the spouse-against-spouse fact pattern: A is law-

yer for an insurance company, paid a regular salary. A's spouse, B, represents the plaintiff
in a $500,000 damage suit against the company A represents. B is paid on a contingent
fee basis. Address by Charles R. Frederickson to a Denver Bar Association topical luncheon, in Denver, Dec. 11, 1974. Certainly, consent to such representation, if it could be

demonstrated, would not suffice to make the representation acceptable under the Code.
However, a finding that such a conflict was improper would not be based only on appeals
to appearances of impropriety, but on the facts, which reveal the kind of conflict with
personal financial interests which would be unacceptable whether the lawyers involved
are husband and wife, parent and child, or related in other ways.
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sional impropriety."4 Specifically quoted is the following ethical
consideration:
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical
conduct of a lawyer may appear to a layman to be unethical ...
When explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal
profession. 7

The ellipses in the material quoted in Opinion 52 mark the omission of several sentences which significantly change the impact
of Ethical Consideration 9-2:
In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in the matters being handled for the client.
While a lawyer should guard against otherwise proper conduct that
has a tendency to diminish public confidence in the legal system or
in the legal profession, his duty to clients or to the public should
never be subordinate merely because the full discharge of his obligation may be misunderstood or may tend to subject him or the
legal profession to criticism."

Thus, the cited Code provision in fact applies to the "champion
of an unpopular cause," and not to lawyers whose professional
actions are misinterpreted by some members of the lay public,
even though the lawyers are acting in accord with the "explicit
ethical guidance" available in the Code for dealing with questions
of conflict of interests.4 9
While the Colorado opinion relies on a finding of appearances
of impropriety, even where no actual conflict may exist,5" the
Virginia opinion is based on a finding of actual conflict. The
Virginia committee states that it is "most reluctant to conclude
, ABA CODE Canon 9.

,7Id. Ethical Consideration [hereinafter EC] 9-2, cited in
at 56.
,ABA

COLORADO OPINION

No. 52

CODE EC 9-2.

See, e.g.,
ABA CODE DR 5-101; DR 5-105; EC 5-1 to 5-3; EC 5-14 to 5-17; EC 5-19;
EC 5-21; EC 5-22.
This is not to impute improper intentions to any lawyer, nor to ignore
the fact that in many marriage situations no actual conflict would exist.
"

COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 55 (emphasis added).

We are of the opinion that Fact Situation 1 gives rise to such an appearance of impropriety, even though such impropriety may not in fact exist, that
such representation should be scrupulously avoided.
Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
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that under no circumstances would [such representation] be
proper."'" Examples of situations that might be proper, according
to the committee, are representation in a completely uncontested
matter after full disclosure and consent, and representation by
married lawyers who are in fact legally separated. The committee
continues, however:
Even these situations give rise to problems but the Committee is not
prepared to say that such representation is improper per se....
[Tihe Committee feels that these instances would be so isolated
that it should be enunciated as a general rule that representation
under these circumstances is in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."

In support of this rule, the committee cites the following
Code provisions: 1) Every client's right to his lawyer's totally
independent judgment and undivided loyalty;5 3 2) a lawyer's duty
to guard zealously against any personal interest or involvement
which might impair dedication to his client's cause;14 and 3) the
client's right to feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his
lawyer without any question of the lawyer's integrity in keeping
the client's confidences inviolate. 5 "To allow a husband and wife
to advocate opposing positions in the same controversy. . . tends
to compromise these well-established principles of professional
ethics.""
The committee also notes that the public considers the marital relationship uniquely close, and states that allowing representation of differing interests by lawyer-spouses would be to
approve an appearance of impropriety "in derogation of Canon
9."57 Clearly the Virginia committee finds the likelihood of actual
impropriety in representation of opposing clients by lawyerspouses much greater than does the Colorado committee.
Furthermore, reliance by both committees on the need to
avoid appearances of impropriety may be contrary to some recent
court decisions in which the concept has been considered. In
Coles, Manter & Watson, P.C. v. Denver District Court" former
1' Virginia opinion at 1.
52

Id.

11ABA CODE EC 5-1.

51Id. EC 5-2.
Id. EC 4-1.
Virginia opinion at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
177 Colo. 210, 493 P.2d 374 (1972).
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members of the public defender's office sought to represent certain defendants on a private basis at the request of their clients.
The Denver District Court found the representation improper
because of appearances that the lawyers had engaged in solicitation of clients or that they had previously mis-stated the defendants' indigency in order to qualify them for representation by
public defenders. This decision was reversed by the Colorado
Supreme Court, which found those appearances insufficient to
justify interference with the defendants' right to the counsel of
their choice. According to the court the proper remedy was not
to disqualify the lawyers from the case, but to bring disciplinary
proceedings against the lawyers based on evidence of actual, not
apparent, violations of the Code.59
An even stronger statement against an overboard application
of the concept of appearance of impropriety is found in the case
of Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
0 in which the
Corporation,"
defendants moved to disqualify the
plaintiff's lawyers because one partner in that firm had previously worked as an associate in the law firm representing the
defendants. The defendants argued that the standard for vicarious disqualification should be set broadly, encompassing participation in suits against any interest ever represented by a previous
firm by all partners and associates of that firm in order to avoid
even the slightest appearance of impropriety.' In rejecting this
contention, the court stated that such important considerations
as the right of clients to counsel of their choice and the need to
avoid restricting the careers of young lawyers required that disqualification be based on proof of actual work in specific cases by
the former lawyer from which it would be reasonable to infer that
he had gained information of value to his present client. "The
danger of damage to public confidence in the legal profession
would be great if we were to allow unfounded charges of impropriety to form the sole basis for an unjust disqualification.""2
Colorado bases its disqualification of lawyers from cases in
opposition to their spouses on grounds of avoiding appearances of
impropriety, while observing that actual impropriety may not
"

2

Id. at 214, 493 P.2d at 375.
370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), afJ'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.
370 F. Supp. at 589.
Id.
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exist. 3 Virginia states that such representation may not be allowed because it will in fact compromise well-established ethical
principles, although the committee offers no facts from which an
inference of compromise of principles could be drawn, but bases
its conclusions upon ideas held by "the public" about the nature
of the marital relationship." In effect both decisions disqualify
married lawyers from certain representation on the basis of "unfounded charges of impropriety."65
B.

Lawyer-spouse's Firm Against Lawyer-spouse's Firm
It has been stated under the original Canons, under the present
Code, and by numerous opinions of this Committee that what a
lawyer cannot do because of ethical precepts neither his partner,
associate, employee or co-shareholder may do."6

This principle of vicarious disqualification has also been applied by courts, particularly in actions where, for example, the
plaintiff seeks to disqualify the defendant's lawyer because of a
former association of that lawyer and the plaintiff's lawyer. 7 It
has been embodied as a disciplinary rule in the Code of Professional Responsibility by an amendment adopted by the American
Bar Association. Previously, disqualification of lawyers in an entire firm was required (as a minimum standard) only when one
member of the firm could not accept employment because it conflicted with the interests of another client.68 Under the amended
rule, however:
If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or
See note 50 supra.
1,Virginia opinion at 2.
63

11 Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), afJ'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.
u COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 56, citing COLORADO BAR Ass'N ETHICS COMM., FORMAL
OPINION No. 27 (1963), and ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 33 (1931).
67 See, e.g., Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955);
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975; Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F.
Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
1002 (1959). In Laskey Bros. the court states: "[A]Il authorities agree that all members
of a partnership are barred from participating in a case from which one partner is disqualified." 224 F.2d at 826.
'5 If a
lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may
accept or continue such employment.
ABA CODE DR 5-105(D) (1971).
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any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or
continue such employment."

Both the Colorado and Virginia opinions have concluded that
representation of clients with conflicting interests by husband
and wife is not ethically proper, and that consent of the clients
involved is not available to lawyers under such circumstances.
Because they cannot obtain consent of their clients, the lawyers
are required to decline the employment according to Disciplinary
Rule 5-101(A)." Under the strict standard of vicarious disqualification described in the preceding paragraphs, one would assume
that the lawyers' firms must also be unable to accept the employment.
Both opinions apply this strict standard to the situation in
which one lawyer-spouse actively participates in a case against
the other spouse's firm.7 But both decline to rule that the two
firms must refuse representation against each other so long as
neither spouse participates in the matter, holding that such representation does not present such an appearance of impropriety
as to require disqualification. This reasoning fails to recognize
that it is not an appearance of impropriety which requires firm
disqualification, but the fact that one lawyer in the firm is precluded from accepting the representation because of ethical precepts."
The anomaly created by the opinions is readily apparent. If
the proper interpretation of the Code requires the conclusion that
spouses cannot directly represent opposing interests, then a consistent interpretation of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) requires that
" Id., as amended, March 1, 1974.
7 Id. DR 5-101(A).

COLOanDO OPINION No. 52 at 56-57; Virginia opinion at 2.
The simple fact that spouses practice with firms representing clients
with conflicting interests shoud not automatically invoke the disqualification of DR 5-105(D) . . . . [Tihe potential for an appearance of impropriety
as proscribed by Ethical Consideration 9-2 is not great enough to ethically
preclude representation.
COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 57.
Conclusion 3 [that the firms may represent opposing interests when
neither spouse participates] was reached in recognition that in such cases
the Committee cannot arbitrarily conclude . . . that an appearance of impropriety must necessarily result.
Virginia opinion at 2.
13 See text accompanying notes 66 and 69 supra.
"'

12
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both firms which employ the spouses must decline that representation. The committees' reluctance to adopt this latter rule casts
doubt upon the correctness of the former conclusion.
Obviously, applying a broad requirement of vicarious disqualification, as the Code seems to require, would produce very
harsh results. The committees were correct in holding that such
representation does not create serious appearances of impropriety. However, to reach this conclusion they had to misinterpret
or ignore Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D). Recognizing the necessity
for exercising great care in the prohibition of any kind of representation would avoid such inconsistency and obtain a result reasonable under both the Code and accepted principles of legal ethics.
Such prohibitions should not be made on the basis of unsubstantiated claims of "appearances of impropriety."
C.

RepresentationInvolving Public Office

Opinion 52 concludes that it is improper for a lawyer to defend a person in a criminal case prosecuted by a member of the
district attorney's office which employs the lawyer's spouse.7 4 Although not specifically stated, presumably the committee would
not permit representation directly against the lawyer's spouse,
but would permit it by a member of one spouse's firm against a
member of the other spouse's office.
Similar conclusions are drawn by the Arizona Ethics Committee.7 5 That committee applies its opinion to any situation in
which one spouse is a member of the staff of a public office engaged in criminal prosecution, and the other is a member of a firm
engaged in private practice in the same community.7" The committee holds that representation would be improper if either
spouse is directly involved in the prosecution or defense.7 7 It then
sets forth strict guidelines for maintaining complete separation of
the case from either spouse, and determines that, if those guidelines are complied with, other members of the private firm can
defend in a case prosecuted by other members of the prosecuting
office.78
COLORADO OPINION No. 52 at 55, 56.
No. 73-6.
7' Id. at 1.
I at 12, 13.
Id.
78 Id. at 14.
7' ARIZONA OPINION
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m was in answer
The Illinois opinion"
to the question posed by
a lawyer whose wife was an assistant state's attorney as to
whether he could represent defendants prosecuted by his wife or
another assistant in that office. The primary responsibility of the
state's attorney was in domestic matters, but she did prosecute
many misdemeanors and "an occasional" felony case."0 The ethics committee said:

We speak of husband and wife being united as one. How two people
can live together as husband and wife while they are in the midst of
contending with all the strength, energy and ability at their command as opponents in a lawsuit and particularly in a criminal case,
is difficult to understand."

The committee then found such representation improper, due to
the fact that defendants might seek out the spouse in private
practice, who might receive special consideration in the defense
of the case."2 On this basis, the committee held not only that the
husband cannot represent defendants in criminal cases prosecuted by the state's attorney's office, but also that he cannot
represent plaintiffs in civil cases involving a criminal violation,
whether or not there is or has been a prosecution. 3 The opinion
does not consider whether a lawyer associated with the husband
could defend a person prosecuted by another member of the
state's attorney's office, nor does it indicate how it might decide
this question.
All three opinions find that the potential conflict presented
when lawyer-spouses take opposite sides of a criminal case is not
one which can be avoided by full disclosure and consent. 4 Arizona relies on the grounds that the state cannot consent to such
representation, and that, even if it could, to do so would be to
sanction an appearance of impropriety. 5 The Colorado committee says that consent is not available to sanction representation
of conflicting interests in cases which involve the public interest.88
The Illinois opinion finds consent unavailable because of the naILLINOIS OPINION No. 311.

I at 1.
Id.
I
Id.
92Id.

u Id. at 3.
" ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 5; COLOADO OPINION No. 52 at 56; Iu.LNOIS OPINION
No. 311 at 2.
ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 5.
"

COLORADO OPINION

No. 52 at 56, citing DRINKER, supra note 37, at 120.
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ture of the conflict itself. That committee states that consent is
designed to permit employment of a lawyer in a situation where
the conflict of interests arises from separate, unrelated transactions, not from the very transaction in which employment is
sought. s7 All these statements about consent apply a principle
developed in the context of consent to representation of opposing
clients by one lawyer to a different situation-conflict between
the lawyer's personal and professional interests."'
A holding that, solely because of the marriage relationship,
consent is unavailable to allow a lawyer to defend a client represented by the prosecuting office which employs the lawyer's
spouse requires a conclusion that the private spouse's entire firm
must be precluded from defense work against the public spouse's
office. This situation was considered by the Philadelphia Bar
Association Ethics Committee in 1961.1' That committee concluded that the marriage relationship itself did not ethically preclude one spouse or the spouse's partners and associates from
engaging in criminal practice, but that any situation which would
impair the community's confidence in the administration of justice had to be avoided. 0 Such loss of confidence would be most
likely, according to the committee, if the two spouses were directly involved in the matter, and might occur even if neither
spouse were involved.9 Ways to decrease the likelihood of such a
loss of confidence include insulating both spouses from the case,
and obtaining the defendant's informed consent to the representation.92 This approach avoids a flat prohibition based on the
marital status of the lawyers, and there is thus no requirement
under the principle of vicarious disqualification that the private
firm is barred from criminal defense work.
" ILLINOIS OPINION No. 311 at 2, citing ILLNoIs STATE BAR ASS'N, PROFESSIONAL ETHics
OPINION No. 166 (1958). This opinion considered the question of whether full disclosure
and consent would permit two lawyers in the same firm to represent opposite sides in the
same matter, and concluded that it would not.
" See text accompanying notes 37-42 supra.
" PHILADELPHIA BAR Ass'N Emics COMM., OPINION No. 61-3 (1961) [hereinafter cited

as PHILADELPHIA OPINION No. 61-3], cited in ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 6. The Philadel-

phia committee considered whether a lawyer or his partners or associates are barred from
representing criminal defendants when the lawyer's spouse is an assistant district attorney. A digest of its opinion appears in MARu,supra note 23, 4031.
" PHILADELPHIA OPINION No. 61-3, cited in ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 13.
91 Id.
11 ARIZONA OPINION No. 73-6 at 14.
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One may also limit the facts which reasonably support an
inference that the criminal justice system has been impaired by
a careful definition of the public spouse's official function. For
instance, the Arizona committee states that, when its opinion
refers to a member of a public prosecutor's staff which employs
one spouse "we have reference solely to a lawyer actively engaged
in the prosecution of criminal cases, and not to a lawyer whose
duties pertain solely to matters other than criminal prosecutions
(e.g., a lawyer working solely on civil matters)." 93
This approach is consistent with the attitude shown by the
Colorado Supreme Court in a case involving charges of unethical
conduct by lawyers who were or had been public employees. In
4 a defendant appealed
Medberry v. People"
his conviction of murder on the ground that his trial lawyer was a county attorney in
the county where the case was prosecuted and should have been
disqualified. In rejecting this contention, the Colorado Supreme
Court observed that the county attorney was employed to serve
as adviser to the county commissioners, and took no part in initiating criminal proceedings. Therefore,
[Iln defending one charged with crime, at least where the county
has no interest beyond that ordinarily attaining, a county attorney
does not represent conflicting interests nor serve two masters. 5

If such careful consideration of a public official's function
allows one lawyer to represent potentially conflicting interests,
similar care should be taken in defining a lawyer's duties so as to
allow the lawyer's spouse to accept such representation.
In conclusion, the Virginia and Colorado opinions apply a
rule of consent which was developed with reference to representation of two clients with conflicting interests by one attorney in
order to forbid representation of two such clients by husband and
wife. Under DR 5-105(D), this prohibition requires that the
lawyer-spouses' firms should also be disqualified from such representation. The opinions eschew such vicarious disqualification
because representation of opposing interests by firms which employ lawyer-spouses does not present a sufficient appearance of
impropriety. This conclusion, although correct, is inconsistent
with the logical system of ethics presented by the Code of ProfesIId. at 1.

107 Colo. 15, 108 P.2d 243 (1940).
Id. at 19, 108 P.2d at 245.
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sional Responsibility. The same result could be achieved in accord with the Code if the opinions permitted representation of
conflicting interests by husband and wife or their firms after full
disclosure to and consent by the clients.
Similarly, completely forbidding defense by one spouse of
criminal cases prosecuted by the other solely because of their
marital relationship should require that the private attorney's
firm is precluded from defense work against the other spouse's
office. Vicarious disqualification of married lawyers' firms can be
avoided, however, by opinions which focus, not on the lawyers'
status, but instead on public confidence in the criminal justice
system and which prohibit facts which might decrease that confidence, as did the Philadelphia Bar Association's Opinion Number 61-3.11 Such opinions could require insulation of lawyers with
potentially conflicting personal interests from participation on
either side of criminal cases, taking care to define the function of
a lawyer in public office precisely so that such insulation is as
narrow as possible.
II.

THE CONSTITUTION

The opinions under consideration are subject to criticism not
only because of their strained interpretations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but also because there exist serious questions as to their constitutionality. Before those questions can be
analyzed, however, one must determine whether the issuance of
the opinions by the various ethics committees constitutes state
action sufficient to activate the protections of the fourteenth
amendment.
A.

State Action

Governmental action sufficient to be subject to constitutional restrictions is most clearly found in the issuance of the
Arizona and Virginia opinions. In each of those states, the bar
association is an official arm of the state supreme court, created
for the purpose of assisting in the regulation of the legal profession, and all lawyers admitted to practice must belong to the bar
association. 7 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar" the Court recog96 See notes 89-91 supra, and accompanying text.
g ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-201 (1956) (creation of the Association); ARIz. Sup. CT.
R. 27(a) (membership requirements); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-49 (1974 Replacement Vol.).
gx 95 S. Ct. 2004 (1975).
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nized that the Virginia Bar was a state agency when acting within
its statutory mandate, although holding that the ultra vires enforcement of a minimum fee schedule was not state action99 for
Sherman Act purposes.'" Accordingly, the integrated bars' ethics
opinions, unless untra vires, would constitute state action.
The Illinois State Bar Association is a private organization,
and issuance of its opinion might initially seem to be private
action. However, the inquiry and hearing divisions of the association's disciplinary committee are commissioned by the Illinois
Supreme Court to serve on the court's disciplinary commission.",'
As commissioners, they are charged with investigating and hearing complaints against lawyers, and with recommending the disciplinary action to be taken by the supreme court in each case.'12
Given this official function of a part of the bar asociation in the
discipline of attorneys, the opinions of its ethics committee on the
same subject would arguably also constitute state action because
of the committee's involvement with a state agency'03 in performing the public function of regulating the legal profession.'0
The Colorado Bar Association is also a private organization,
and it has no official function in the discipline of Colorado attorneys."'5 However, a variety of supposedly private activities have
been found subject to constitutional restrictions."' No precise test
for recognizing state action has been formulated, since "[o]nly
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance. "107
One approach to the question of state action has been to
Id. at 2015.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
ILL. SuP. CT. R. 753(a) (Supp. 1974).
"
Id. 753(a)-(c).
3 Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Powe v.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)
and McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
I For cases recognizing that public functions might be sufficient to constitute state
action, see Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
"
Petition of Colo. Bar Ass'n, 137 Colo. 357, 365, 325 P.2d 932, 936 (1958).
'
See Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), and cases
cited therein.
"I Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
"

"
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determine whether the state is so involved with the private activ0 The
ity as to make it subject to constitutional limitations.'1
most recent cases applying the "state involvement" test have
concentrated especially on whether the involvement amounts to
governmental control of, or right to control, the nominally private
action. 10 9 "Under this control standard state ex officio
membership on policy-making bodies and state veto power over
institutional decisions might be important factors." 110 In the context of this test, it is worth noting that the Board of Governors of
the Colorado Bar Association is made up of lawyers representing
different geographic regions of the state and representatives of
such state organizations as the District Attorneys Association,
the House of Representatives and State Senate, the County and
District Judges Associations, the Court of Appeals, and the
Supreme Court."' Also, on at least one occasion, the Colorado
Supreme Court has reacted to an opinion of the bar association's
ethics committee by stating that lawyers affected should ignore
the opinion." 2 This is action tantamount to veto power over the
committee's decisions, and therefore within the control test set
3
forth in Pendrell v. Chatham College."1
The second approach courts have used in finding that nominally private action constitutes state action has been the "public
function" test."4 "[Sitate action exists where a private entity
performs what would ordinarily be a municipal, governmental
function ..
."I" One recent case applying this doctrine is
United States v. Wiseman,"6 which held that private process
servers performed a public function." 7 In Dacey v. New York
Cases cited note 103 supra.
McDonald v. NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625, 630 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Pendrell v. Chatham
College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 498 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 498 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
ColoradoBar Association 1974-1975 Administration, 4 CoLo. LAwYER 47, 48 (1975).
"2 Address by Charles R. Frederickson, supra note 45.
" 370 F. Supp. 494, 498 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See text accompanying note 110 supra.
114 Cases cited note 104 supra.
IS Pendrell v. Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494, 497 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See Barrett
v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), citing Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S.
296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974).
445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 967 (1971).
Id. at 796, citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944).
O*
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County Lawyers' Association"' the author of the book How to
Avoid Probate! sued the New York County Lawyers' Association
for denial of his civil rights.."9 Dacey charged that the Association's petition to adjudge him in contempt for unlawful practice
of law was an attempted abridgement of his rights to freedom of
speech and press.'20 The Second Circuit applied the doctrine of
judicial immunity to the suit by Dacey, noting that "when the
Association instituted its proceedings against Dacey, its role was
analogous to that of a public prosecutor.''2
Many cases have found that the practice of law is a public
function. 22 The Colorado Supreme Court has held that restraint
of illegal practice of law benefits both the legal profession, by
protecting lawyers' private interests in having business, and the
general public, by protecting lay people from the harm of having
unqualified people act as lawyers. 2 3 In the context of disbarment
proceedings, the same court has stated, "It is the privilege, if not
the duty, of every attorney to call to the attention of this court
any act of a licensed attorney which may fairly be considered to
'2 4
disqualify him."'
In addition to formal regulation of the legal profession by the
courts, most state bar associations issue opinions like those under
21 5
consideration interpreting the ethical rules for their members.
Although such opinions may not have final authority,
[they] do have a considerable informal force. There are no scientific
studies to prove this, but bar executives and officers, Ethics Committee members, and others with experience have repeatedly stated
2
that this is so.'1
"'

423 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).

III

The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).

' The Association's petition was eventually dismissed. New York County Lawyers'

Ass'n v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1967).
423 F.2d at 192.
' See, e.g., In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 327-28, 41 P.2d 161, 162 (1935); In re Thomas,
16 Colo. 441, 446, 27 P. 707, 708 (1891); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Johnson, 344
Ill. 132, 143, 176 N.E. 278, 282 (1931).
"2 Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 409, 312 P.2d
998, 1003-04 (1957).
"I People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Class, 70 Colo. 381, 384, 201 P. 883, 884 (1921)
(dictum).
' M.Au, supra note 23, at 1.
I' Id. at 2-3. Following this statement, Maru cites several authorities, including D.
Sears, then Chairman of the Ethics Comm., Colo. Bar Ass'n, in 33 TENN. L. REv. 145
(1966).
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In Colorado the present rules of procedure for the discipline of
attorneys'2 7 were drafted by the grievance committee of the Colorado Bar Association and submitted by its Board of Governors to
the Colorado Supreme Court, which 2adopted rules "substantially
the same" as those submitted to it. 8
In summary, state officials with the power to discipline attorneys have been involved to a considerable extent with the Colorado Bar Association, as evidenced by their representation on the
organization's Board of Governors and by the fact that, on at least
one occasion, the supreme court has, in effect, vetoed an opinion
issued by the association's ethics committee.2 9 Moreover, given
the attitude that regulation of the practice of law is a public
function, 3 0 participation in that function by the bar association
in such ways as drafting rules of procedure for the discipline of
attorneys and issuing opinions on questions of professional ethics
adds support to a finding that the issuance of Colorado's Opinion
3
52 constitutes state action. '
If the opinions under consideration are deemed to constitute
state action, they are subject to the restrictions imposed on the
states by the fourteenth amendment. The effect of the opinions
may be considered under four aspects of constitutional rights:
The burden on a lawyer's choice to marry another lawyer; 32 the
restriction of the lawyer-spouses in the exercise of their rights to
work in the occupations they choose; 33 the interference with
clients' rights to counsel of their choice; 34 and the use of an irrebuttable presumption that lawyers married to one another cannot
zealously and professionally represent clients with differing inter3
ests.' 1
B.

Right to Marry
The effect of an ethics opinion which absolutely precludes

Cnv. P. Ch. 20.
Molen, Foreword to COLORADO BAR ASS'N, THE PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBLTIES OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES IN COLORADO at 4 (1957).
'2' Notes 110, 112 supra, and text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
"3 See text accompanying notes 122-24 supra.
"I Of course, if the opinion is used by the Colorado Supreme Court to discipline an
attorney, state action would clearly be found, under the reasoning of Shelly v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
132 See text accompanying notes 17-19, 23 supra.
'
See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
,' See text following note 19 supra.
3 See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
COLO. R.

"
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representation of differing interests by lawyers married to each
other is to penalize a lawyer's choice to marry another lawyer. A
lawyer may find, for example, that he is unable to represent defendants in criminal cases because his wife is an assistant district
attorney. Or both spouses may find themselves unable to obtain
jobs, because prospective employers wish to avoid possible conflicts with other law firms in the community. 3 ' This harsh effect
on lawyers related to each other by marriage is in striking contract to the relative leniency with which representation of differing interests by lawyers related in other ways is treated. 7
The marriage relationship has long been conceded to occupy
a protected position under the Constitution:
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights
to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar
order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected. '

A variety of state regulatory schemes have been found unconstitutional because of their effects on the marriage relationship: A
state tax law under which income of the wife and children living
with the husband was taxed as the husband's; 39 mandatory maternity leave rules for school teachers; 40 and laws forbidding use
of contraceptives by married people.'
In addition to those schemes, anti-miscegenation statutes
have been held invalid because they interfere with the freedom
to marry.' In Perez v. Lippold 3 the California Supreme Court
held that marriage is "a fundamental right of free men" which
could not be infringed by the state except for important objectives and by reasonable means.'44 Furthermore, the court said:
See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
See note 23 supra.
'
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See
also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 715, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (1948).
'3' Hoeper v. Tax Comm'r, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
40 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
"' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d
'3'

'37

17 (1948).
",
'"

32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
Id. at 714, 198 P.2d at 18-19.
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Since the right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the
person of one's choice, a statute that prohibits an individual from
marrying a member of a race other than his own restricts the scope
of his choice and therefore restricts his right to marry.'

Under this reasoning, the harsh effects which result from the
opinions under discussion amount to a penalty on a lawyer's
choice to marry another lawyer, and therefore restrict his or her
right to marry. Certainly, the states' objective, protection of the
public by prevention of conflicts of interests between lawyerspouses, is important. Whether absolute preclusion of such representation by lawyers married to one another is a reasonable
means to that objective is open to serious question.'
C.

Right to Work

As already discussed, one effect of the opinions under consideration may be to close employment opportunities for lawyers, at
least in certain fields within the profession.14 7 To determine
whether such an effect renders the opinions unconstitutional, it
is necessary to examine the somewhat complicated line of cases
in the area of the right to work.
It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a
living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the
purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.'

However, the right to work is not an absolute one, and this is
particularly true of what the Colorado Supreme Court has called
"the learned professions," for which the state may require a license of one who wishes to practice. 4 Although the states may
regulate admission to, or practice of, such professions in order to
protect the public, they cannot do so "in a manner or for reasons
that contravene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.' ' 50 At least one court has warned
"'

'
"'

Id. at 715, 198 P.2d at 19.

See text accompanying notes 176-80 infra.
See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.

Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915), quoted in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 720
(1973). A similar view of the right to work as a fundamental right is found in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Van Zandt v. McKee, 202 F.2d 490, 491 (5th Cir.
1953); Battaglia v. Moore, 128 Colo. 327, 332, 261 P.2d 1017, 1020 (1953); People v. Love,
298 11. 304, 310-11, 131 N.E. 809, 811 (1921).
People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 P. 928 (1929).
"s Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). Cf. In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Ex parte Garland, 71
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that standards of professional ethics must not be interpreted in
such a way as "to unnecessarily circumscribe the career of a
young professional. The Canons may not be used . . to obtain
the advantages of an implied restrictive covenant that would be
of doubtful validity in any other employment situation."''
Although one may have a right to work as a lawyer which
may not be infringed by the state, it is not as clear that one has
a right to work as, for example, a criminal lawyer. A strong argument demonstrating the existence of such a right may be found
in the case of Prouty v. Heron."2 There, the plaintiff had been
licensed as a professional engineer, without restriction. Thereafter, he sought renewal of his license, and was classified as a civil
engineer. He sued to enjoin the Colorado Board of Examiners for
Engineers and Land Surveyors from restricting his practice to
that branch of the profession, and the injunction was granted.
The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that he acquired a valuable
right protected by the due process clause of the Colorado and
United States Constitutions when he qualified for a license to
practice without restriction under the standards prevailing at the
time of his admission. "It follows, therefore, that the legislature
cannot . . deny or abridge that right in any manner except for
cause," and then only in accordance with due process requirements.' The limitation on an engineer's right to practice all
specialties within his profession is analogous to the restrictions
which the opinions studied in this article impose on the practice
of law by lawyers married to other lawyers. As with the opinions'
effect on the right to marry, it is necessary to inquire whether the
limitation on a lawyer's right to practice his profession is necessary to achieve an important state objective. While the importance of the state's objective is conceded, whether the means cho54
sen is reasonable is doubtful.
D.

Clients' Rights to Counsel of Their Choice
As discussed above,

5

there are many situations in which

U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Chenoweth v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 57 Colo.74, 141
P. 132 (1913).
5I Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 583
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), afl'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.
12 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
" Id. at 174-75, 255 P.2d at 758.
'" See text accompanying notes 176-80 infra.
" See text following note 19 supra.
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clients may undergo substantial hardship because of the opinions
under consideration. This is particularly true in instances where
one spouse is employed in a matter against the other spouse's
firm, as, for instance, where the husband seeks to represent the
buyer of a house who obtains a mortgage loan from a bank represented by the wife's law firm. The flat prohibition against representation of differing interests by lawyers married to each other
may also work hardship in highly-specialized areas of law where
relatively few lawyers with the required training and experience
may be available. In such a field, the question of conflicts of
interests may be complicated by the fact that attorneys may
move from one firm to another as they gain experience in the
field; it is thus instructive to review the doctrines which have
developed regarding conflicts with the interests of clients of one's
former firms.
In general, a former client need show only that the attorney
representing his present adversary represented him in a matter
substantially related to the present case, and such a showing will
establish an irrebuttable inference that the attorney received confidential information of value to the adversary. 15 This inference
becomes rebuttable, however, where the attorney is to be "vicariously disqualified"-for example, by virtue of his partner's former association with a firm which represents the client.'57 One
reason given for allowing a lawyer to rebut the presumption is
that the "effect of an over-harsh rule of disqualification must be
to hinder adequate protection of clients' interests in view of the
difficulty in discovering technically trained attorneys in specialized areas who were not disqualified ... "8
It is important to note that this recognition of the need to
protect clients' interests in obtaining qualified counsel has arisen
in the context of representation by an attorney which conflicts
with the interests of another of his clients,'59 present or past.
Certainly similar protection of that right should be offered for
t' Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed,
264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
...
Id.; Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581,
587 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.
"I Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955). See
also Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 583, 587
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, Docket No. 74-1104, 2d Cir., May 23, 1975.
"I ABA CODE DR 5-105.
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clients where the representation conflicts with the lawyer's personal, financial, or property interests, 60 provided that the client
gives informed consent to such representation. Protection of this
right should not require a showing of special hardship such as lack
of other qualified counsel to allow the client's knowledgeable
choice of his lawyer to be honored.
E.

Conclusive Presumptions

To the extent that the opinions absolutely forbid representation by a lawyer of interests which differ from those represented
by his spouse solely because of the marital relationship they act
as conclusive presumptions that the lawyers are not capable of
professionally representing their clients.' The~use of such a
presumption of unfitness raises serious questions as to the opinions' constitutionality.
The classic discussion of the role of presumptions in statutory schemes is given by the Supreme Court in the case Mobile,
J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed.'62 The Court there holds that it is
permissible for a given regulatory scheme to allow or require an
inference of one fact from evidence of another, without denial of
due process of law, but only if
there [is] some rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, and [if] the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely
arbitrary matter....
If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself prescribing
a rule of evidence . . .does not shut out from the party affected a
reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the
facts bearing upon the issue, there is no ground for holding that due
6 3
process of law has been denied him.

Thus, there are two approaches to challenging a presumption
in a regulatory scheme. First, one may show that there is no
rational relationship between the fact proved and the fact presumed. An example of this approach appears in United States
Department of Agriculture v. Murry.' 4 Murry involved a challenge to a rule which denied eligibility for food stamps to any
person over 18 who was claimed in the previous year as a depen16 Id. DR 5-101.
" See text accompanying

,' 219 U.S. 35 (1910).

Id. at 43.

" 413 U.S. 508 (1973).

notes 63-65 supra.
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dent child for tax purposes by a taxpayer not in a household
eligible for food stamps, and to all members of the dependent's
household. The Court recognized Congress' interest in preventing
abuses of the food stamp program by children of wealthy parents,
particularly college students. However, it rejected the rule because the standard it set had no rational relation to the dependent child's present indigency or need for food stamps, and even
less rationality as a measure of the need of other members of his
household.'65 "It therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process
''156

The second approach is to show that the presumption prevents a defense to the fact presumed by the one on whom it
operates. This argument was advanced early in this century to
overturn tax regulations which presumed conclusively that gifts
made within a certain time before a taxpayer's death were in
contemplation thereof and so were taxable as part of the donor's
estate."7 In rejecting such statutes, the Court said, "a statute
which imposes a tax upon an assumption of fact which the taxpayer is forbidden to controvert, is so arbitrary and unreasonable
' 68
that it cannot stand under the Fourteenth Amendment.'
In recent years, the doctrine that conclusive presumptions
violate due process by preventing a defense to the fact presumed
has been applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate a number
of legislative or regulatory schemes. Carrington v. Rash"9 involved a provision of the Texas constitution which denied the
right to vote in state elections to a member of the Armed Forces
not registered to vote in Texas prior to induction. Forbidding a
soldier any opportunity to controvert the presumption of nonresidence "imposes an invidious discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'' ° Similarly, suspension of a driver's
license of a driver involved in an accident who failed to give proof
of financial responsibility was found unconstitutional because the
Id. at 513.
I5
Id. at 514.
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (federal statute applied to gifts within two
years of death); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) (state law applied to gifts
within six years of death).
"I Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 325 (1932). Note that present federal tax law
contains a rebuttable presumption that gifts made within three years of death should be
taxed as part of the decedent's estate. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2035(b).
"'
380 U.S. 89 (1965).
Id. at 96.
'"
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statutory scheme did not consider whether the driver was in fact
liable;' a regulation which allowed children to be taken away
from their unwed father without a hearing on his fitness was
struck down;'72 and a state regulation under which the classification of residency or non-residency for tuition purposes was unchangeable while the student remained enrolled in the state university was found void.' 73
Most recently, the Supreme Court heard a case involving
rules which required pregnant school teachers to take unpaid
leaves of absence upon reaching a designated month of pregnancy.'74 The school systems sought to justify their rules on the
ground that they were protecting their interest in preventing unfit
teachers from teaching. This interest was found legitimate, but
the Court held that the challenged regulations swept too broadly,
amounting to a conclusive presumption that all pregnant women
are unfit to teach after a particular point of pregnancy. Under this
reasoning, the regulations were found unconstitutional, because
"permanent irrebuttable presumptions have long been disfavored
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." '
The Colorado and Virginia ethics opinions are subject to
challenge in both respects. By prohibiting representation of opposing interests by husband and wife, they prevent the lawyers
from showing that there is in fact no conflict of interest, or that
the clients have given informed consent to the representation.
Furthermore, neither opinion suggests a basis in fact which would
support an inference of professional misconduct from the fact
that the lawyers are married to one another. Instead, both rely
on "the public's" view of the marital relationship, without any
attempt to demonstrate that "the public," or even a significant
minority of it, holds such a view. Because the opinions lack ra"

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 645 (1971).

'T'

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In this case two lower court
decisions were consolidated. One challenged a regulation which required a teacher to begin
maternity leave after four months of pregnancy. LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326
F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972). The other involved
a rule requiring leave to begin after five months. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd.,
326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973).
"I Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644, citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 446 (1973).
'7
''
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tional relationship between the fact proved and the fact inferred,
and because they prevent any defense to the fact presumed, they
are subject to challenge as invalid conclusive presumptions.
IlI.

REGULATING CONFLICT OF INTERESTS BETWEEN SPOUSES

In determining whether it is necessary to forbid representation of conflicting interests by lawyers married to each other, one
should consider whether there is an adequate system available to
provide satisfactory discipline in any cases where the lawyers do
in fact act improperly. This approach has been used by the U. S.
Supreme Court in cases in which lawyers were denied admission
to the bar. The Court has required a showing that exclusion of the
individual or class of individuals is essential to accomplish the
state's interest in maintaining high professional standards. 7 ' The
same showing should be made before flatly denying a lawyer the
right to accept a certain kind of representation, but the opinions
under examination have failed to do so.
In Colorado the machinery for disciplining attorneys has recently been strengthened by a requirement that attorneys admitted to the bar and actively practicing in the state must pay an
annual fee to defray the cost of disciplinary procedures against
lawyers."' The system has been used frequently to discipline attorneys for a variety of unprofessional conduct.7 8 Even if disciplinary proceedings are not brought, representation which presents
a serious conflict of interest may be challenged by a party to a
case through a motion to disqualify the attorney involved. 79
In view of the unsatisfactory results which arise from the
prohibition of representation by spouses of clients with differing
interests, and the fact that suitable means to discipline lawyers
who act unprofessionally in such a situation are available, the
opinions' conclusions that consent may not be given to represen-

"'In re Griffiths,

413 U.S. 717, 727 (1973) (denial of admission to a resident alien).
See also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
'7
COLO. R. Civ. P. 227.
People v. Wilson, 176 Colo. 389, 490 P.2d 954 (1971); People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo.
357, 490 P.2d 951 (1971); People v. (Attorneys Respondent), 162 Colo. 174, 427 P.2d 330
(1967); People v. Selby, 156 Colo. 17, 396 P.2d 598 (1964); People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n
v. Ginsberg, 87 Colo. 115, 285 P. 758 (1930). Cf. Coles, Manter & Watson, P.C. v. Denver
Dist. Ct., 177 Colo. 210, 493 P.2d 374 (1972), and text accompanying notes 58-59, supra.
"I, See, e.g., Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964); Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc.,
163 F. Supp. 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed, 264 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1002 (1959); Coles, Manter & Watson, P.C. v. Denver Dist. Ct., 177 Colo. 210,
493 P.2d 374 (1972).

SPOUSES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

tation which pits lawyer-spouse against lawyer-spouse or the
spouse's firm is unnecessary. A better approach to the question
of such representation could be made if the ethics committees
had begun their inquiries with the following assumption:
There is no reason to doubt that these are mature, capable individuals who will honor the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Any...
policy that, in effect, denies equal opportunity to either spouse on a
contrary assumption should accordingly be discouraged, for it resists
the new reality from which clients and the profession itself benefit
that accords married men and women equal treatment. 80

CONCLUSION
The author realizes that, at the present time, most clients'
consent would probably result in restrictions similar to those set
forth in the opinions under discussion. That is, most clients would
consent to representation by the firms so long as neither spouse
is involved; some clients would consent to representation by a
lawyer against a client represented by the lawyer's spouse's firm;
and only a few clients would knowingly consent to direct representation of conflicting interests by husband and wife.
The reader might inquire why the decision of clients is preferable to the holdings of the opinions if in fact it is likely that the
effect of the two will be similar. One answer is that there is great
value gained by achieving a result acceptable to lawyers and
nonlawyers without sacrificing consistent application of the Code
of ProfessionalResponsibility. Furthermore, the number of lawyers married to other lawyers will continue to increase with the
increased enrollment of women in law school, and that increase
will no doubt be accompanied by greater acceptance of husband
and wife lawyers as professionally responsible, competent individuals. Allowing clients who wish it the right to consent to representation of differing interests by husband and wife will allow
smooth adjustment to that increased acceptance.
Nancy B. Calvin
Simpson Memorandum, supra note 17, at 3.
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No. 52
(Adopted February 9, 1974)
COLORADO OPINION

Syllabus
It is improper for a lawyer to represent a client having interests which differ from
those of a client represented by the lawyer's spouse, and such impropriety may, but does
not necessarily extend to members and associates of the firms with which each spouse is
associated.
Facts
Lawyer A and Lawyer B are husband and wife. They are not associated in the practice
of law.
1. Lawyer A seeks to represent a client whose interests differ from those of a client
represented by Lawyer B.
2. Lawyer A seeks to represent a client being prosecuted by a district attorney's
office which employs Lawyer B.
3. Lawyer C, a member of Lawyer A's firm, seeks to represent a client having
interests which differ from those of a client represented by Lawyer D, a member of Lawyer
B's firm.
Opinion
These fact situations raise the question of whether there is any conflict of interest
when husband and wife represent clients having differing interests. Closely aligned are
subsidiary questions of whether, if such conflict exists, it can be eliminated by full disclosure and consent by the clients or whether there is such an appearance of impropriety that
the employment must be declined. Finally, these fact situations raise the question of
whether the ethical obligation to decline employment must extend to members of a firm
with which either spouse practices.
Our opinion recognizes the realities of the marital relationship and the possibility at
least that the domestic and professional responsibilities of lawyers A and B may be on a
collision course when they represent conflicting interests.
It takes little imagination to anticipate innumerable situations where either spouse
might find it difficult to exercise professional judgment solely for the benefit of the client
and free of personal considerations. This is not to impute improper intentions to any
lawyer, nor to ignore the fact that in many marriage situations no actual conflict of
interest would exist. It simply recognizes that this situation is generally fraught with great
potential for conflict of interests. See particularly EC 5-21. Thus, to the extent that their
clients' conflict may lead lawyers A and B into either domestic or financial conflict, one
disciplinary rule immediately comes into play. DR 5-101(A) states:
"Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not
accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of
his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property or personal interests."
For purposes of this opinion, we assume full consent from the clients. We note,
however, that:
"The Canon does not sanction representation of conflicting interests where
such consent is given, but merely forbids it except in such cases. The American Bar Association has acquiesced in numerous decisions of its Ethics Committee construing the exception as not exclusive and consent is unavailable
where the public interest is involved. There are, also, certain cases in which
such representation is improper or at least unwise even with consent."
Drinker, Legal Ethics, p. 120 (1953).
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The question, therefore, is whether this conflict of interest, real or potential, may still
allow for representation after consent is given. Obviously, without consent the proffered
representation must be declined. The primary ethical consideration is whether such representation raises the appearance of impropriety. Ethical Consideration 9-2 reads:
"Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer may
appear to a layman to be unethical. . . . When, explicit ethical guidance
does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal
system and the legal profession."
We are of the opinion that Fact Situation 1 gives rise to such an appearance of
impropriety, even though such impropriety may not in fact exist, that such representation
should be scrupulously avoided.
The same considerations are applicable where either spouse is in public office. Formal
Opinions 14, 18, 45, 46 and 48. The additional ethical consideration which is applicable
to Fact Situation 2 is EC 8-8, which states:
". ...
A lawyer who is a public officer, whether full or part-time, should
not engage in activities in which his personal or professional interests are or
foreseeably may be in conflict with his official duties."
See also ABA Opinions 34 and 186 and New York State Bar Opinion 149. Thus, we
conclude that because of the public visibility of Lawyers A and B the relationship described in Fact Situation 2 is improper.
Fact Situation 3 involves the concept generally referred to as "vicarious disqualification." This concept is incorporated into DR 5-105(D), which states:
"If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may accept
or continue such employment."
This disciplinary rule and its associated ethical concepts support strongly the statements in the Preamble to the Code of Professional Responsibility that while ethical considerations are primarily "aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward
which every member of the profession should strive," lawyers must nonetheless "with
courage and foresight be able and ready to shape the body of law to the ever-changing
relationships of society." Traditionally the opinions of this Committee and those of other
state bar associations and the American Bar Association have construed the concept of
"vicarious disqualification" broadly. It has been stated under the original Canons, under
the present Code, and by numerous opinions of this Committee that what a lawyer cannot
do because of ethical precepts neither his partner, associate, employee or co-shareholder
may do. Formal Opinion 27 and ABA Opinion 33. We do not wish to change or affect this
body of well-reasoned opinion. In our view, the same rationale which requires a lawyer to
decline employment in Fact Situations 1 and 2 applies to either Lawyer C or D when the
client is directly and personally represented by one spouse or the other. In other words, if
Lawyer A's personal client has an interest which differs from that of a client of the firm
in which Lawyer A's spouse practices, there would be a requirement to decline the employment. Even though the client's consent is obtained after full disclosure, this appearance
of impropriety cannot be avoided.
The same rationale is inapplicable, in our opinion, where firm clients-as opposed to
personal clients-have differing interests. The simple fact that spouses practice with firms
representing clients with conflicting interests should not automatically invoke the disqualification of DR 5-105(D). Where the clients are fully informed of the situation and choose
to consent to continued representation, the potential for an appearance of impropriety as
proscribed by Ethical Consideration 9-2 is not great enough to ethically preclude representation.
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Of course, we assume that neither spouse actually obtains information about the
clients represented by the other spouse's firm as the result of the marital relationship. If
either Lawyer A or B receives information inadvertently or otherwise by reason of the
marital relationship, the confidences thus obtained must be preserved inviolate. See ABA
Opinion 47.

SPOUSES AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
APPENDIx B

Opinion letter from R.J. Lillard, Chairman, Legal Ethics Committee, The
Virginia State Bar, dated November 12, 1974.
This is in response to your letter of March 29, 1974, regarding the propriety of a lawyer
representing one party to a divorce action when the other party is being represented by a
firm of which the lawyer's spouse is a member.
Since receiving your inquiry the Legal Ethics Committee has received several other
inquiries and memoranda relating substantially to the same issue. In addition, we had
appear before us at our meeting in Richmond on May 22, 1974, two young ladies whose
presentations were most helpful. We have given all of this our most careful consideration.
The Committee is most reluctant to conclude that under no circumstances would it
be proper for an attorney to represent one party to an action when the attorney's spouse
represents the other party. Indeed, there could conceivably be circumstances where such
representation would not be improper per se; for example, in a completely uncontested
matter after full disclosure by both attorneys and acquiescence by the clients, or where
the husband and wife attorneys are in fact legally separated. Even these situations give
rise to problems but the Committee is not prepared to say that such representation is
improper per se. However, the Committee feels that these instances would be so isolated
that it should be enunciated as a general rule that representation under these circumstances is in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Every client has the right to expect his lawyer's totally independent judgment and
undivided loyalty. (EC 5-1). Every lawyer should zealously guard against any personal
interest or involvement which might impair in any way his total, unrestrained dedication
to his client's cause. (EC 5-2). And every client must feel free to discuss whatever he
wishes with his lawyer. There should be no question of his lawyer's integrity in keeping
these confidences inviolate, and the client should feel no inhibition whatever in making
such revelations to his lawyer. (EC 4-1). To allow a husband and wife to advocate opposing
positions in the same controversy, in the opinion of our Committee, tends to compromise
these well-established principles of professional ethics.
We recognize the wide interest in the subject of your inquiry and that to limit our
response would leave related questions unanswered. Therefore, within the limits permitted by the ethical considerations cited above, DR 5-105 (A through D), and Canon 9, it is
the consensus of our Committee that:
1. Lawyer-spouse against lawyer-spouse (i.e., each actively involved in the
same case) is not ethically permissible, absent circumstances such as set out
above.
2. Lawyer-spouse actively participating in a case against lawyer-spouse's
firm is not ethically permissible, (your inquiry), again absent similar circumstances.
3. Lawyer-spouse's firm against lawyer-spouse's firm (neither spouse actively participating) is permissible.
Conclusions 1 and 2 were reached in recognition that the public generally considers
the husband-wife relationship uniquely close, and that to hold otherwise would be to
approve the appearance of impropriety in derogation of Canon 9.
Conclusion 3 was reached in recognition that in such cases the Committee cannot
arbitrarily conclude either that an actual conflict of interest exists or that an appearance
of impropriety must necessarily result.

NOTE
INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION

-

UNITED STATES

ADOPTION OF VIETNAMESE CHILDREN: VITAL
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE COURTS*
The law, therefore, through adoption makes it possible to provide these children with homes in which they will receive affection,
care, and protection, from adoptive parents who will have a legal
relationship that includes the same rights and responsibilities that
exist between natural parents and their children.'
INTRODUCTION

State statutes which establish and protect the privilege of
adoption permit adoption of foreign-born children by United
States citizens. As a result, thousands of children orphaned or
abandoned in South Viet Nam have been placed for adoption
with United States families.
Because of delays involved, because of the special nature of
the adoption of a Vietnamese child, and because the child has
*At the printing of this note, May 1975, the state of the law under the recently
changed leadership of South Viet Nam is uncertain. However, the laws referred to herein,
whether they remain in effect or not, are the legal framework which governed international
adoption of Vietnamese orphans in the Republic of Viet Nam under the leadership of
President Nguyen van Thieu. For this reason, relevant portions of Vietnamese documents
are cited and are included as an appendix to this note.
Although United States adoption of Vietnamese-born children is the frame of reference of this note, similar considerations are relevant with respect to any international
adoption.
In Saigon, South Viet Nam, June 22 to July 3, 1974, this author inquired as extensively as possible about the legal and social status of orphaned and abandoned children.
Among the many who were most helpful in spite of more pressing concerns with medical,
nutritional, and daily care for the children, were: Margaret Moses and Rosemary Taylor,
Saigon Director of Friends For All Children; Mr. Robert Chamness, Director of Holt

Adoption Services, Saigon; Mrs. Nguyen thi Phuong, Social Worker, International Social
Service, Saigon; Ms. Pat Weser, United States Embassy, Saigon; local orphanage directrices and workers in the Delta region and the environs of Saigon.
In the United States, Wende Grant, Director, and the staff of Friends For All Children, Boulder, Colorado, helped to make it possible to gather documentation necessary
for treatment of this subject. Nguyen thi Xuan Huong, Vietnamese national and University of Denver graduate student; Connie Boll, Director of Friends of Children, Inc., and
of the Rosemary Taylor Agency, both of Darien, Connecticut; and many parents of Vietnamese adopted children have shared their experiences and knowledge.
Further insight has been possible because of this author's work in Vietnamese adoption and in support programs for non-adoptable children in Viet Nam. With her spouse,
she has been a party to the United States finalization of the adoption of a Vietnameseborn child.
I N.Y. DEP'T Soc. SEAV., NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATION ON ADOPION 5 (1972).
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been brought to the United States upon petition for a final decree
of adoption in a United States court, it may appear that the
court's decision whether or not to grant the decree is somewhat
after the fact. The child has been brought half-way around the
world. He is probably receiving from the family who wishes to
adopt him the most adequate diet, complete medical care, and
psychological parenting he has ever known. The family, for its
part, has been scrutinized by social workers, adoption agencies,
United States immigration authorities, and the Vietnamese
government. Nevertheless, the court's decision is crucially important to all the parties to the adoption.
The judge is the last and most authoritative determiner of
the future of the parties to an adoption, domestic or international. The ruling of the court must be in the best interest of the
child, and in violation of the rights of none of the parties. The
final decree, if granted, must be unassailable by any later claims.2
In the case of adoption of a Vietnamese child by a United
States family, the court's discretion and protection are particularly necessary for securing the child's best interest. The child has
no counsel to represent him, and the agency which placed him
with the family is most often geographically distant. The court
has the authority to examine post-placement reports and to inquire about the family's adjustment.3 Decrees must not be
granted on the premise that even an unpromising future is better
than abandonment. The number of applicants for Vietnamese
infants far exceeds the number of available children.' These children, like all others, have a right to grow and develop under the
best possible circumstances.'
The necessity for the decree to be unassailable is articulated in TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-101 (1955):
[TMo protect them from interference, long after they have become properly
adjusted to their adoptive homes, by natural parents who may have some
legal claim because of a defect in the adoption procedure.
3 E.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-507 (Supp. 1973).
ORDER OF ADOPTION. - The judge must examine all persons appearing
before him pursuant to the last section, each separately, and the report of
the investigation provided pursuant to the last section and if satisfied that
the interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, he must make
an order declaring that the child shall thenceforth be regarded and treated
in all respects as the child of the person adopting.
Interview with Wende Grant, Director of Friends For All Children, in Boulder,
Colorado, Oct. 25, 1974.
1 Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/811 at 1 (1948); Declara-
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A ruling which violates the rights of none of the parties,
including those of the natural parents, and the granting of an
unassailable final decree are interrelated concerns. If all prior
rights to the child have been properly and legally terminated, the
decree will be secure from later attack. Parties to the United
States adoption of a Vietnamese child are entitled to this protection and final security of status just as are the parties to a domestic adoption.
If an adoption is effected pursuant to local statutes which do
not contemplate the problems peculiar to foreign adoptions, there
is a possibility that some rights will be violated. Among these are
the child's right to the legal status (free for adoption) accorded
him by the laws of his domicile and recognized by the United
States Immigration Act,' and the right of the adoptive parents
to protection from later extortion or unscrupulous claims that
rights to the child were not properly terminated.7
Jeopardy to the rights of some parties or excessive protection
of the rights of others is a distinct possibility when the petition
is examined solely within the context of local procedural law. The
majority of local statutes pertaining to adoption were not drafted
in contemplation of transnational or transcultural adoptions. The
substantive intent of the law for the benefit and protection of the
parties may actually be violated by strict procedural application
of the local statutes. If the court hearing a petition for adoption
of a Vietnamese child will consider the vastly different cultural
and legal circumstances from which the child so recently comes,
and also appreciate the possible narrowness of its local statutes,
the parties to the adoption will have the same protection and
security of status that parties to domestic adoptions enjoy.
It is the purpose of this note to explore United States and
Vietnamese adoption procedures, the cultural realities and legal
tion of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 19, U.N. Doc.
A/OR/14/5/16 (1959).
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (G)(1)(F) (1965).
See note 11 infra regarding protections for adoptive parents; CIWL CODE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, Decree-Law No. 028-TT/LSU, tit. 7, ch. 1 (1972) (official transl.
Phuong Khanh Nguyen, Legal Processing Assistant, Far Eastern Law Division, Law Library, Library of Congress, August, 1974) [hereinafter cited as C. Civ. V.N.], arts. 248
to 251. The relevant portions of C. Civ. V.N. are included in the appendix to this note.
See also the text accompanying notes 31 through 39 infra concerning social upheaval and
possible ramifications for parties to an adoption.
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system of Viet Nam, the statutory perspective of the United
States courts, and to provide an added perspective for the court
in light of these considerations.
I.

UNITED STATES AND VIETNAMESE ADOPTION PROCEDURES:

SIMILAR YET DIFFERENT

A.

United States Adoption

The termination of all prior rights to the child and a final
decree establishing a legal parent-child relationship between the
child and the adoptive parents are the principal components of a
United States adoption.8 If the natural parents wish to give the
child up, they may usually do so in a number of ways: by a release
of custody to the new parents; by a release of custody of the child
to an agency which then has the authority to make adoptive
placement and release its custody to the new parents; by abandonment as defined by the law of the jurisdiction; or by judicial
termination of parental rights as defined by the law of the jurisdiction.' In theory at least, in the United States, there is always
some person or institution in custody of the child, and custody is
traceable back to the birth certificate because recording and certification of the births of children are routine.
In the United States, potential adoptive parents who have
received custody of the child petition the court for a final decree
of adoption.' 0 In hearing this petition, the court determines
whether or not the placement is in the best interest of the child,
establishes whether the child is indeed legally free for adoption,
and attempts to protect the rights of all parties concerned." The
I E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 9:3-24, 30 (1953). Termination of prior parental rights to
the child and the decree of adoption are interrelated and part of the same proceeding. In
re Adoption of Children by D., 61 N.J. 89, 293 A.2d 171 (1972), discusses the difficulties
inherent in the interrelation of both steps. NEV. REv. STAT. § 127.110(2)(g) (1973) is an
example of separation of the two steps: "[Tihe petition for adoption shall state, in
substance, the following: That there has been a full compliance with the law in regard to
consent to adoption." The consent to adoption is a separate procedure which precedes a
petition to adopt.
I E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 224, Consent of Parents and Exceptions; § 224m, Relinquishment for Adoption (West Supp. 1974). These sections are an example of the legal definition of steps usually taken in giving up custody or parental rights.
,0 E.g., IOWA CODE § 600.1 (1971).
See, e.g.,

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 36-101 (1955):

Purpose of chapter - Construction. - The primary purpose of this chapter
is to protect children from unnecessary separation from parents who might
give them good homes and loving care, to protect them from adoption by
persons unfit to have responsibility of their care and rearing, and to protect
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court's determinations are facilitated by the above-mentioned
custom of birth registration and by statutory controls over the
form and manner of relinquishment and passage of custody from
one party to another. Any "gap" in the legal history of a child
born in the United States would indicate possible violation of the
rights of a natural parent or some other legal quardian.'" Concern
them from interference, long after they have become properly adjusted to
their adoptive homes, by natural parents who may have some legal claim
because of a defect in the adoption procedure.
The secondary purpose of this chapter is to protect the natural parents
from hurried decisions, made under strain and anxiety, to give up a child,
and to protect foster parents from assuming responsibility for a child about
whose heredity or mental or physical condition they know nothing, and to
prevent later disturbance of their relationship to the child by natural parents
whose legal rights have not been fully protected.

When the interests of a child and those of an adult are in conflict, such
conflict should be resolved in favor of the child; and to that end this chapter
[shall] be liberally construed.
See also N.J. REv. STAT. § 9:3-17 (1960):
Public policy. This act shall be administered so as to give effect to the
public policy of this State to provide for the welfare of children requiring
placement for adoption and so as to promote policies and procedures which
are socially necessary and desirable for the protection of such children, their
natural parents and their adopting parents. To that end, it is necessary and
desirable
(a) to protect the child from unnecessary separation from his natural
parents, from adoption by persons unfit for such responibility, and
from interference by his natural parents after he has been established
in an adoptive home;
(b) to protect the natural parents from hurried or abrupt decisions
to give up the child;
(c) to protect the adopting parents from assuming responsibility for
a child without sufficient knowledge of the child's heredity and capacity for physical and mental development, and, having accepted a child
for adoption, from later disturbance of their relationships to the child
by the natural parents.
See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-102 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1 (1966).
" See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 435 (1974). These requirements for consent to
the adoption of a minor are typical of the thoroughness of United States state statutes:
Consent to adoption of minor:
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, if the person to be adopted is
a minor, consent to the adoption shall be given, and the final adoption decree
executed on the part of the minor, by both of his parents or by the surviving
or sole parent. Such consent and decree shall be sufficient when given and
executed:
(1) By one parent, if the other parent has abandoned the care and
support of the minor, or is, in the opinion of the probate court, incompetent
to have the care and custody of such minor;
(2) By the mother, if the minor is not born in lawful wedlock, or though
such minor was born to a woman living in lawful wedlock, it is proved beyond
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about this continuity of legal custody is well in keeping with the
adoption hearing's purpose to protect the rights of all the parties. 3
United States adoptions of Vietnamese children have appeared for finalization in significant numbers before United
States courts in the past 5 years.' 4 Although the legal formalities
observed in the adoption procedure itself are similar, the course
of a child's life from birth to adoption and the legaf documentaa reasonable doubt that the husband of such woman is not, by reason of
nonaccess, the father of such minor;
(3) By the minor and his spouse, if the minor is married;
(4) By the guardian, if the minor is under guardianship;
(5) By the department of social and rehabilitation services, if the
minor has no parent, guardian, husband or wife, or if the parents, guardian,
husband or wife of such minor have abandoned his care and support or have
left the state or, in the opinion of the probate court, are incompetent to have
the care and custody of the minor;
(6) By the department of social and rehabilitation services of this state
or its counterpart in another state, if the minor has been committed to the
care and custody of such department by a court of competent jurisdiction
without limitation in respect to adoption, or if the minor has been relinquished to it in accordance with applicable state law;
(7) By a child placing agency licensed or approved by the appropriate
authority in this or another state if the minor has been committed to the care
and custody of such department by a court of competent jurisdiction without
limitation as to adoption, or if the minor has been relinquished to it in
accordance with applicable state law;
(8) By the parent or parents as above provided, though one or both of
such parents be minors, if such minor parents are, in the opinion of the
probate court, of sufficient judgment and discretion to act for the best interest of such child to be adopted; otherwise consent shall be given and the
decree executed by and in behalf of such minor parents as though such minor
parents were being adopted; but in neither case shall the adoption be subject
under provisions of section 454 of this title to being vacated at the instance
of such minor parents after they become of age;
(9) By the department of social and rehabilitation services, if the
minor has been adopted in a foreign country and if readoption is necessary
in the United States, for the purpose of naturalization as a citizen of this
country;
(10) By the department of social and rehabilitation services when so
authorized by a public agency or licensed child placing agency of another
state having jurisdiction of a child whose adoptive parents are residing in
Vermont.
13 Supra note 11. See also text following note 5 supra.
14 Between July 1969 and July 1973, 6,400 United States visas were issued to
Vietnamese-born children. Of those, 3,790 were granted citizenship at birth and acknowledged by American fathers. An estimated 2,640 entered the United States as immigrants
awaiting adoption by United States families. USAID, Meeting on Placement and Adoption of Vietnamese Children in American Homes, 18 (1973).
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tion of that period are quite different from what they would have
been in the United States.
B.

Vietnamese Adoption

In Viet Nam recording and certification of births are not
routinely done. The natural mother may or may nor register the
child at birth." If natural parents are unable to provide for a
child, it may simply be raised by the large, extended family unit
to which they and the child belong." The intervening circumstances of war, extreme poverty, and vice have perpetuated a climate
wherein family units are weakened and often destroyed. 7 Thus,
children are commonly given up by abandonment to the care of
local orphanages, to unrelated persons, or simply deserted in public places. Formal relinquishment is possible, but seldom practiced. 8
In the United States the adoptive parents initiate proceedings; under Vietnamese law any of the parties to the adoption
may request an adoption hearing." In that public hearing the
court approves or rejects the adoption on the basis of two criteria:
(1) Fulfillment of legal conditions; and (2) legitimate motivation
for the adoption and its benefit to the child.20 An adoption contract containing required consents and drawn in the presence of
a notary at the residence of either the child or the adoptive parents must be submitted in a brief prior to the hearing.2 '
" Customs with respect to birth registration vary. The date may indicate when the
child began school, the date of conception, or the date when the child reached 1 year of
age. Registration of birth is often done to attain a status such as student, aid recipient,
or property holder.
"[A]nd I asked her [the grandmother] what would the mother do with these
children? And she said, 'Take care of them as long as we can. These are our children.' "
Hearings on Relief and Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina Before the Subcomm.
to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 Orphans and Child Welfare at 12 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Rel. & Rehab. War Victims Hearing].
" See MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE, REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, SOCIAL POLICY AND OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL WELFARE at 24; pt. IV at 31
(1968-71) [hereinafter cited as V.N. Soc. POL.].
1 A semi-literate, destitute, or socially embarrassed mother is not likely to see the
need to record her failure by identifying herself in a relinquishment.
"1 C. Civ. V.N. art. 254.
20Id.

" Id. art. 252.
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Differences Between United States and Vietnamese
Adoptions

The child's identity and his legal status as free for adoption
must be established in adoption proceedings in both countries.
This is accomplished by a birth certificate and a release of custody which are required to accompany the petition for adoption.
Thus, the Vietnamese born, United States-adopted child comes
before the court with the same documentation that is routine in
domestic United States adoptions: a birth certificate or birth
judgment, and a release of custody with consent to adoption.
The hidden difference is that these documents have been
formulated in compliance with Vietnamese rather than United
States law. 2 The Vietnamese birth certificate and release of custody to the adoptive parents have evolved from radically different
cultural circumstances and from a legal system designed to serve
people in those circumstances.2 3 In Viet Nam the birth certificate
may name a natural mother, and the release with consent to
adopt may come from an orphanage, with no accounting for any
span of time or termination of rights in the interim. Vietnamese
law permits legal custody and the authority to release a child for
adoption to originate in the institution sheltering a child. 4 Establishment of such authority in the institution caring for a child
facilitates chances for betterment of the position of the orphaned
or abandoned child. His best interest is served by legal allowances
for the impossibility of exhaustive identification of someone in his
circumstances whereas, in the United States, where the hardships
of war, poverty, and vice do not exist to a similar extent, such a
legal standard might violate the best interests of a child and only
an exhaustive legal verification of his past may serve him best.
Id. arts. 247-51.
n We can understand that the Social Welfare policy of the Republic of
Viet-Nam was worked out based on the Constitution of 1st April, 1967,
especially on the following provisions . ...
V.N. Soc. POL. at 5.
,4 C. Cv. V.N. arts. 249-52, 254 at appendix. By allowing establishment of authority
to consent and powers of relinquishment over a child with no prior legal identity, Vietnamese law facilitates adoption or other benefits in spite of the impossibility of tracing his life
history.
The Ministry of Social Welfare has articulated the government's concern: "The state
advocates protecting the families, mothers and infants because the family is the foundation of society." V.N. Soc. POL. at 6. This concern is also evident in constant references
to orphaned and abandoned children as "underprivileged elements" in Vietnamese society
and needful of support.
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II.

THE CULTURAL REALITIES AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF VIET NAM

Some exploration of both the cultural realities and the legal
system of Viet Nam is necessary to an articulation of considerations which could broaden a court's perspective in the application
of local United States statutes.
A. Cultural Realities
Complete documentation of a social climate is difficult at
best. These observations on Vietnamese culture and customs are
carefully made after extended research with directors of Vietnamese orphanages, foreign agencies, adoption workers, embassy officials, missionaries, Vietnamese and French-Vietnamese citizens,
and American parents familiar with the histories of their adopted
Vietnamese children.
The family remains unsupplanted as the strong center of
Vietnamese society. The Constitution of Viet Nam affirms its
central importance.25 The child is answerable to and watched over
by everyone older in his family unit.2" Adoption is not common
even though it is encouraged by the government in this time of
war, upheaval, and extreme poverty. An adopted child under
Vietnamese law immediately loses his right to the family altar
and inheritance at the birth of a natural heir.2 8 The importance
of the family concept and the anomalous position of an adopted
child is exemplified by a Vietnamese woman who explained the
security and strength of the extended family unit while stating
that she had eight natural children and one legally adopted niece,
a term which illustrates the lesser status of adopted children in
Vietnamese society.
Local orphanages in Viet Nam are shelters for children who
have been orphaned or abandoned. The same religious order may
often also provide extended care and day care for other needy
children. There is recognized, however, a sharp distinction between orphans and children who have not been totally aban2

CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM art. 17 (1967) (V.N. Soc. POL. transl. 1971).
The State recognizes the family as the foundation of the society. The State
encourages and assists in the formation of families, and cares for mothers
and infants.

Id.
, Interviews with Nguyen thi Xuan Huong, University of Denver graduate student,
in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 1974 and interviews in Saigon, Viet Nam, June 1974.
V.N. Soc. POL. at 29.
" C. Civ. V.N. arts. 261 & 262.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 52

doned. It was explained to the author that recordation of vital
statistics, such as marriage or legal relinquishment of custody of
a child, have only recently become routine. People are semiliterate, well known to one another only within their communities, and unlikely to travel more than a few miles from home in a
lifetime. 9 The head of an orphanage, however, is active in the
community and known to all, and does have the means to ascertain the status of the children in the orphanage.
Orphanages are not casual about the release of children.
Children are their reason for existence. Dark-skinned, racially
mixed, deformed, handicapped, male, or desperately ill children
are often those released for adoption. They are the ones with the
least hope of integration into their communities; the least likely
to find a means of livelihood to enable them to survive. Thus, the
child who comes before United States courts for adoption has
survived a process of somewhat negative selection within his native society.
Along with the disruption of the family unit and resultant
traumas for children, there has been a simultaneous flourishing
of the unsavory elements of society:
The social evils are developing extensively and become an increasingly serious and complicated problem: War and poverty are
the most favorable medium for the increase of vagrancy, juvenile
delinquency, prostitution, use of narcotics and gambling. Preventive
and eradication measures have been taken against those vices. 3

There are large concentrations of orphaned or abandoned children in areas known for what the Ministry of Social Welfare terms
"social evils. ' ' 3 1

United States adoption statutes recognize and provide
Interviews with Mrs. Nguyen thi Phuong, Social Worker, International Social Service, Saigon, June 1974; and Nguyen thi Xuan Huong, University of Denver graduate
student, Denver, Colorado, Sept. 1974.
30 V.N. Soc. POL. at 31.
3' There are 19 orphanages in Gia Dinh Province which includes
the city of Saigon.
The geographical region which includes Saigon has 39 percent of the total number of
orphanages in the Republic of Viet Nam. 19.5 percent of them are in the region which
includes the city of Da Nang. V.N. Soc. POL. at 26.
Outside the door in Saigon, youthful human flotsam . . . scraping a

pittance.. . . Some just beg; others steal or become prostitutes - and some,
even the youngest, have turned to pushing drugs.
NEWSWEEK, May 28, 1973 at 53; also included in an extension of remarks inserted by
Representative Mink, CONG. REC. 3428 (daily ed. May 24, 1973).
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against black market practices in adoption." These practices
exist in Viet Nam as well and are not statutorily treated. In
addition to having comparable motivations for profit, the potential Vietnamese opportunist is also a person in most dire straits,
in whose environment it is accepted that the unscrupulous or
desperate commonly, if illegally, sell children or derive income
33
from their labors.
Specific information commonly available in the United
States which permits conclusive determination of identity and
responsible advertisement of notice is not easily obtainable in
Viet Nam. In the Vietnamese language certain names are more
common than Smith or Jones are in English. 4 Vietnamese birth
certificates do not commonly include details about parents' racial
background, appearance, education, or occupation which would
permit distinction between persons of the same name.3 5 Established mailing addresses and identification comparable to social
security numbers may be unavailable due to the present conditions in the country.
In light of these cultural factors 3 it is foreseeable that a
mismanaged attempt to verify the authority to give consent, or
3 E.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 695e (1974) Bringing Child into State for
Placing; Mo. REV. STAT. § 543.110 (Supp. 1967) Prohibiting Transfer of Custody of the
Child: Penalty; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.108 (1973) Restrictions on Child Placing in
Michigan.
Rel. & Rehab. War Victims Hearing, supra note 15, at 17.
SEN. KENNEDY. "[Clould you talk just a moment about one of the problems that you have been aware of, as to how real it is, the fact that mothers
actually sell children in Viet Nam."
MR. KLEIN. "This is true, Mr. Chairman."
SEN. KENNEDY. "And also the problem of abandoning children. Is this
true?"
MR. KLEIN. "This is true, Mr. Chairman."
Statement of Mr. Wells Klein, Executive Director, American Council for Nationalities
Service, New York, and Member of the Kennedy Study Mission to South Viet Nam.
Regarding parents' deriving income from their children's labor see appendix to this note,
C. Civ. V.N. art. 274 (control of children's property); art. 276 (control of property earned
by child's labor).
Family names such as "Nguyen" or "Ton" originally indicated geographical origins
of a family. Today people socially embarrassed by their origins often give children different names to avoid stigma. Interview with Nguyen thi Xuan Huong, University of Denver
graduate student, in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 1974.
' Interview with Suzanne Dosh, Assistant Director, Friends For All Children; Peg
Peters and Sandra Schneider, Adoption Workers, Friends For All Children, in Boulder,
Colorado, Sept. 1974.
" See notes 31, 32, 34, & 35 supra, and accompanying text.
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the indiscriminate publication of notice required by a United
States court, could provide an opportunity for an unscrupulous
person to claim the child, thereby creating a legal limbo into
which the child is propelled by requirements designed to provide
certainty of status.
B.

Legal System

Vietnamese law would attempt to preclude the opportunity
for exploitation of the child or the adoptive family by recognizing
and requiring consent of the family council in the absence of
parents or grandparents with legal control, and by giving the head
of the benevolent institution 7 rearing a child the power to relinquish custody and consent to its adoption. Courts assume custody
and give consent for children abandoned in the streets and for
recognized illegitimate children without known or identified parents. 8 Constructive notice or notice by advertisement is not required.
The rights of the natural relatives, including parents, grandparents, and family council, are of a much broader scope than
in the United States where the grandparents' consent is only required in those states which refuse to accept relinquishment by
a minor natural mother without her parents' consent also.39
Protection of the rights of the natural parents is accomplished by provision for authority through a stipulated sequence
of relatives if the parents or others in the sequence are dead or
"unable to express an opinion on the matter."4 0
" See appendix to this note, C. Civ. V.N. arts. 249-52, 254. Charitable institutions
are defined by Vietnamese law. Decree Law No. 027/66 art. 1 (1966) (legal transl. Truong
Dac Phuong):
All organizations operating in the territory of Viet Nam and set up either by
an individual or a religious denomination, with a fraternal, non-profit seeking object, and having the capacity to receive at least 10 persons, for feeding
them and assisting them, shall be considered as charitable organization[s]
governed by the provisions hereof.
They are further defined, Order No. 620/BXH/ND art. 1 (1966) (legal transl. Truong Dac
Phuong):
Shall be considered as charitable institutions by article 1 of Decree Law No.
027/66 . . .the following organizations: orphanages, small children nursery,
old people houses, beggar improvement houses, mute and deaf houses, children sponsorship center, vocational training centers, etc. and similar organizations, meeting all the conditions provided in article 1 hereabove and the
activities of which are permanent.
C. Civ. V.N. art. 250 in the appendix to this note.
" E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(2) (1972).
" See C. Civ. V.N. arts., 249, 250 in the appendix to this note.
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Notice is automatic with the search through the progression
of parties empowered to consent by the death or incapacity of
others closer to the child. Allowance for separations due to the
upheavals and disasters of war is apparent in the phrase "dead
or unable to express an opinion," which occurs several times in
4
the text of the law. 1
Both Vietnamese laws and government statements of intent
express strong motivation to provide for the orphaned and abandoned. 4 Due to the death, disappearance, and incapacity of so
many, the paramount concern is to meet the needs of the homeless, and thereby mend the fabric of Vietnamese society. 43 Legal
standards of Viet Nam are like the laws of the United States in
that they reflect the cultural concerns, protect the rights, and
attempt to meet the needs of the people they govern. Legislatures
and courts must, however, realize that while the concerns of the
two countries regarding children are the same, the means of implementation of the safeguards of all rights are different and the
differences must be recognized in order that the best interest of
the parties be served.
III.

STATE STATUTES-THE PRESENT PERSPECTIVE OF THE COURT

At this time, there is no uniform United States policy with
respect to recognition of the legal documents of the foreign-born,
United States-adopted child. A United Nations agreement on the
subject, ratified by both parties, or a United States-Vietnamese
treaty supported by an act of Congress, would provide a standard
for such uniform treatment.4 Neither the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights nor the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of the Child make specific mention of the legal status
of the orphaned or abandoned child.45 To date no treaty between
1 Id. This is further evidenced by provision for passage of paternal power from father
to mother in C. Civ. V.N. art. 267: "In case the father . . .cannot exercise such power
due to his absence or any other reason whatsoever ....
" See CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM, art. 17, supra note 25. Further statements
of this intent are: V.N. Soc. POL., supra note 17 at 6 (recognition of families, mothers and
infants as underprivileged elements of society); id. at 17 (government resettlement of
197,378 refugees, 53 percent of whom were under 15 years of age); id. at 25 (Coming Home
Program to reunite children with families where possible and encouragement of adoption).
,3V.N. Soc. POL., supra notes 23-25 & 42.
1 M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 156 (2d ed. 1969): "Under Art. VI a ratified
treaty becomes the law of the land, even though it is not a legislative act but more nearly
a 'contract' between two nations."
41 Supra note 5.
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the United States and Viet Nam with respect to adoption has
been concluded; and there appears to be no treaty between any
other country and the United States which would serve as precedent for uniform determination of the legal status of children
based either on laws of their domicile, or on some other standard.
During the period of numerous inter-country Korean adoptions of
the 1950's and 1960's, there was apparently nothing concluded."
Each state enacts laws to protect the rights and provide for
the needs of citizens within its own jurisdiction. Most states make
little or no provision in their adoption statutes for the completely
different culture, legal system, customs, and economic environment from which the foreign-born, United States-adopted child
comes.47 Although some states may recognize foreign judicial decrees of termination of parental rights, this is helpful only in the
instance that there is such a decree from the domicile." In Vietnamese placements this is not a usual occurrence. The Uniform
Adoption Act, which is incorporated in the statutes of many
states, mentions foreign adoption, but does not uniformly provide
for recognition of the law of the child's domicile with respect to
relinquishment for adoption." There is thus grave possibility of
violence to the rights of the very parties whom the statutes by
their intent would protect. 0
A.

With Respect to Consent5
1. Consent by Guardian
One purpose of statutory regulation of authority to consent

46 Interview with John Adams, Director of Holt Children's Services in Eugene, Oregon, Sept. 6, 1974.
11E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 927 (Cum. Supp. 1970); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
710.3(3)(a)(3) (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-215 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-17
(Supp. 1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-35 (1973); ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.385 (1973); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 509 (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 71-207 (1962).
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-17 (1971).
, See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.20 (1966); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 61-215 (Supp. 1971). Both statutes, typically, give the same effect to a foreign decree of
adoption as to a decree issued within state jurisdiction. This is of little help to the foreignborn child not yet finally adopted in his own country when he is petitioning for a United
States adoption.
10 See, e.g., jurisdictional statutory requirements, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.84 (persons
required to consent).
1, It must be clear that this discussion of statutory characteristics is illustrative of a
variety of legal procedures. Any evaluation is made with respect to international adoption
only. Exhaustive comparison of state law would serve no purpose, since jeopardy to the
rights of the parties as discussed herein occurs in jurisdictions where courts have discretion
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is protection of all parties to the adoption from coercion or other
unscrupulous practices by an intermediary who also may be custodian of the child.5" State statutes commonly provide for custody
in a court or designee of the court when there is no living person
in custody of the child.5 3 However, establishment of custody and
concomitant authority to give consent for adoption of a child
5
without a guardian varies widely.
In Hawaii, for instance, consent may be given by the court
5
itself if the guardian is not legally empowered to give consent.
In Georgia, consent may be waived where parents are incapacitated or cannot be found and "the court is of the opinion that the
adoption is for the best interest of the child.
...
56 Among the
strictest provisions are those requiring judicial termination of
parental rights or an order from a court giving consent powers to
a guardian. 7 More moderate is the requirement that the person
giving consent have authority to do so under the laws of the
jurisdiction of the child's domicile. 8 Oklahoma, for example, recognizes consent of the person having legal custody who resides
outside the United States. 9 A state not specifically recognizing a
foreign legal document may very probably recognize the validity
of a relinquishment of custody, a consent to adopt, or an adoption
decree from elsewhere in the United States so long as it is in
compliance with the laws of the state having jurisdiction. 0 Many
states appoint an individual or an agency to act as next friend or
in enforcing statutory requirements to promote the best interest of the child. Where that
discretion is not specifically granted, legislative intent to act in the child's best interest
would still allow something less than strict statutory construction. See note 11 supra.
52 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 67(a) (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-708 (1974).
' See note 61 infra.
E.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500 (1972); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 127.040, 127.050,
127.053, 127.055, 127.057 (1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 432(a) (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (interim Supp. 1974).
53 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 578-2(4) (Supp. 1974).
" GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403 (2) (1974) (exemption where child abandoned or parental
custody terminated).
11E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 72(a) (1973) (concerning court order establishing
consent powers); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.84(1)(a), 48.871 (1957) (concerning judicial termination of parental rights).
" E.g., MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.44(4) (Supp. 1975):
[Tihe court . . . shall determine whether the consent was executed in accordance with the laws of that state or country . ...
"' OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.5(6) (Supp. 1974).
' E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 535 (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.170 (Vernon
1949).
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representative of the child when no one fulfills the statutory requirements authorizing power of consent." The appointment of
a next friend indicates recognition of the fact that the child's best
interests will truly be served when he is a separate party to the
adoption with his own legal counsel.2
2. Consent by Intermediary Agency
In any international adoption the court and counsel must
appreciate that whether or not the international agency which
acts as intermediary holds legal custody and gives consent for the
adoption, examination of its role is one of the most thorough
protections for the rights of all the parties. Understanding of the
foreign legal and cultural parameters within which the intermediary functions will facilitate reasonable application of state statutory requirements for both consent to adopt and notice.
The local Vietnamese orphanage which consents to adoption
by a United States family might appear to be the counterpart of
an American placement agency. Rather, it is the international
agency which acts as intermediary and brings the available child
and prospective parents together. The Vietnamese orphanage
stands in the place of the natural parent for an orphaned or abandoned child. An agency which is licensed in Viet Nam may or
may not have authority to consent,63 but does parallel the placement agency in a domestic United States adoption.
Strict Vietnamese control of intermediary practices is
achieved by means of individual contracts by which foreign agencies are licensed to operate in Viet Nam, rather than by statutes
controlling operation of charitable institutions.64 Each contract is
by government decree. 5 Due to varied forms of guardianship perE.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-1 (Supp. 1974):
[I]f there be no legal guardian nor any person having the legal custody of
the child, then such consent must be obtained from some discreet and suitable person appointed by the court or judge thereof to act as the next friend
of such child ....
6 Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321
N.Y.S.2d 65, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805 (1971); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.J. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 65 (1973); Foster, Adoption and Child Custody:
Best Interests of the Child?, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1972).
6 This authority is by individual contract, note 65 infra.
" As charitable institutions, Vietnamese orphanages and international agencies are
strictly controlled and subject to inspection at all times. They are accountable for their
finances and charges. See note 37 supra for definition of a charitable institution.
" The usual contract begins with an order number identifying the institution which
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mitted by these individual contracts, foreign agencies may place
children with releases directly from the local orphanage to a family in the United States."6 Awareness of this governmental control
of all foreign adoptions and of the scope of authority of a
governmentally-limited number of agencies is significant to the
judicial consideration of the role of the intermediary in Vietnamese placements. Verification of authority to give consent may or
may not give an indication of the intermediary's activities, but
the terms of its Vietnamese contract will. 7
Examination of the authority of the benevolent society, i.e.
charitable institution, to relinquish the child without consideration of the credentials and the role of the international agency
which actually made the placement will not provide the protection for the parties which United States laws intend."
B.

With Respect to Notice

In the United States, statutory provision for notice to the
natural parents of an adoption hearing is a component of the
has been decreed a charitable institution by the Ministry of Social Welfare. Usual terms
of such a contract would include agreements to absolutely respect Vietnamese adoption
laws; agreement to place children only with families having approved social work home
studies with certified approvals; agreement to provide nourishment for children, to assist
local orphanages, and to provide emergency medical care; and agreement to hold guardianship of children only as specified by contract.
se The scope of authority permitted by contract is discussed in note 65 supra. An
international agency may not have spent the months required by the added paperwork
step of documenting its legal custody on a per child basis when that custody is already
decreed by contract.
7 Note 65 supra.
0 The term "benevolent society" (C. Cirv. V. N. arts. 250, 253 in appendix to this
note) comes from the Vietnamese "hoi phuoc thien." Vietnamese law is modeled after the
French Civil Code and French is the second language in Viet Nam. Translated from this
French-Vietnamese background, the English choice of words would be "benevolent society." This is so because the French adjective "benevole" means without charge, while
the French adjective "charitable" only refers to the Biblical virtue of love for one's neighbor. The operation of the groups defined in note 37 supra is more accurately "benevole."
"Societe," in French, refers to an organized group of people working together while the
French noun "institution" denotes the commencement of something, or a social institution such as marriage. Without French influence the Vietnamese to English translation
of "hoi phuoc thien" is more accurately "charitable institution." Decree Law No. 027/66
Order No. 620 BXH/ND, which refer to charitable institutions, and C. Civ. V.N. arts. 250,
253, which refer to benevolent societies, were translated by two different persons. From
their context it is apparent that both refer to the groups sheltering and having custody of
orphaned, abandoned children. P=TITE LAROUSSE DICTIONNAIRE ENCYCLOPEDIQUE 115, 191,
555, 974 (1959); interview with Nguyen thi Xuan Huong, University of Denver graduate
student, in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 1974; notes 19 and 37 supra; C. Civ. V.N., appendix
to this note.
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constitutional right of due process."9 Notice may or may not be
required to parents whose consent is not required because their
parental rights are terminated. 0 Louisiana appoints a curator ad
hoc, who may accept service of notice where the parent "cannot
be located or is not domiciled within the state."" Even when both
parents are dead, Rhode Island requires that notice be published
in such newspaper as the court directs."
Concerns for the non-custodial divorced parent," the natural
mother, 4 and the security of the child and his adoptive family
after issuance of the final decree 5 are all well founded in view of
the rising divorce rate, and the vulnerability of the parties to
extortionate or black market adoption practices.
The only provision for notice in Vietnamese adoption law is
that in the event of divorce, the parent in custody "should notify
the other spouse" of the adoption."6 Passage of the power of consent from parents through paternal grandparents, maternal
grandparents, and family council to court or benevolent society,
protects ties to biological relatives and provides for notice in a
manner more cognizant of local realities in Viet Nam than would
a United States court-ordered summons."
Because only persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States are entitled to constitutional due process, 8 a court may be
' U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
" Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-5 (Supp. 1974) which does not require presence or
consent of an abandoning parent or guardian with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-104 (1971) which
requires notice to "all whom it may concern."
' LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:426 (1965).
72 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-7-8 (1969).
E.g., In re Adoption of Bascom, 126 Mont. 614, 246 P.2d 223 (1952).
7 Statutes specifying a period of time which must elapse before relinquishment is
valid are common. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-107 (Supp. 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
4, § 9.1-8 (Supp. 1974). U.S. CONST., note 69 supra, also establishes the right of the natural
parent to notice as a party to the adoption of a child.
"' Letter from Daniel J. Evans, Governor of the State of Washington, to the Washington State Senate, March 20, 1973, accompanying Senate Bill No. 2459, ch. 134 (1973):
Failure to give such notice can mean that adoptive parents may lose their
child at some point in the future if the parent who was not notified attacks
the adoption in court. The processes and procedures provided for in this act
are designed to render as secure as possible any adoption which is finalized
in a legal manner.
C. Civ. V.N. art. 249 in appendix to this note.
" Interview with Nguyen thi Xuan Huong, University of Denver graduate student,
in Denver, Colorado, Sept. 1974. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
" Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242 (1896) (concurring opinion):
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acting improperly by extending such protection to those still in
Viet Nam. Strict construction and application of local statutory
requirements for authority to consent or service of notice would
be in part an incorrect presumption that the same constitutional
rights and the same social circumstances exist in the forum from
which the child immigrates."
IV. ADDED PERSPECTIVE FOR THE COURT
A court aware of differences between United States and Vietnamese adoption procedures, the influence of Vietnamese law
and culture on the parties to the adoption, and the possible narrowness or inapplicability of local statutes will be best able to rule
in the best interest of the child, to protect the rights of the parties,
and to assure the finality and security of its final decree. The
following suggestions may aid the court in meeting its responsibilities.
A.

Comity

Use of the principle of comity would permit recognition of an
individual's status under foreign law, so long as it is not offensive
to the morals or public policy of the local forum.80 In a parallel
circumstance, polygamous foreign marriage has been recognized
by comity so that the parties to that institution are not deprived
of the incidents and benefits of their status.8 In discussion of
comity, Goodrich notes "[Rjeasonable expectations of the family members arising out of their relationship based on their personal law could be given the maximum effect possible under
The term "person," used in the fifth amendment, is broad enough to
include any and every human being within the jurisdictionof the republic.
Id. (emphasis added).
7 There is no express mention of due process of law in the Vietnamese Constitution.
90
To constitute a conflict with the public policy of the state justifying
rejection of the foreign law or right, the latter must be contra to good morals
or natural justice or prejudicial to the state or its citizens.
15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 4(4)b (1967).
Doubtless Congress, by virtue of its powers in the field of foreign relations, might also lay down a mandatory rule regarding recognition of foreign
judgments in every court of the United States. At present the duty to recognize judgments even in national courts rests only on comity and is qualified,
in the judgment of the Supreme Court, by a strict rule of parity.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANNOTATIONS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE, 1964 (N. Small ed. 1964, U.S. Govt.
Printing Off.) at 775.
" In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948). Two
widowed spouses were granted a share in the estate of the deceased.
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forum law.""2 Acceptance of the legal status of the child relinquished for adoption established under Vietnamese law would
allow him the benefit of an adoptive family. 3 Denial of that benefit, or unnecessary peril to it, is hardly in keeping with the morals,
public policy, or intent of the United States adoption laws to
serve the best interest of the child. 4 In Doulgeris v. Bambacus,5
Virginia courts refused to recognize a Greek adoption finalized in
Greece without consent of the natural mother. Homer Clark
found this denial to the adopted child a failure to afford her the
protection of her best interests which was at the heart of Virginia
legal policy.88 He also noted other United States acceptances of
Greek adoptions. 7
Legislative intent to protect the best interest of the child and
acceptance of Vietnamese legal standards through comity would
permit reasonable, though not always statutorily strict, verification of the child's legal status.
B.

Legislative Reform

Growing interest in foreign placements is and has been a
trend since Korean adoptions began in significant numbers.8 8 Increased numbers of Vietnamese adoptions appearing for finalization before United States courts attest to this.88 There are no
indications that the situation will change. Birth control and legalized abortion may continue the scarcity of adoptable children and
a corresponding surplus of potential adoptive parents in the
United States for some time. Legislation which makes provision
for this trend is needed. Enactment of state statutes dealing speH.

GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT LAWS 243 (1964).
C. Civ. V.N. arts. 248, 253 at appendix to this note.
' See notes 11 and 80 supra.
" 203 Va. 670, 127 S.E.2d 145 (1962). In this case, strict construction of state statute
denied the best interest of the child, which interest Virginia law by its intent would
protect.
11H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 665 (1968). In Doulgeris v. Bambacus,
203 Va. 670, 127 S.E.2d 145 (1962), the child's adoption for convenience of an aging couple
was an accomplished fact. Denial of recognition of her status, because her legal Greek
adoption was without her natural mother's consent, was of no benefit to the child or to
the natural mother. It also deprived her of an inheritance which would have been in her
best interest after years of service and companionship to the adoptive parents.
H. CLARK, supra note 86.
The late Mr. Harry Holt began the Holt Adoption Program in 1956. Since that
time, Holt has found homes for over 12,000 children. Holt Children's Services of Viet Nam,
Inter Country Adoption Program Informational Pamphlet.
" Supra note 15.
2
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cifically with foreign adoptions would be a progressive step. The
typical recognition by states of final foreign adoption decrees is
useless to the child not adopted in his native country.'" Wisconsin
has recently modified its laws to allow for the circumstances of
such children.'
There are provisions which facilitate the process of formalizing the adoption of a foreign-born child in some state statutes.
[T]he court having jurisdiction of adoptions in the country,
upon evidence presented by the commissioner of public welfare from
information secured at the port of entry, or upon evidence from other
reliable sources, may make findings of fact as to the date and place
of birth and parentage of such person.'
Where a consent or a surrender is signed in a foreign country,
the execution of such consent shall be acknowledged or affirmed in
a manner conformable to the law and procedure of such country."3
[Ifn the case of any child from outside of the United States, its
territories or the commonwealth of Puerto Rico placed for adoption
by the welfare commissioner or by any child-placing agency, the
petitioner has filed an affidavit that such child has no living parents
or that such child is free for adoption and that the rights of all
parties in connection with such child have been properly terminated
under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the child was domiciled
prior to being removed to the state of Connecticut . . ..

Such separate provisions allow for foreign legal and cultural
differences without disruption of the intended function of local
statutes in domestic adoption. With a minimum amount of legislative enactment, the best interests of all children, foreign and
United States born, have been protected in states with these
statutory provisions.
C.

JudicialAwareness

Most effective in the final analysis will be a realistic appraisal by the court of all factors, including the legal and cultural
circumstances of the Vietnamese or any foreign-born child. The
legal documents of the child should be viewed in the context of
,o See notes 47 and 49 supra.
91 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.97 (1974); Public Act No. 74-164 § 7(d)(1) (1974) Conn.
Legisl., repealing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-44 (1958).
144.176(2) (1970).
ch. 4, § 9.1-10K (1966).
' Public Act No. 74-164 § 7(d)(1) (1974) Conn. Legisl., repealing CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45-44 (1958).
2

MINN. STAT. ANN. §

"

ILL. REV.

STAT.
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the needs and realities faced by citizens of Viet Nam or another
foreign state. Effective safeguards remain for the scrutiny of the
court: the licenses and qualifications of the intermediary agencies
and institutions concerned, enforcement of thoroughness in adoptive family studies, and state department of welfare approvals of
those studies. 5 One authority has urged that the court seek
[a]ssurance that a thorough investigation of all relevant facts has
been made by some competent and reliable person or welfare
agency, so that the court can know that the adoption is likely to be
successful. That is more important than anyone's domicile, more
important then any mechanical or legal connection between any
person and any state. Insistence upon connection with a particular
state is artificial and irrelevant to the true problem."
CONCLUSION

The legal concept of adoption has evolved from provision for
a legal heir to present concern for the best interest of the child."
The unique manner in which foreign adoption, as discussed
herein, has developed indicates that the concept of adoption may
be evolving further still toward a time when the focal point of the
concept will be the right of any child anywhere, regardless of
geographical or legal boundaries, to accommodation of national
laws and a mutuality of understanding between them which will
permit that child to attain "affection, care and protection . . .
and a legal relationship that includes the same rights and responsibilities that exist between natural parents and their children.""
The development of foreign adoption is unique because the
leadership in establishing procedures for meeting the legal requirements of a foreign nation, the United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service, and the state, came not from formal
adoption agencies but from individual United States citizens.9 9
The courage and resourcefulness of such individuals began the
phenomenon now recognized as international or foreign adoption.
In order to unite children with families needing and wanting
, 8 U.S.C. § 204.2 (1970).
" LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAW 579 (1959).
Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1922); Huard, Law of
Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 HARV. L. REV. 743 (1956).
" See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
" Two pioneers in the field of international adoption are Mr. Harry Holt and Mrs.

Wende Grant. See note 88 concerning Mr. Harry Holt. In 1965, Wende Grant, Director of
Friends For All Children, and Duane Grant were among the first United States citizens
to complete a Vietnamese adoption by proxy.
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them, and to responsibly share this expertise, international adoption agencies have been founded. 0 0
Similar initiative and resourcefulness is required of present
adoptive parents who must prepare extensive legal documents
and make considerable financial and emotional investment,
based only upon the hope that a child may be placed with them.
Such determination is not born of objective awareness. Those
aware of the truly overwhelming nature of international "red
tape" and those aware of the potential legal pitfalls are among
the first to become discouraged and withdraw. Therefore these
parents and the best interests of their adoptive children are especially needful of a United States legal system as cognizant of their
needs as it is of the needs of parties to domestic adoptions.
The current movement toward refinement of adoption procedure is a viable solution to the scarcity of children available for
adoption in the United States, and to the desperate needs of
children in other parts of the world. It is, however, a phase which
will require added perspective on the part of the courts and legislators if our legal system is to protect the rights and meet the
needs of this unique and growing segment of the United States
citizenry as adequately as it has met other needs and novel circumstances in the past.
Doris M. Besikof
" Friends For All Children, 445 So. 68th Street, Boulder, Colorado; Holt Children's
Services, P.O. Box 2420, Eugene, Oregon.
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APPENDIX
CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM, promulgated by Decree-Law No. 028TT/LSU dated December 20, 1972. Articles 247-54, 263-64, 274, 276 concerning adoption,
child welfare etc.

TITLE VII-ADOPTION
CHAPTER I:

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION

Article 247. An adoption should be based on legitimate reasons and be beneficial to
the adopted child.
A person may adopt several children, but a child cannot be adopted by several
persons, except by two spouses.
Article 248. Only a man or woman over 35 years of age shall be authorized to adopt
a child and [he or she] should be 20 years older than the adopted child unless exemption
is granted by the Chief of State.
A married man or woman can only adopt a child jointly with the spouse or with the
consent of the latter.
Unless exemption is accorded by the Chief of State, both spouses who adopt a child
should have been married for at least 10 years and have remained childless, and one of
the spouses should fulfill the requirements stipulated in paragraph 1 of this article.
When one of the spouses cannot express his opinion concerning the matter, the other
may adopt the child for his own, but should fulfill all other requirements stated above.
Vietnamese citizens may adopt and be adopted by foreigners.
Article 249. If the adopted child is a minor and his own parents are still alive, both
parents must consent to the adoption.
If the father or the mother is dead or unable to express an opinion on the matter, the
consent of either one of them is sufficient.
If the parents are separated or divorced, the consent of the father or the mother,
whichever has custody of the child, is sufficient to the completion of the adoption, but he
or she should notify the other spouse. The latter has the right to object to the adoption
within a period of 1 month with a notarized act to the spouse who consented and to the
person who wants to adopt the child.
Article 250. If both parents of a minor are dead, or if both are unable to express [an
opinion] on the matter, the consent shall be given by either the paternal grandfather or
paternal grandmother. If they are not available, the consent shall be given by either the
maternal grandfather or maternal grandmother.
If no grandparents are alive, the consent shall be given by the family council.
If it is an abandoned child or an illegitimate child who has been recognized but whose
parents are dead or unable to express [an opinion] on the matter, the consent shall be
given by the court in lieu of the family council.
With regard to children being reared by a benevolent society, such society shall give
consent to the adoption.
Article 251. The consent of the child is also necessary if he is 16 years of age.
CHAPTER II:

PROCEDURES FOR ADOPTION

Article 252. The adoption of the child is made by a contract of adoption concluded
in the presence of: a notary of office of justice of the peace at the place of residence of the
adoptive parent or the adopted child, the adoptive parent, the child if 16 years old, and
any person whose consent is necessary to the adoption.
If these persons live abroad, they can submit their consent to Vietnamese diplomatic
or consular personnel.
Article 253. The contract of adoption shall record the consent of the parents or the
grandparents, or the family council, or of the benevolent society, along with the consent
of the adopted child if 16 years old.
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Article 254. The contract of adoption shall be approved by the court of first instance
at the place where the contract was made, upon request of either party concerned.
In the case mentioned in Article 249, paragraph 3, the court will hear the pleading of
both parents before having a public hearing for the case. The brief of the case shall be
submitted to the public prosecutor. The court shall, in a public hearing, approve or reject
the adoption after having considered:
(1) whether the fulfillment of the legal conditions have been fulfilled;
(2) whether the motivation for the adoption is legitimate and whether the adoption
is beneficial to the child.
CHAPTER III:

EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

Article 263. The adoption may be abrogated by order of the court upon request of
the adoptive parent or the adopted child, or relatives [of the child] when he is a minor,
only for very important reasons.
The court shall decide after hearing the pleading of the public prosecutor.
The declaratory part of the judgment shall be transcribed and recorded in the margin
of the birth certificate of the adopted child as stated in Article 256.
The judgment shall also determine the guardianship of the child, if he is a minor.
Article 264. The judgment abrogating the adoption shall terminate all future consequence of the adoption.
TITLE VIII-PATERNAL POWER
Article 274. During marriage, the father shall enjoy the property of the juvenile child
until the child is 18 or has become emancipated [from the parental power]. If the father
dies, such enjoyment shall be assumed by the mother.
In case the parents are divorced or separated, such enjoyment shall belong to the
party the court deems not at fault in the divorce or separation.
Article 276. Property acquired by the child from his own labor or from an inheritance which specifies that the parents shall not take any part therein, shall be separated
from that enjoyed by the parents.
Prepared by Phuong Khanh Nguyen, Legal Processing Assistant, Far Eastern Law
Division, Law Library, Library of Congress, Aug. 1974.
DECREE LAW No. 027/166 of July 15, 1966, laying down modalities for the operation
of charitable institutions in Viet Nam (selected articles therefrom).
CHAPTER I
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS DEFINITION AND PROCEDURE FOR SETTING UP
ARTICLE 2. Charitable institutions can operate only after having obtained a license
issued by the Minister of Social Affairs, after they have filed a declaration in due form to
the Prefecture of Saigon, the Mayor's Office or the Provincial Administrative Headquarters in the provinces depending on the location of the said charitable institution. The
procedure for the filing of the said declaration is outlined in the following articles.
"
ARTICLE 3. Charitable institutions having been set up exactly as per the provisions
outlined herein, shall be granted the juridical personality. Charitable institutions having
been confirmed as being of public utility shall have in addition the capability to receive
donations made by living persons or by persons after their death . . ..
ARTICLE 4. In the declaration in respect of the setting up of the charitable institution,
the following information shall have to be given:
-Name of the agency
-Its objects and policies
-Office
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-Relief capability, and operating facilities of the agency
-Full name, citizenship and address of the Director of the agency.

ARTICLE 7. Any change in the location of the office, name and By-laws of the agency
shall have to be reported to the administrative authorities of the locality eight (8) days
prior to carrying out same.
ARTICLE 8. Those having been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor and who have
been sentenced to imprisonment, except sentenced due to inattention or negligence, and
not the offense of fleeing after having caused a traffic accident, shall not be qualified for
holding the position of Director, training member or supervising member of a charitable
institution.
If during their term of duty, any of these staff members fall within the above cases of
disqualification, they shall have to resign and the agency shall have to find forthwith a
replacement.
ARTICLE 10. Whenever a director is replaced, the agency shall have to report the fact
to the administrative authorities of the locality. To the report shall be attached the...
judiciary record of punishments not more than three months old of the replacement.
The Prefect, Mayor or province chief of the locality shall give his comments, and shall
convey the said report to the Minister of Social Affairs who will examine it and decide it.
In case the Ministry of Social Affairs does not approve it, the agency shall have to propose
another replacement.
ARTICLE 11. Any change in the training and supervising staff shall also have to be
reported to the administrative authorities of the locality eight days prior to the carrying
out of same.
To the said report shall be attached an extract from the judiciary record of punishments
not more than three months old of the replacement.
CHAPTER H
CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION
ARTICLE 12. Charitable institutions shall have to comply with laws and regulations on
public sanitation.
ARTICLE 13. Whenever it is found that the life or health of the relieved persons is
jeopardized due to the narrowness of the installation, or due to the constructions being
unfirm, or due to the negligence in the care and feeding of the above persons, or because
there is an abuse or rough treatment against them, the director shall have to fix up
constructions which have to be rehabilitated or shall have to straighten up the way of
operating the agency by taking appropriate action.
In case of emergency, the Prefect, Mayor or Province Chief may order the temporary
closing of the agency until the maintenance of the installation is completed, or changes
in the training and relief are made.
ARTICLE 14. Each agency shall have to keep a register numbered and initialled by the
Prefect, Mayor or Province Chief on the first page and last page thereof. The following
information shall have to be given in full:
a. With respect to orphans of less than 18 years of age: Full name, age, sex, birthplace,
parents' name, address (if any), and the ones of persons having entrusted them to the
agency.
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Besides, as regards unrecognized persons and that the above information cannot be written, the following should be specified: estimated age, sex, special physical features upon
their admittance, date and time of admittance, and sent to the agency by which individual
or agency.
Three (3) days after having admitted children not having been recognized by anyone, the
agency shall have to report to the local administrative authorities for making out their
civil status.
ARTICLE 17. The agency shall be compelled to keep account books, it shall have to
record cash receipts and cash disbursements in a clear manner, as well as donated items
and sums of money, and how the income and properties donated during the lifetime and
after the death of persons are managed and utilized. The agency shall also have to keep
adequately all documents for supporting each disbursement having been made as well as
all cash receipts referred to in the above paragraph.
ARTICLE 18. If the group or private person who/which is running the agency wants to
stop the operations of the said agency on his/its own initiative, he/it shall have to give a
prior notice of at least one (1) month to the Prefect, Mayor or Province Chief together
with a report on the financial position closed as of the date of stoppage of operation, and
an inventory of properties (personal properties and real properties) for enabling the authorities to solve on time various problems on the nurber of relieved persons, on the
finance and properties of the agency, if any.
CHAPTER I
CHECKING AND SANCTIONS
ARTICLE 19. All charitable institutions are placed under the permanent control of a
local control committee . ...
ARTICLE 21. In addition to the penalties provided for criminal offenses, the director
and staff of charitable institutions may also receive warnings, or they may be proposed
for being replaced, and the charitable institution may be closed temporarily or definitively
by a decision of the Minister of Social Affairs based on the report and recommendations
of the members of the Control Committee referred to in Articles 19 and 20 hereabove.
ARTICLE 22. Private persons or persons managing an association or convents
who/which, on his/their own initiative, give permission to the operation of a charitable
institution without a license as referred to in article 2 hereabove, or who/which do not
comply with the order closing the agency temporarily or definitively shall be liable to a
fine of from VN$1,000 to VN$10,000 and to imprisonment ranging from one to 5 days, or
to one of these two penalties.
In case of a second offense, the bodily sanction shall have to be enforced, and the amount
of the fine shall be doubled.
ARTICLE 23. Any director or staff of a charitable institution having not been ratified,
but who still take part in the operations of the agency in such a capacity shall be liable
to a fine ranging from VN$1,000 to VN$10,000.
In case of second offense, the penalty shall be doubled and the offender may also be jailed
during one day up to 5 days. In addition, the agency may be closed.

Translated by: Truong Dac Phung, legal translator.

NOTE
FEDERAL TAXATION OF DIVORCE PROPERTY
SETTLEMENTS AND THE AMIABLE FICTIONS OF STATE

LAW
A property settlement' pursuant to a divorce or dissolution
of marriage may have substantial federal income tax consequences2 for husbands in common law property jurisdictions.3
Since United States v. Davis4 the transfer of appreciated property
from a husband to his wife at the end of their marriage has constituted a taxable event for the husband. Although the Davis decision has been criticized,' it is still the law of the land.7 A recent
It is immaterial whether the "settlement" is the product of an agreement between
the spouses or an apportionment of property made solely by the court. The federal income
tax consequences in either case would be identical. Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d
97 (10th Cir. 1964).
2 In two such recent cases the total amount of taxes in controversy exceeded $200,000.
Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 257 (10th Cir. 1974); Imel v. United States, 375 F.
Supp. 1102, 1103 (D. Colo. 1974).
1 See Hjorth, Community Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a
Proposal, 50 WASH. L. REV. 231 (1975), for a recent discussion of the tax consequences of
divorce property settlements in community property jurisdictions. A discussion of the
income tax consequences of divorce in general is beyond the scope of this note. See Graves,
Federal Taxation in Separationand Divorce, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1972); Gunn, The
Federal Income Tax Effects of the Missouri Version of the Uniform Divorce Act, 1974
WASH. U.L.Q. 227.
370 U.S. 65 (1962), revg 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
' See note 12 infra.
I See Schwartz, Divorce and Taxes: New Aspects of the Davis Denouement, 15
U.C.L.A.L. REV 176 (1967); Note, Property Transfer Pursuant to Divorce-Taxable
Event? 17 STAN. L. REV. 478 (1965); Note, Capital Gains Taxation on the "Transfer" of
Appreciated Property From Husband to Wife Pursuant to a Divorce Settlement, 38 IND.
L.J. 494 (1963).
1 The Davis rule has generally been expanded by the lower courts. See, e.g., Pulliam
v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964). The most recent Revenue Ruling on the
subject is based on Davis. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 6.
The opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court is In re Questions submitted by United
States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974), hereinafter referred to as Imel. The Colorado
Supreme Court rendered that opinion in response to a question concerning Colorado law
submitted by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado which arose
out of the case it was considering, Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974).
The question was:
Under Colorado law, is such a transfer [by a husband pursuant to a divorce
property settlement] a recognition of a 'species of common ownership' of the
marital estate by the wife resembling a division of property between coowners [and therefore not taxable to the husband], or does the transfer
more closely resemble a conveyance by the husband for the release of an
independent obligation owed by him to the wife [and therefore taxable
under Davis]?
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Colorado case, Imel v. United States,8 and Oklahoma cases' upon
which Imel relies have attempted, through interpretations of
state law, to avoid the Davis rule and thereby benefit resident
taxpayers. This note will discuss the merits of these attempts to
sidestep Davis.
I.

DAVIS

V. UNITED STATES

In Davis a Delaware husband transferred appreciated stock
to his wife pursuant to a divorce settlement "in full settlement
and satisfaction of any and all claims and rights against the husband whatsoever," 10 including her rights under Delaware law to
dower, intestate succession, and to share in a portion of her husband's property upon divorce. The husband argued that under
Delaware law his wife's above-mentioned marital rights were
such that she was, in effect, a co-owner of his property, so that
as a result of the property settlement there was a nontaxable
division of property between him and his wife as co-owners,
rather than a taxable transfer to his wife of appreciated property
owned solely by him. The government argued that a Delaware
wife's marital rights did not give her an interest in her husband's
property, but merely imposed upon him certain personal obligations.
On review the Supreme Court held that while a Delaware
wife might have some interest in the property of her husband, the
interest was an inchoate one which did not remotely reach the
dignity of co-ownership. In support of its opinion the Court cited
her inability to manage or dispose of her husband's property, the
lack of descendability of her interest, the requirement that she
survive him to share in his intestate estate, and the fact that her
share of his property upon divorce depended upon the discretion
of the court. Therefore, the Court concluded that
375 F. Supp. at 1116. The Colorado Supreme Court answered that the transfer more
resembled a division between co-owners. 517 P.2d at 1334. On that basis, the district court
held that the husband was therefore not taxable for his transfer of appreciated property
to his wife. 375 F. Supp. at 1118.
The procedure of certification to the Colorado Supreme Court, in itself, is not open
to serious dispute. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 94 S. Ct. 1741 (1974). For a criticism of this
procedure, see Mattis, Certificationof Questions of State Law: An ImpracticalTool in the
Hands of the FederalCourts, 23 MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1969).
' The Oklahoma cases followed by the Colorado Supreme Court are discussed in text
accompanying notes 80-106 infra.
" Language from the agreement quoted in 370 U.S. at 67.

TAXATION OF DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS
[riegardless of the tags, Delaware seems only to place a burden on
the husband's property rather than to make the wife a part owner
thereof. .

.

. [T]he rights of succession and reasonable share [at

divorce] do not differ significantly from the husband's obligations
of support and alimony. They all partake more of a personal liability
of the husband than a property interest of the wife. The effectuation
of these marital rights may ultimately result in the ownership of
some of the husband's property. . . but certainly this happenstance
does not equate the transaction with a division of property by coowners. I

Consequently, the husband realized a taxable gain upon this disposition of appreciated property."
Davis, then, requires that state law be examined to determine the property rights of spouses' 3 within the state. The statecreated property right must then be measured against the "federal criteria"' 4-the wife's power to dispose of or manage her interest, the descendability of the interest, whether she must survive her husband to receive it, and whether the size of the interest
is within the discretion of the court-to determine if the wife's
interest reaches the dignity of co-ownership so that the transaction is a nontaxable one.
On the basis of the Davis test, property settlements in community property jurisdictions, where a wife is a co-owner are
'Id. at 70.
' The Court reasoned that by its inclusive definition of income, i.e., "all income from
whatever source derived, including . . . [glains derived from dealings in property ....
[INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, 61(a)(3)], Congress intended the economic growth of the stock
transferred here to be taxed. The gain to be taxed is the "excess of the amount realized
therefrom over the adjusted basis" of the stock. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(a). The
"amount realized" is "the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1001(b). In divorce
property settlements the "property . . . received" is the release of the wife's marital
rights. The Court ruled that the fair market value of the rights released by the wife could
be determined-in an arm's length transaction such as this, the wife's marital rights may
be presumed to be equal to the fair market value of the property given her by the husband.

370 U.S. at 72, 73, rev'g 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961) which had held, following Commis-

sioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 918 (1960), that it was
impossible to presume that the wife's rights were equal in value to the property transferred
by the husband for their release.
11Nowhere in Davis is this requirement expressly stated. That state law be consulted
is implicit throughout the Court's lengthy discussion of Delaware law. Moreover, Davis
has also been construed as requiring a determination of state law with respect to the
property rights of a wife. See, e.g., Wiles v. Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 257 (10th Cir.
1974).

" Wallace v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 748, 760 (S.D. Iowa 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d
757 (8th Cir. 1971).
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generally nontaxable. 5 The same is apparently true in common
law property states where there is an equal division of property
which is jointly acquired, either by gift or by commingling of
earnings in the acquisition of property." However, in common law
jurisdictions a transfer by a husband to a spouse who has not
commingled her earnings 7 with his in jointly acquiring property
would normally be taxed under the Davis rationale. The exception to this rule has been created by Imel and related cases. An
understanding of the marital relation and marital property rights,
both past and present, is helpful in considering Imel.
II.

A.

THE COMMON LAW MARITAL RELATIONSHIP

Early Common Law

The concept that marriage suspended the legal existence of
a wife and merged it with that of her husband had its roots in
English common law.'8 Because of this merger, marriage had severe effects upon a wife's property rights." Her tangible personalty acquired before or during the marriage became her husband's; 2 her husband became entitled to the use, enjoyment,
rents, and profits of her realty until birth of issue; 2' after birth of
issue he acquired a life estate in her realty as tenant by the
curtesy 22 which, unlike tenancy by the marital right, survived her
15 At least when there is an equal division of community property. Frances R. Walz,
32 B.T.A. 718 (1935). Of course, the situation may be more complex, as when an unequal
division of community prGperty is made. See Hjorth, supra note 3, at 252.
" Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974 INT. REv. BULL. No. 29, at 6. The ruling is discussed by
Hjorth, supra note 3, at 253.
" See, e.g., Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1975) where the wife
contributed her earnings for a few of their first years of marriage, stopped working, and
then made no more contributions to acquire any of the property which was the subject of
the property settlement. That case did not consider Rev. Rul. 74-347, but it does illustrate
one of many situations in which the Ruling would fail to give favorable tax treatment to
a husband in a common law property jurisdiction.
15This was not the case in many other cultures, e.g., Egyptian and certain American
Indian societies. Crozier, Marital Support, 15 BOSTON U.L. REv. 28, 29 (1935). Nor was it
true in early Saxon, Scottish, Welsh, or Civil law. Johnston, Sex and Property: The
Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward
Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1033, 1044 (1972).
"' See W. TIFFANY, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 124 (3d ed. R. Cooley 1921), and
Johnston, supra note 18, at 1045-46.
2* 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN §§ 206-38 (1873).
2,This tenancy "by the marital right," or jure, uxoris, attached to realty of the wife
acquired before or during the marriage. 1 AMERCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.50 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952).
" Id. at § 5.57.
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death. Moreover, the husband owned his wife's earnings,223 and
she could not contract, sue, or be sued on her own behalf.

While marriage gave a husband a substantial interest in the
property of his wife, the reverse was not true. His wife acquired
no vested interest in his property until his death, at which time
she was entitled to dower and/or 21 an intestate share of her hus2
band's personalty. 1
And for all her proprietary sacrifices, what did a wife receive
from her husband at common law? Besides dower and intestate
succession,2 a wife was entitled to be supported by her husband.
The total marital relationship-with a wife losing her property
and the right to her own labor but acquiring her husband's legal
obligation of support-has been unattractively, but perhaps accurately described some 40 years ago as follows:
Such a situation can be explained on the theory that one of the
parties has an original right to the other's labor [and property]
without having to pay for it; although in no other department of life
has anyone had such an ownership . . . since the abolition of slavery. Clearly, however, that economic relationship . . . is the eco-

nomic relationship between an owner and his property rather than
that between two free persons ....

The financial plan of marriage

law was founded upon the economic relationship of owner [the husband] and property [the wife] .28

B.

Modern MaritalRights in Colorado
In the last 100 years there has been considerable change in
the rights and status of married women in Colorado. Property of
all types acquired by a woman prior to her marriage, including
TIFFANY, supra note 19, at § 48.
J. BISHOP, supra note 20, at §§ 39, 44.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 21, at 735. At common law, dower was a

W.
2

life estate in one-third of the lands of which a husband had been seized at any time during
coverture. This interest vested only at the death of the husband, yet was protected
throughout the marriage since a wife must have joined in any conveyance by her husband
else her dower attached to such property at her husband's death. See generally id. §§ 5.15.49.
26 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 402 (2d ed. 1923); W.
TIFFANY, supra note 19, at 144-45.
71 Dower and intestate succession were rights of the Delaware wife discussed in Davis.
The third interest of the wife, her right to a reasonable share of her husband's property
upon divorce, did not exist at common law. See note 61 infra.
2 Crozier, supra note 18, at 28. Ms. Crozier, no doubt Miss or Mrs. Crozier in 1935,
was specifically criticizing the old common law rule that a husband owned his wife's labor
and earnings, but the language also describes the entire early common law marital relation.
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the rents and profits therefrom, and any property she receives by
descent, devise, or gift now remains her separate property after
her marriage, subject only to her disposal and her debts. 29 She
may sue or be sued in her own right. 0 She is entitled to earnings
from her own business or employment, 3' and may make her own
contracts. 2 In addition, a wife in Colorado, just as in all common
law property jurisdictions, 33 still retains her right to be supported
by her husband.3 4
Lest it seem that a Colorado wife has the best of both old and
new worlds,3 namely the right to own her own property as well
as the right to demand support from her husband, consider a wife
in a community property jurisdiction.36 Spouses in community
property states are viewed as equal partners with a vested one37
half interest in all the wealth acquired by the efforts of either.
Since both spouses are deemed to contribute equally, a community property wife is a one-half owner of such property despite
the fact that she may produce less income than her husband, or
no income at all. Community property husbands are also required
to support their wives.Y In contrast, "with a possible exception
or two, ''31 a Colorado wife has no vested interest in the property
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-201 (1973).
- Id. § 14-2-202.
" Id. § 14-2-203.
3 Id. § 14-2-208.
" Phipps, Marital PropertyInterests, 27 ROCKY MTN.L. REV. 180, 184 (1955).
3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-101 (1973) provides that failure to support and maintain a wife, and children under 16 years of age, is a felony. This statute is viewed as
enforcing, not creating a husband's duty of support. Kilpatrick v. People, 64 Colo. 209,
170 P. 956 (1918). A wife's right to support seems to be better protected today than at
common law, which provided no direct action to enforce a husband's duty of support.
Phipps, supra note 33, at 185 n.18. Now the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5-101 to -143 (1973) provides a civil in addition
to the criminal remedy for nonsupport. See Conrad v. McClearn, 166 Colo. 568, 445 P.2d
222 (1968).
" For an excellent comparison of the status and rights of wives in the United States
and those in other countries see Glendon, MatrimonialProperty: A ComparativeStudy
of Law and Social Change, 49 TULANE L. REV. 21 (1974).
36 Very briefly, a community property jurisdiction is one in which the property "the
husband and wife have is common property, that is, it belongs to both by halves." W. DE
FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1, at 1 (2d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as DE FUNIAK].
3 Id. § 1, at 2.
m Id. § 133, at 328 & n.10.
" In re Questions Submitted By United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo.
1974) (Imel).

1975

TAXATION OF DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS

of her husband. Thus, for the great number of wives who do not
have separate property of their own, or who, because they earn
less than their husbands, have less property than their husbands,
the marriage partnership is one in which they are the junior partner.
Perhaps the central feature of Colorado marital law is that a
husband has separate property, free of any interests of his wife.
Yet there are at least three4" restrictions in favor of a wife which
limit a Colorado husband's rights in his separate property. They
are his wife's rights to 1) support, 2) intestate succession, and 3)
a share of her husband's property upon divorce." As will be seen
from the following discussion, and from the opinions of the
Colorado Supreme Court,4" none of these interests make a wife in
any way a co-owner in the separate property of her husband.
1. Right of Election and Intestate Succession
In Colorado a wife has the right of intestate succession. 3
Prior to the adoption of the Colorado Probate Code" the precise
nature of a wife's right to inherit the property of her husband, and
her right to elect against his will, 5 was somewhat unclear. While
these rights give her some interest in the property of her husband,
the interest can be defeated by her husband. By conveying his
property prior to his death, he could leave her with nothing. This
is illustrated by an excerpt from Richard v. James, 6 where a
" In addition a wife also has an interest in the couple's homestead in that it may not
be conveyed solely by the husband. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35-118 (1973). Dower and
curtesy have been abolished by statute in Colorado. Id. § 15-11-113.
" Subsumed in the category of support are a wife's statutory rights to maintenance
(alimony) and child support. Id. §§ 14-10-114 to -115. Only intestate succession and the
right to a share upon divorce will be discussed here. Regarding the taxation of the husband's personal obligations of support see Graves, supra note 3.
'2 See, e.g., In re Questions Submitted By United States Dist. Ct., 517 P.2d 1331,
1334, 1335 (Colo. 1974) (Imel).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-102(1) (1973) provides that the intestate share of a
surviving husband or wife is:
(a) If there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the entire intestate estate;
(b) If there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving spouse
also, the first twenty-five thousand dollars, plus one-half of the balance of
the intestate estate;
(c) If there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue of the
surviving spouse, one-half of the intestate estate.
14COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-10-101 to -17-101 (1973).
The surviving spouse's right to elect is now id. §§ 15-11-201 to -202.
46 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956)
(en banc).
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widow attempted to set aside her husband's transfer of most of
his property into a trust less than a month before his death:
There no longer remains a question of doubt of the power of a husband to convey his property during his lifetime to whomsoever he
sees fit; even though it has the effect of depriving the wife of all right
to inherit any part thereof, provided the transaction is bona fide and
not merely colorable. This is true even though the express purpose
of the conveyor is to deprive another of his right of inheritance. If
the deed is genuine it cannot be said to be invalid."
If the conveyance is fraudulent, or "colorable," 5 a Colorado

wife may have some chance of setting it aside. Yet Richard v.
James shows that the express purpose of depriving a wife of her
right of inheritance does not make a conveyance fraudulent."
Neither does the fact he may have reserved a life estate, or some
other interest or powers.50 Plainly, it is difficult to characterize a
husband's transfer as fraudulent.
The right of election given a surviving spouse under the Colorado Probate Code greatly enhances a wife's right of inheritance.
The prior statute" merely granted the right to elect, despite the
provisions of his will, to take one-half of the property owned by a
husband at his death. Under case law such as James this was an
empty right if he had made substantial inter vivos transfers, leaving little from which to take one-half.2 Under the Code, however,
a wife may elect 5 3 to take one-half of her husband's "augmented
estate." 54 This estate includes not only property held by a husband at death, but also the value of property tranferred by him
at any time during the marriage to someone other than his wife
," Id. at 184, 292 P.2d at 979. This case and this topic in general are carefully dis-

cussed in Rea, Election to Take the Statutory Share, 29 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 506, 531
(1957) and Scott, The Revocable Trust and the Surviving Spouse's Statutory Share in
Colorado, 36 COLO. L. REV. 464, 466 & n.8 (1964).
" The Colorado cases speak of a husband "defrauding" his wife by a conveyance. But
the term "fraud" has been generally used to define only the extreme situation in which

the husband executes a deed which is in truth a sham and is not intended as a conveyance
at all, i.e., a "colorable" deed. See Rea, supra note 47, at 525, 529.
" See Scott, supra note 47, at 471.
Hageman v. First Nat'l Bank, 514 P.2d 328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973). See Scott, supra

note 47, at 469-72 for a discussion of factors courts may have considered prior to the
Colorado Probate Code.
Ch. 276, § 1, [1961] Colo. Sess. Laws 864-65.
52 See Schmidt, Family Protection Under the Uniform Probate Code, 50 DENVER L.J.
137, 145 (1973).

"

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 15-11-201 (1973).

", Id. § 15-11-202, which defines the estate.
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without full consideration and in which transfer he retained a
right of possession, enjoyment, or income from the property; a
power to revoke, consume, invade, or dispose for his own benefit;
or whereby he held with another with a right of survivorship; or
where transfer was made without any of the above but within 2
years of death to the extent that the aggregate transfers to any
one donee in either of the years exceed $3,000.11 By exercising her
right to elect one-half of the aforementioned estate a wife may
effectively set aside transfers by her husband which, prior to the
adoption of the Code, would have defeated her right to inherit his
property.
Much of the pre-Code case law is overruled. However, as to
transfers in which a husband retained no interest nor power, and
which were made more than 2 years prior to death, a wife would
have to rely on pre-Code case law to vindicate her right to inherit
such property. Those cases offer very little remedy."
A Colorado wife, then, is granted only a limited interest in
her husband's separate property by virtue of her right of intestate
succession. The most significant feature about this right is that
in Colorado, as in all common law property states, a wife must
actually survive her husband in order to become vested with her
share of his intestate estate.57 This right is a mere expectancy;
should she predecease her husband, her right of intestate succession is lost and does not pass to her heirs. On the other hand, a
cardinal principle of community property jurisdictions is that a
wife's one-half interest in the community property 8 passes to her
heirs if she predeceases her husband." Moreover, a Colorado
wife's right to elect against her husband's will is also a personal
Id.
" See Schmidt, supra note 52, at 145-46.
"7COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-102 (1973) grants an intestate share only to a
surviving spouse. Section 15-11-104 even requires that a spouse must survive the deceased
spouse by 120 hours, else he or she is deemed to have predeceased the decedent and the
decedent's property passes to other heirs.
58 A community property wife's interest is especially significant where she has made
few financial contributions. She has a vested one-half interest in what would be, in a
common law state, the separate property of her husband.
s' DE FUNIAK § 1, at 2:
The community property system is marked by two essential characteristics:
(1) the transmissibility of the wife's interests to her heirs, so that if the wife
dies first, her heirs take the share to which she would have been entitled if
she had survived; and (2) during the existence of the marital relationship the
spouses are . . . joint owners, or partners . . ..
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right which disappears if unexercised prior to her death, and does
not pass to her heirs.'"
2.

Right to Property at Dissolution

A wife's right to a share of the property of her husband upon
divorce was unknown to the common law and is of statutory
origin." In the past such Colorado statutes have consistently been
interpreted as not vesting in a wife any interest in her husband's
property until the court actually orders the division. However, it
appears that she might prevent or set aside fraudulent conveyances intended to defeat her right to a division of property analogous to her remedy with regard to inheritance. 2
It is apparent that in Colorado the absence of any significant
interest of a wife in her husband's property during their marriage
is not cured by her statutory right to a share of his property upon
divorce. Her share, besides being undetermined, may be soundly
and entirely defeated prior to the decree because it is an expectancy, not a property right. In Todd v. Todd 3 the Colorado Supreme Court held that the husband's trustee in bankruptcy could
defeat the wife's statutory right to share in the property of her
husband when the date of bankruptcy occurred after an interlocutory decree had given her possession of the property, after the
final decree of divorce, and after the hearing concerning division
of property, but before the court had made an order actually
awarding her a share of her husband's property. Obviously, her
right to a share at divorce was not such that it gave her any
protectible interest prior to the actual award of her husband's
property. Her expectancy was defeated because "[d]ivision of
" This was true of the pre-Code right as construed by the Colorado courts. See Gallup
v. Rule, 81 Colo. 335, 255 P. 463 (1927) and Deutsch v. Rohlfing, 22 Colo. App. 543, 126
P. 1123 (1912). The present Code expressly states that the election is a right which may
be exercised only during the lifetime of the surviving spouse. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1511-203 (1973). Should it not be exercised, a wife who had received nothing under the will
would leave nothing therefrom to her heirs, and they would be unable to exercise the right
for her.
11 2 J. Bisiop, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION
§§ 1117, 1139 (1891).
62 See, e.g., Zingone v. Zingone, 136 Colo. 39, 314 P.2d 304 (1957), wherein the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded a dismissal of a wife's counterclaim against
her husband's parents to recover the house he had conveyed to them. The court said the
wife was in a position similar to that of a creditor whose debtor had fraudulently conveyed
property, or a wife whose husband had conveyed property to defraud his wife of her right
to support and maintenance.
" 133 Colo. 1, 291 P.2d 386 (1956).
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property, [and] property settlements . . . are within the sound
discretion of the trial court and no rights vest until the matters
involved are determined. ""
Similarly, Du Bois v. First National Bank65 held that a wife
who has been awarded a one-third interest in certain realty of her
husband must take that interest subject to a mortgage given by
her husband after their marriage but prior to her action for divorce. Consequently, the interest awarded could be foreclosed by
the mortgagee. The court stated that the bank's knowledge of
their martial problems did not apprise it of the fact that she
would obtain a decree of divorce and an interest in her husband's
property, and that even "if the bank could foresee such an end
to their unhappiness, its lien on the property, taken in good faith,
would not be subordinate to the purchaser's title which she
subsequently secured.""6 It can be concluded that a wife's right
to a share at divorce does not give her an interest which is safe
from an encumbrance created by her husband, even one created
after their marriage.
Finally, in Dickinson v. Dickinson 7 a wife, suing to set aside
a fraudulently induced property settlement, was awarded onehalf of her husband's net worth at the time of their divorce, less
the amount already received pursuant to the agreement. Her action was not to annul the decree so that the court might make an
equitable division of property. Instead, her argument rested
solely upon the contention that she was entitled, by virtue of their
marital relationship, to one-half of the property owned by her
husband at the time of the divorce. In reversing, the court held
that her counsel's contention
that she is entitled to a share of the defendant's property, solely
because it was acquired by the defendant during the period the
marriage relation existed between them, without regard to the divorce proceedings .... is not tenable. The property acquired by the
defendant during the period he was married to plaintiff belonged to
him. Plaintiff had no such interest in this property as would invest
her with the right to maintain an action, the sole purpose of which
was to secure any part of it, either during coverture or after the
Id. at 5, 291 P.2d at 387 (emphasis added).
43 Colo. 400, 96 P. 169 (1908).

Id. at 404, 96 P. at 170. The court also found that Mrs, DuBois had failed to prove
fraud in the transaction.
"

" 50 Colo. 232, 114 P. 652 (1911).
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marriage relation had been dissolved ....
[T]he judgment ...
must be reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to
dismiss ....
1

All of this is not to say that a wife is not entitled to a share
of her husband's property upon divorce. That is not the question.
The issue is the nature of her right to receive such a share.
Colorado, and other common law property states, have chosen to
make that right an equitable one which does not vest in her any
interest in her husband's property. Nor, absent fraud, may she
prevent her husband from conveying or encumbering any of his
separate property. It apparently has never even been suggested
in Colorado that her right is descendible so that it would go to
her heirs should she predecease her husband. Instead of a system
of community property wherein each spouse is entitled to onehalf of the community property at the dissolution of the marriage, 9 Colorado's system allows a husband to retain his separate
property subject to an equitable share for his wife upon dissolution. In determining how much of her husband's property a wife
should receive, Colorado courts have, pursuant to the various
statutes," traditionally considered
whether the property was acquired before or after marriage, the
efforts and attitudes of the parties towards its accumulation, the
respective ages and earning abilities of the parties, the conduct of
the parties during the marriage, the duration of the marriage, their
stations in life, their health and physical condition, the necessities
of the parties, their financial condition, and all other relevant circumstances.7"

As to the efforts of a wife in the accumulation of property by
her husband,72 courts have often considered her contribution as a
housewife in making an equitable division.7 3 Naturally, where a
wife has participated in the operation of a joint business with her
" Id. at 235, 114 P. at 653.
" Again, a community property wife's right to one-half of the community property is
most significant, in comparison to that of her common law counterpart, when the wife
makes only small financial contributions to the community property. In that situation,
she would have a vested one-half interest in property which in a common law state, would
be the separate property of her husband.
70 Colorado's old statute provided that property be divided "in such proportions as
may be fair and equitable." Ch. 37, § 6, [1958] Colo. Sess. Laws 223.
Carlson v. Carlson, 497 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Colo. 1972) (citations omitted).
7 Of course, property acquired by a wife with her own funds is her own separate
property.
" See, e.g., Schrader v. Schrader, 156 Colo. 521, 400 P.2d 675 (1965).
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husband or contributed similar nondomestic efforts, that too will
the division is within the
be considered by the court.7" In all cases
75
sound discretion of the trial court.

The Tenth Circuit considered the nature of a wife's property
rights in Colorado, and whether a husband should be taxed on his
transfer of appreciated property to her upon divorce, in Pulliam
v. Commissioner.71 It noted that "[u]nder Colorado law the

wife's rights during marriage do not vest in her an ownership of
any part of the husband's property.

' 77

And because "the wife's

interests are very similar to those in Delaware considered in
United States v. Davis, ''7 it held that the transfer pursuant to the
divorce decree was a taxable event for the husband.
Now, some 12 years later, the Colorado Supreme Court has
held in Imel that there is an exception to the rule stated in
Pulliam that a Colorado wife has no vested interest in the property of her husband during the marriage. The exception is that
"vesting takes place at the time of the filing of the divorce action."7 In creating that exception, the court followed the philoso-

phy of the Oklahoma Supreme Court expressed in Collins v.
Oklahoma Tax Commission0 and modified in Sanditen v.
Sanditen.81
In Collins v. Commissioner," called Collins I, the Tenth Circuit, relying on its decision in Pulliam, held that an Oklahoma
husband was taxable in a divorce property settlement. The husband had argued that the Oklahoma property division statute, by
commanding a court to make a division of jointly acquired property,3 thereby vested an interest in each spouse in such property.
7, See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 156 Colo. 513, 400 P.2d 440 (1965). Also, where a wife is jointly
operating a business with her husband and is contributing her own funds, she is a joint
tenant although title is in her husband's name. Therefore, at divorce she is entitled to her
share as a joint tenant and "not claiming in the capacity of [a] wife." Wigton v. Wigton,
73 Colo. 337, 341, 216 P. 1055, 1057 (1923). This is distinguishable from the facts in Imel,
where Mrs. Imel contributed her efforts to her husband's business, but not her own funds.
For that reason Imel more closely resembles Bell.
11See, e.g., Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662 (1955).
,9 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964).
77 Id.
71 Id. at 99.
7' 517 P.2d at 1333.
446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968).
" 496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972).
" 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961) provides that as to property
13 The statute, OKxI.
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Acknowledging that Davis required an examination of state law,
the Tenth Circuit could find no difference between Oklahoma
and Colorado law sufficient to compel a result opposite that
reached in Pulliam. The wife's right to a share of her husband's
property, where such was jointly acquired, vested no interest in
her during the marriage, notwithstanding the language of some
early Oklahoma cases.84 This right was not descendible," its
quantum was within the discretion of the court, and it gave her
no right to manage or dispose of the property in question.86 As in
Colorado, a wife's right to a share in Oklahoma failed the Davis
tests.
Neither did the Tenth Circuit find that the other right of an
Oklahoma wife, that of intestate succession, made her a coowner. As in Colorado, an Oklahoma wife must survive her husband to receive her intestate share, and should she predecease
him, her right of intestate succession would not pass to her heirs.87
"acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title thereto be in
either or both of said parties, the court shall make such division between the parties
respectively as may appear just and reasonable.
... Jointly acquired property is not
defined in the statute, but from the cases it is clear that where a wife performs only
domestic duties she is contributing to the acquisition of property, so that most property
acquired during the marriage would be jointly acquired. See Note, Domestic Relations:
Relevant Factors in the Division of Jointly Acquired Property, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 288, 289
(1970).
" The Tenth Circuit had some difficulty with Davis v. Davis, 61 Okla. 275, 161 P.
190 (1916) which stated that a wife did have a vested interest in her husband's property.
A careful reading of that case shows that the court meant that a wife's statutory right to
have a division of property, wherein she might get some interest, was a vested right which
could not be defeated by her misconduct. This is a much flimsier right than a vested
interest in property and could be called a vested right in an expectancy.
11 Citing Jones v. Farris, 180 Okla. 341, 69 P.2d 344 (1937) wherein the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that the mandatory division of property section of the divorce statute
did not vest in a wife a right in jointly acquired property which would pass to her heirs
upon her death.
11Consequently, the language of Thompson v. Thompson, 70 Okla. 207, 173 P. 1037
(1918) labeling jointly acquired property as being similar to community property fails to
make a wife a co-owner under the Davis tests.
87 Oklahoma has a peculiar statute which gives a wife a greater right of intestate
succession than does Colorado or other common law property states. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
84, § 213 (1970):
Second ....
Provided, that in all cases where the property is acquired by
the joint industry of husband and wife during coverture, and there is no
issue, the whole estate shall go to the survivor, at whose death, if any of the
said property remain, one-half of such property shall go to the heirs of the
husband and one-half to the heirs of the wife, according to the right of
representation. (Emphasis added).
Under this statute a wife's heirs might receive her share of jointly acquired property
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Shortly after Collins I the Oklahoma Supreme Court was
called upon to determine Mr. Collins' tax liability on the same
property settlement, this time under an Oklahoma tax statute8
very similar to section 1001 of the Internal Revenue Code. Referred to as Collins II,1 the issues were identical to those considered by the Tenth Circuit in Collins I. While the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided the husband's liability only under the state
statute, it clearly rejected the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit
regarding the similar federal statute and concluded that the
Oklahoma statute providing for a mandatory division of jointly
acquired property gave a wife a vested property interest therein."
The court relied upon Davis v. Davis9 for the proposition
that a wife has a vested interest in jointly acquired property. Yet
that case held only that the wife's statutory right to a share upon
divorce is not forfeited because she was at fault in the divorce
action. 2 Citing Williams v. Williams,93 the Collins II court
stressed that the kind of property which may be divided at divorce, jointly acquired property, is not subject to the discretion
of the court. However, the kind of discretion which United States
v. Davis implied was inconsistent with the notion that a wife was
a co-owner was the court's discretion to make a "reasonable"
division of property. 4 Collins I based its conclusion that an Oklaeven when she predeceases her husband. This does not mean, however, that an Oklahoma
wife, just as a community property wife, has a vested interest in such property which
would always pass to her heirs even when she predeceases her husband. The surviving
husband's dissipation of the jointly acquired property, or his remarriage, could leave her
heirs with nothing. Consequently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has said this statutory
rule is not a rule of property but a rule of descent and distribution. Essex v. Washington,
198 Okla. 145, 176 P.2d 476 (1946).
The Oklahoma statute is now OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2310 (1966).
,' Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (1968).
"
Collins II contains little discussion of intestate succession. The court acknowledged
that the statute governing intestate succession was a rule of descent and distribution, not
of property. Id. at 296. See note 87 supra.
11 61 Okla. 275, 278, 161 P. 190, 193 (1916).
2 See note 84 supra.
'3 428 P.2d 218 (Okla. 1967).
11 370 U.S. at 70. The Oklahoma divorce statute, like Delaware's, empowers the court
to "make such division between the parties respectively as may appear just and reasonable
....
" OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (1961). Also to distinguish the facts in Davis, the
Collins H court stated, in dictum, that factors traditionally considered by divorce courts,
such as the financial needs of the spouses, were not to be considered in Oklahoma. Only
the actual efforts and money contributed by the parties should be considered. Presumably, it might then be said that the court was not actually exercising any discretion at all
in dividing property. 446 P.2d at 296-97. Ignoring financial need has been criticized as
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homa wife's interest was similar to that of a wife in a community
property state upon Thompson v. Thompson. 5 While that case
contained some very broad language, it merely held that a husband could be awarded jointly acquired property which was held
in the name of his wife. The case did not hold that spouses in
Oklahoma have the same rights as those in community property
states. Finally, the court concluded that Colorado law was so
different from Oklahoma's" that Pulliam was not controlling.
Nor was it bound by the Tenth Circuit's holding in Collins I that
an Oklahoma wife's right to a statutory share upon divorce did
not make her a co-owner under the Davis tests, because the
operation of the Oklahoma divorce statute is not affected by the
absence of "a right to make present disposition of property, nor
absence of a descendable interest. A wife has a vested interest in
jointly acquired property of the marital community [by virtue of
'' 7
that statute]. 9
It is certainly true that the Davis criteria of descendibility,
management, and the right of disposition do not control the operation of the Oklahoma divorce statute. A wife in that state may
claim her share under that statute regardless of Davis. The issue,
however, is whether the interest given an Oklahoma wife by that
statute is such that, using the Davis criteria, she is a co-owner
claiming her one-half of the marital property, or whether, as in
harsh and has not been consistently followed by the court since Collins I. Note, supra
note 83, at 291.
Moreover, the fact the division is solely on the basis of the parties' contributions is
not sufficient to avoid Davis. There the Supreme Court did imply that a discretionary
division was inconsistent with the concept of a vested interest in the wife. But the Court
also required more-that the wife's alleged property interest be descendible, and that she
be able to manage or dispose of it-else she was not a true co-owner.
'5 70 Okla. 207, 173 P. 1037 (1918).
IS The few differences are: 1) Only contribution is to be considered in Oklahoma,
although domestic contributions are sufficient; 2) A property division is mandatory in
Oklahoma; and 3) There is some difference in the rights of an Oklahoma wife's heirs to
receive property of a surviving husband, although the Oklahoma Supreme Court ignored
this in Collins I.
17446 P.2d at 297. By this the court obviously meant to deny the applicability of the
Davis tests. Yet it attempted to bolster the wife's interest by saying it was exercisable "at
any time during marriage, even though she is not entitled to divorce." Id. Apparently the
court was referring to a wife's right to a division of property in a separate maintenance
proceeding. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1275 (1961). However, that she is entitled to a
division absent a divorce does not greatly enhance her interest in her husband's property.
She is still unable to control it, or to make a present or testamentary disposition. Under
Davis, she is still not a co-owner, and this division ought to be as taxable as one pursuant
to a divorce.
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Davis, her interest does not reach the dignity of co-ownership.
From that perspective, it is inconsequential that the Oklahoma
court labels the interest that she has under the statute as
"vested." Whether vested or not, does it meet the Davis criteria?
The Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to answer that question
in Collins IV' when its Collins I decision was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, called Collins III,"9 for further
consideration in light of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's opinion
in Collins II. The opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court was one
paragraph in length and did not purport to limit its earlier Davis
decision. Nor did it discuss the merits of Collins II. Nevertheless,
the Tenth Circuit reversed itself and held that the factors in
Davis were not "federal criteria"'' 0 which must be met by state
law before a wife's rights could be considered those of a co-owner.
The language of Davis is to the contrary. 0' The Tenth Circuit's
opinion is supportable though, since it concluded that by Collins
II the Oklahoma Supreme Court had proclaimed wives in that
state to be co-owners of property jointly acquired during the marriage. If that is what Collins H proclaimed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has since changed its mind.
02 which was not a divorce action,
In Sanditen v. Sanditen,1
an Oklahoma wife seized upon the vested property right given her
by Collins II and on that basis attempted to recover from her
husband her portion of property jointly acquired that he had
given away gratuitously without her knowledge or consent. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Collins H had not given her
such an interest. The Sanditen court said Collins II held only that
the wife's right to property, granted by the mandatory property
division section of the divorce statute, became vested during the
412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
393 U.S. 215 (1968)(per curiam). This is the entire opinion:
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is vacated
and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration
in light of the opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in [Collins II].
412 F.2d at 212.
101 370 U.S. 65, 70 (1961). By the Court's holding that state "tags" did not change
the fact that Delaware law places only a burden on her husband's property, rather than
make her "a part owner thereof," it is apparent the Court ignored state labels and looked
to the substance of state law. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra; accord, Wallace
v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 748, 760-61 (S.D. Iowa 1970), aff'd, 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.
1971).
496 P.2d 365 (Okla. -1972).
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pendency of the divorce action. 03 Further, a wife has no vested
interest in property jointly acquired, for if she had that would
make Oklahoma a community property jurisdiction, which it is
not. ' 4 Therefore, except during the pendency of a divorce action
a wife in Oklahoma is not a co-owner.1°5
A leak sprung in the dike fashioned by Sanditen. In
McDaniel v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,06 a husband transferred to his wife property held in his name but acquired by their
joint efforts during their marriage. He claimed that under Collins
II his wife already had a vested interest in the property and in
effect was a co-owner, so that the division did not constitute a gift
by him which could be taxed. After noting that it had made
several pronouncements in Collins II not necessary to support the
result reached,0 7 the court reiterated its holding in Sanditen that
an Oklahoma wife is vested with an interest in jointly acquired
property only during the pendency of a divorce. Interestingly, the
court stated that where there was no divorce action the jointly
acquired property is owned by the husband. 18 He has the sole
power of disposition; he alone can transfer it; he is liable for the
property taxes thereon; and his wife has no descendible interest
therein. 0 9

III. Imel

AND

Davis

The Colorado Supreme Court expressly followed Collins II,
Sanditen, and McDaniel in its Imel decision. The court held that
while in general a wife had no interest in the property of her
husband,"' such an interest was vested in her upon the filing of
"03
Id.

at 367.

104Id.
101 This did not mean that Mrs. Sanditen was not entitled to relief. The court held
that although she had no vested interest until a divorce action was commenced, she could
prevent or recover conveyances made by her husband to defraud her right to a share of
property upon divorce. The same right exists in Colorado, see note 62 supra.
"
499 P.2d 1391 (Okla. 1972).
07 Id. at 1393. One of which evidently was that a wife is, in general, a co-owner or
one with a vested interest.
00 Id. at 1394.
'"Id.

517 P.2d at 1334-35. From the cases cited the court meant by this that a wife could
prohibit transfers to defraud her of her right of intestate succession. See text accompanying notes 43-56 supra. The court made no mention of those cases allowing a wife to prohibit
fraudulent transfers prior to a divorce.
11
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a divorce action."' The court found no significant difference between the Oklahoma and Colorado divorce statutes pertaining to
the mandatory division of property."' It went a step beyond either
Sanditen or McDaniel when it declared that it was not "concerned" with the situation in which "one of the parties dies or the
action is dismissed prior to a decree of divorce or prior to a division of property." ' 13 The wife's right was inchoate only in that
prior to the division the particular property to be transferred had
not been determined." 4 After the filing her rights are analogous
to those of a wife who has a resulting trust in the property of her
husband, so that it is not necessary, after the filing, for both
spouses to join in the conveyance of property held in the name of
only one of them." 5 It is submitted that the interest described by
the court in Imel is not, applying the Davis tests, sufficient to
make her a co-owner. But then assuming, arguendo, that she does
become a co-owner upon the filing of a divorce action, the fallacy
of holding that there is no taxable transfer in such a situation is
easily illustrated.
It is admitted by both the Oklahoma and Colorado Supreme
Courts that prior to the filing of a divorce action, a wife has no
interest in the property of her husband. Her interest, unlike that
of wives in community property states, arises from the transfer
mandated by the property division portions of the divorce statute."' That this interest vests upon the filing of a divorce action,
if true, should be a taxable event in itself. Presumably the wife
suddenly has become a co-owner. By filing her action she has
what is in effect a vested undivided interest as a joint tenant. The
fact that it is undivided should not make a difference for tax
purposes." 7 It is not uncommon for a divorce court to fashion a
property settlement in which there is not a partitioning of the
property, but rather where the former spouses are made joint
.. Id. at 1332, 1334, 1335.
"I Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1335. By this the court implied that the wife's interest "vested" upon filing
...
the divorce action, but should the action be dismissed, or one of the spouses die, she would
lose her interest. The district court described her interest as a vested one subject to
divestment. 375 F. Supp. at 1118.
"1 517 P.2d at 1335.
115

Id.

Collins I, 446 P.2d at 296-97. Imel relies upon Collins II in general and seems to
have reached the same conclusion. 517 P.2d at 1334-35.
"' There are apparently no reported cases directly on point.
"'
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tenants in the property acquired by the husband."' Since she was
not a co-owner prior to the transfer, why should that transfer not
be taxable as the one in Davis? In Davis the wife actually received
her husband's property prior to the divorce, yet that was a taxable disposition because prior to that time she was not a co-owner.
The same reasoning applied to Imel and Collins H. Prior to the
time of the alleged vesting the wife was not a co-owner. Consequently that vesting, like the transfer in Davis, could be viewed
as a taxable event.
A better interpretation of Imel and Collins II is that, instead
of receiving a vested interest which makes her a co-owner, a wife's
marital rights, after the filing of a divorce action, become protectible by the court. Imel was not "concerned""' with situations in
which the wife died after filing her action. And since the court did
not reverse its earlier holdings,'1 it can be inferred that should a
wife die, her interest would not be descendible. Presumably neither could she dispose of her share, nor begin to manage or control
it. In addition her husband may convey property without joining
her. Given the limited nature of the wife's rights, even after vesting, it is clear that whatever right she has is not the same right
as that of a co-owner. All that is accomplished by the vesting is
that the wife's interest thereafter may be protected by the court
even though its quantum is as yet undetermined.1" ' That, however, adds nothing to the rights a wife had before these cases. In
Colorado a wife has been able for some time to prevent transfers
22
to defraud her.'
While neither Imel nor Collins II expressly purports to govern
the federal taxation of property settlements,'" both courts reIRS In McDonald v. McDonald, 150 Colo. 492, 374 P.2d 690 (1962) the court decreed
that property owned by the spouses in joint tenancy should remain in joint tenancy after
their divorce. Oklahoma favors a partitioning, but has upheld a decree making a division
of property by designating the spouses as tenants in common. Smith v. Smith, 206 Okla.
206, 242 P.2d 436 (1952).
"' 517 P.2d at 1335.
See text accompanying notes 43-56 and 60 supra.
...517 P.2d at 1335.
'2 See note 62 supra. The current Colorado statute enables the court to issue a
temporary injunction restraining either spouse from transferring or encumbering any
property after the commencement of proceedings for the dissolution of marriage. CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-108(2)(a) (1973). The prior statute allowed a similar order. Ch.
37, § 6, [19581 Colo. Sess. Laws 223.
" Nevertheless, the court in Imel stated that
[in Colorado a wife may have a certain species of common ownership in
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jected the rule in Davis that co-ownership was to be determined
with reference to federal criteria.' It is submitted that when
state and federal decisions are in conflict, the findings of federal
courts regarding the federal taxation of state-created property
rights should prevail regardless of the label given these rights by
the state courts.
IV.

STATE AND FEDERAL CONFLICTS

Davis itself did not elucidate carefully the role played by
state laws and state court decisions in federal income taxation.
It did make clear that whether a wife was a co-owner so that there
was no taxable disposition of property by her husband was a
question of federal and not state law.' By that holding the Supreme Court did not presume to control the rights of the parties
under state law. That the Court did attempt to do so is the straw
man created by state decisions. 128 Instead, the Court meant that
the operation of the federal taxing statutes upon state-created
rights cannot be determined by state law, but must be determined by referring to the objects intended to be taxed by the
federal statute. There is much support for this conclusion.
The oft cited'2 case of Burnet v. Harmel'2 held that Texas'
characterization of an oil and gas lease as a sale rather than a
lease did not prevent the federal income tax statute from taxing
the "sale" as if it were a lease. The taxpayer argued that if Texas
law classified the transaction as a sale, it must be taxed as a sale
and not as a lease. The federal act taxing sales of this kind of
asset' 2 imposed a lower tax than the section which taxed leases
of the same property. The Court flatly rejected the taxpayer's
the husband's property which will not prevent a taxable transfer from occurring when he makes a transfer to her. If so, that is distinguishable from the
species of common ownership which vests upon the filing of the divorce
action.
517 P.2d at 1335.
"I Collins II said that the right to make a disposition of her interest and the lack of
its descendibility were not controlling. 446 P.2d at 297. Imel, besides its general adoption
of Collins II, simply ignored the criteria, stating it was not "concerned" with the situation
in which a spouse died, and declared that a transfer of property pursuant to a settlement
resembled a division of property between two co-owners. 517 P.2d at 1334-35.
12 370 U.S. at 70.
"z As where the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Collins II held that the Davis factors
did not control the operation of Oklahoma's divorce statute. 446 P.2d at 297.
"' See, e.g., 10 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 61.02, at 2 (1970).
'n 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
"' Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(a), 43 Stat. 262.
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argument that whether a sale had occurred depended upon the
law of the State of Texas. The federal statute
neither says nor implies that the determination of ...
[whether
there was a sale] . . . is to be controlled by state law. For the
purpose of applying this section to the particular payments now
under consideration, the Act of Congress has its own criteria, irrespective of any particular characterization of the payments in the
local law. The state law creates legal interests but the federal statute
determines when and how they shall be taxed. We examine the
Texas law only for the purpose of ascertaining whether the leases
conform to the standard which the taxing statute prescribed ....
"I

The Davis Court, using a similar rationale, concluded that
Congress, by its broad definition of income, intended that the
131
appreciation of the stock transferred by the husband be taxed,
and that the controlling federal statutory language "sale or other
disposition" of property included his transfer to his wife.' 31 In
other words, whether there is a taxable transfer from husband to
wife or a nontaxable division between them is dependent upon
the Court's interpretation of congressional intent regarding the
taxation of interests or property created by the state. It does not
depend, as Imel and Collins urge, upon the label or tag the state
chose to give the wife's interest. The nature of the right created
is to be determined by the federal court, which then determines
whether that right is an object intended to be taxed by the federal
3
statute. 11
That a federal court may make an independent appraisal of
state-created property rights, and then determine the effect of the
federal tax statute upon a transaction involving those rights, is
supported by the early case of United States v. Robbins.'34 A
husband and wife domiciled in the community property state of
287 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).

370 U.S. at 68.
132
3

Id. at 71.

Accord, Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940), where the Court

determined that what Wisconsin called a special power of appointment was actually the
same interest meant to be taxed under a statute which taxed general powers of appointment. While the act did not actually define a "general power of appointment," the Morgan
Court, like the Davis Court, was able to determine Congress' intent in that regard. "If it
is found in a given case that an interest or right created by local law was the object
intended to be taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what name is given to the
interest or right by state law," Id. at 81. This process has been called the "economic
realities" test. 10 J. MERTENS, supra note 127, at 3.
34 269 U.S. 315 (1926). See generally Swihart, Federal Taxation of New Mexico Community Property, 3 NATURAL RES. J. 104, 116-24 (1963).
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California had attempted to file separate income tax returns
whereby each would report one-half of the community income,
which in their case was either earned solely by the husband or
came from his separate property. The Treasury Department at
that time did not permit the splitting of community income between spouses domiciled in California,' 5 presumably because the
interest of a California wife in the community property was insubstantial and amounted to a mere expectancy while her husband was alive.' 6 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes,
affirmed the ruling of the Treasury Department. Holmes' opinion
rested on the ground that California Supreme Court cases showed
that the wife had only an expectancy. Unlike other community
property jurisdictions, a California wife had no descendible interest in the community property. Davis' requirement that a wife
must have a descendible interest in order to be a co-owner is thus
in accord with Robbins. Collins I and Imel either ignore or deny
the requirement that a wife have a descendible interest to be a
co-owner. Neither of these decisions make the wife's interest descendible, nor does the prior case law.'37
Subsequent to Robbins, California enacted a statute making
the wife's one-half interest in the community property descendible,' 35 and subsequently the Supreme Court held that California
spouses could split their income.' 9 Justice Holmes' dicta in
Robbins-that a California husband could be taxed upon the
whole of community income because he possessed extensive control over it' 4 -was not followed in later cases. In Poe v.
Seaborn,'41 one of several test cases which argued Holmes' dicta,
the first-mentioned factor which indicated the substance of the
wife's interest in the community property was her right to make
a testamentary disposition.'4 2
"I T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. BULL. 238 (1921) allowed income splitting in all the other
community property states. Congress has, since 1948, provided for joint returns in all
states. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2, 6013. There remain, however, income tax advantages
for community property spouses who receive community income. See Swihart, supra note
134, at 126.
' ' 269 U.S. at 326.
"3 See text accompanying notes 43-56 supra.
lu Ch. 18, § 1, [1923] Cal. Sess. Laws.
"' United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931)(per curiam).
,,O269 U.S. at 327.
' 282 U.S. 101 (1930). This case was cited in Davis for the proposition that until
Congress granted relief (e.,., joint returns) common law jurisdictions have fewer tax
advantages than community property states. 370 U.S. at 71.
"1 282 U.S. at 110. See also Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118, 121 (1930); Hopkins v.
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Colorado and Oklahoma's description of a wife's interest in
the property of her husband as "vested" subsequent to the filing
of a divorce action does not change the result dictated by Davis
or Pulliam. The rule is that the nature of the state-created right
must be ascertained by a federal court which decides whether the
right created or the transaction which occurred is the object to be
taxed by the taxing statute.4 3 So the conclusory label "vested"
does not determine whether the essential federal criteria for coownership have been met. As has been seen, the wife's vested
right is not descendible, it gives her no rights of management or
disposition, and, certainly in the Colorado case, its quantum was
subject to the discretion of the divorce court. Notwithstanding
being "vested," the wife's rights are insufficient to prevent the
operation of the federal tax upon the husband's transfer. This
would by no means be the first instance of a federal court's disregarding a vested state property right in matters of federal taxation. 44
CONCLUSION

Except for allowing a wife her separate property and earnings, little change has occurred in marital property law in comBacon, 282 U.S. 122, 126 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127, 131 (1930); Swihart, supra
note 134, at 119-21.
"
That principle has also been explained as follows:
State law is not used for tax purposes in the same way that it is employed by a federal court exercising jurisdiction in diversity cases under the
principle of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. Under the Erie doctrine . . . state law
furnishes the substantive rule of decision. In tax cases, on the other hand,
the substantive rule is federal, and state law merely establishes some of the
facts to which the court applies federal law in order to reach its conclusions.
Whether or not a particular fact is to be established by means of state law
is a matter of legislative intent.
Note, The Role of State Law in Tax Determinations,72 HARV. L. REv. 1350, 1351 (1959)
(footnotes omitted).
"I The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, on April 30, 1975, heard oral arguments on
the appeal of Imel v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974). The district court
followed the opinion it received from the Colorado Supreme Court in response to the
question it certified to that court. The Tenth Circuit has not yet decided the case. Dicta
in two recent Tenth Circuit cases indicate that court favors the Davis rule. See Wiles v.
Commissioner, 499 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1974) and Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d
462, 468 (10th Cir. 1974), where, referring to a wife's vested right announced in Imel, the
court said
[sluch a characterization is not controlling for tax purposes. Rather, consideration must be given to the true nature of the transfer under Colorado law.
When so viewed, it is apparent that Colorado places a burden upon the
husband's property rather than making the wife a part owner thereof.
Id. (citation omitted).
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mon law states," 5 including Colorado and Oklahoma. A wife in
these states is not allowed a one-half interest in marital property146 which she may manage and control, or dispose of presently
or by will. Instead, she is entitled to her own property, which is
often less than that of her husband. She is also given certain
rights against the property of her husband should the marriage
be dissolved by divorce or death, but these rights do not make her
husband's property subject to her control or disposition.'47 In the
case of divorce her interest is not even a fixed share."' As Davis
Johnston, supra note 18, at 1090:
Beyond a married woman's separate property and outside earnings...
there has been no fundamental change in marital property law. Wives are
still expected to perform services in the home for their husbands without
recompense beyond the limits of the husband's duty of support.
14 Colorado's new Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act defines marital property to
be divided at dissolution as all property acquired by either spouse after the marriage
except that acquired by gift, bequest, devise, descent, and some other property. COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-113(2) (1973). Marital property closely resembles community
property. However, the statute does not make Colorado a community property state
because it does not give a wife, or either spouse, any interest in the marital property which
they did not already have in Colorado. Instead of changing Colorado into a community
property state, the statute, by its express terms, merely specifies what property may be
divided upon dissolution. Id.
"I The Colorado Supreme Court in Imel evidently felt it could skirt this deficiency
by holding that the right which vested upon filing a divorce action (which even then was
not descendible) was inchoate prior to that time (and therefore naturally beyond the wife's
control and disposition) only in the sense that the specific property to be transferred had
not yet been determined. 517 P.2d at 1335. The weakness of this argument is that a true
co-owner, such as a wife in a community property state, need not have her one-half
interest specifically determined before she may dispose of it, e.g., at death. DE FUNIAK §§
198-99.
Equally unavailing is the argument that the right to a share at divorce makes her a coowner because the statute granting it is mandatory. Besides the fact that she could get
much less than one-half and perhaps nothing, the mere fact it is mandatory that the court
give her some of her husband's property does not give her the rights of control and
disposition that Davis demands.
"' It has been argued (e.g., by Gunn, supra note 3, at 249 n.87) that because the
quantum of a wife's share upon divorce in a common law property state is subject to the
discretion of the court should not cause a different tax result than a divorce in a community property jurisdiction, since several of those states have similar provisions. See DE
FUNIAK § 227. Davis implied that the discretion granted the trial court was inconsistent
with the notion the wife was a co-owner. 370 U.S. at 70. See also note 94 supra. It is
submitted that, while a discretionary division would seem inconsistent with the concept
of co-ownership in either jurisdiction, there is nevertheless a fundamental difference between the two situations.
In common law property states the existence of a court's discretionary power to divide
the husband's property is reflective of the fact that his wife never had a vested interest
therein, and that whatever interest she will receive is dependent upon the discretion of
the court. "What [she will receive] might be ascertained independently of the extent of
"'
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held, such rights impose a burden upon the property of her husband, but hardly make her a co-owner thereof. A state's declaration, as in Imel or Collins II, that she is theoretically a co-owner
but without the rights of one is a "theoretical protestation"'4 9 that
she ought to be viewed as a co-owner for tax purposes despite the
true nature of her rights. The state's label fails to prevent the tax
imposed by Davis because it fails to make her a true co-owner.
For that reason it does not seem unfair'50 to tax the husband, who,
like Mr. Davis, has his property to himself but alleges his wife
owns it too. Why should he have it both ways?
The Davis criteria-a descendible property right not subject
to the discretion of a court and which a wife may manage and
dispose of-have traditionally been lacking in common law
property states. At one time Davis could be criticized'5 ' because
the husband's property" (370 U.S. at 70), i.e. without reference to a fixed percentage of
whatever her husband owned.
On the other hand, in community property jurisdictions both spouses are viewed as
having vested one-half interests in the community property. See note 36 supra. A court's
discretion in making a division of property between them is therefore not reflective of the
fact that a wife has no interest in the community property until a discretionary award is
made by the court. Instead, the court's discretion can be viewed as its power to divest
either spouse of part of his one-half interest should the court make an unequal division
because of fault, financial condition, etc. This is supported by the fact that in New Mexico
and Louisiana the community property must be equally divided. DE FUNIAK § 227, at 515.
In New Mexico it has been held that, absent a statute authorizing a court to make an
unequal division thereby divesting a spouse of a portion of his one-half, the court has no
such power. Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 499, 500, 185 P. 780, 793 (1919).
"' This term was used by Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799,
827 n.116 (1943), in describing the recently enacted and since repealed Oklahoma community property statute. Cahn noted that the wife's very limited power of control and
disposition over community property was difficult to reconcile with the concept of community property and with the "theoretical protestation" of the statute that each spouse
had a vested one-half interest therein. He further stated that "[wihenever the local
statute appears to be inspired by the objective of special tax privileges, unrelated to
historic institutions of the state, it must be examined with a high measure of skepticism."
Id. at 828. Perhaps the same could be said of Imel and Collins I.
The term "amiable fiction" was used by Justice Sutherland in Tyler v. United States,
281 U.S. 497, 503 (1930), to describe the common law notion that at death no transfer,
and hence it was argued no taxable transfer, occurred between husband and wife holding
property as tenants by the entirety. The taxpayer's argument was unsuccessful for reasons
not relevant here, but the language aptly describes the fiction that no transfer occurs in
Colorado or Oklahoma divorce property settlements because the wife is already a co-owner
of the property.
S At least it has not seemed so unfair as to persuade Congress to change the result.
One draft of a statute which would do so has been available since 1954. See ALI FED.
INCOME TAX STAT. § 257(a)(Feb. 1954 Draft).
151 See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 3, at 250-51.

TAXATION OF DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS

a wife's power to manage and dispose of her interest was also
lacking in the eight 5 ' community property states. Yet husbands
in those states received favorable tax treatment. It appears,
though, that in community property states there is a definite
trend toward making a wife a true co-owner. Common law property jurisdictions suffer by comparison.' 53
It has been asserted that the fairest regime of marital property is community property. 4 In that system both spouses are
recognized as equal partners and true co-owners. If Colorado and
Oklahoma wish to benefit husband/taxpayers in their states upon
the theory that husband and wife are co-owners of marital prop"' Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. DE FUNIAK § 1, at 1. While the wife's control and ability to dispose of her interest
were determinative in Davis, it might also be pointed out that there are other matters
which may be equally important such as her liability for debt. Id. § 94, at 235.
I" Texas, for instance, has allowed joint management of community income which
is commingled. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(b) (1971). A recently enacted statute in
Washington requires joint action to convey or encumber community property. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (1974). See generally Cross, The Community Property Law in
Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 729 (1974). California and Idaho have gone further than
joint management and control, placing the power of management and control of all community property in both spouses. CAL. CIv. §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1975). See Note,
Equal Managment and Control Under Senate Bill 569: "To Have and to Hold" takes on
New Meaning in California, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999 (1974). See also Glendon, supra note
35, at 38-39. The significant changes in Idaho are contained in IDAHO CODE § 32-912 (Supp.
1975):
Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control
the community property, and either may bind the community property by
contract, except that neither the husband nor wife may sell, convey or encumber the community real estate unless the other joins in executing and
acknowledging the deed or other instrument of conveyance, by which the real
estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the consent in writing of
the other shall not obligate the separate property of the spouse who did not
so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may by express
power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, convey or
encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds, conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity herewith are hereby validated.
See Young, Joint Management and Control of Community Property in Idaho:A Prognosis,
11 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (1974).
"I Sassover, Matrimonial Law Reform: Equal Property Rights for Women, 44 N.Y.
STATE B. J. 406, 408 (1972). This is not to say that community property is without faults.
See, e.g., Younger, Louisiana Wives: Law Reform to Their Rescue, 48 TULANE L. REV. 566
(1974), and Younger, Community Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 211 (1973). See Glendon, supra note 35, at 38-39 for a recent discussion of
property law reform in favor of a wife in community property states.
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erty, the proper method would be to make them so. Imel relies
upon the theory that husband and wife are co-owners, but ignores
the fact that in Colorado they are not.
Danny C. Aardal

BOOK REVIEW
by PETER D. ROSENBERG, Clark
Boardman Co., Ltd., 1975, Pp. 405. $25.00
Mr. Rosenberg, a patent examiner in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, has authored numerous book review articles
for the Journal of the Patent Office Society. He is a member of
the New York Bar and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree and a
Bachelor of Chemical Engineering degree from New York University, a Juris Doctor degree from New York Law School and a
Master of Laws in Patent and Trade Regulation degree from
George Washington University.
With such impressive credentials one might possibly assume
Mr. Rosenberg's book to be directed primarily to the academic
community and to be primarily concerned with esoteric areas
and issues of patent law. Such is not the case. Patent Law
Fundamentals is truly a well written and easily understood book
on fundamental patent law and the flavor of the book is one for
non-patent lawyers, scientists and businessmen alike to enjoy.
Mr. Rosenberg has sectioned the book into six major parts.
The first part presents the elementals and basis of patent law.
The second part sets forth the statutory requirements for obtaining a patent. The third analyzes the priority of rights when more
than one inventor claims rights to the same patent. Part four
provides the procedure necessary for preparing and prosecuting
a patent before the Patent and Trademark Office. Part five discusses patent exploitation including licensing and infringement
problems. Finally, part six examines patents in an international
context. Each of the above parts is logically set forth with a lucid
discussion. The text is further accompanied by a thorough table
of contents, an extensive 16-page table of cases and a
comprehensive 16-page index. Rosenberg's style of writing is such
that one not familiar with patent law can readily grasp the concepts.
A minor flaw in Mr. Rosenberg's book is the apparent lack
of rigor in proofreading, indexing, and, most important, accuracy
in footnoting.' Such annoyances as "exhausting" for "exchangPATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS

' More significant errors are found in the Table of Cases. For example, Kellogg Co.
v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) is cited to 305 U.S. 11. Also, Luckett v.
Delpart, Inc., 270 U.S. 496 (1926) is cited with a 1928 date. The reviewers did not exhaus-
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ing" must be eliminated. The table of cases is not consistently
alphabetical, for example, "Butt Technical", "Broderick",
"Branch" appear in reverse alphabetical order. In addition, certain cases listed in the text do not appear in the table of cases.
These criticisms, however, are trivial compared to the overall
value in general patent knowledge the book imparts to, for example, a lawyer engaged in general practice.
Patent Law Fundamentals is an excellent initial research
source for access into patent law precedent when a more detailed
understanding of the legal problems is desired. Fortunately, Mr.
Rosenberg has provided parallel cites to the West Reporter
System (available to all practitioners) and to the BNA Patent
Quarterly (used primarily by patent, trademark, and copyright
attorneys). Patent Law Fundamentals is timely and fulfills a
much needed void in patent legal literature for lawyers. 2 The book
should remain timely since provision has been made for annual
pocket part supplements.
Most lawyers embrace both a fear and an ignorance of patent, copyright, and trademark situations. Mr. Rosenberg's book
dispels any such fear at least for patent law. A good casual reading of this book should enable any lawyer to advise his client as
to the fundamentals of patent law, the basic procedures for obtaining a patent, and the means to exploit the invention. Of
course, a lawyer not admitted to the bar of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office cannot prosecute the patent for the client.
Rather, he must refer the client to a patent attorney or agent.
In conclusion, the reviewers highly recommend Patent Law
Fundamentalsas an essential reference in a general practitioner's
library. But our recommendation is only for a subsequent corrected printing or edition in hopes that the numerous accuracy
problems will be corrected by the author.
Donald M. Duft* and Robert C. Dorr**
tively analyze the technical accuracy of the author's Table of Cases, but uncovered the
above on a superficial inspection.
I Another very good review book is Paul Goldstein's work, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DOCTRINES (1973).

* Patent Attorney, Boulder, Colorado; B.S., 1949, Illinois Institute of Technology;
LL.B., 1953, New York University; LL.M., 1971, New York University.
** B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engineering; M.S., 1970, Northwestern University; J.D., 1974, University of Denver.

BOOK REVIEW
COURT REVIEW OF PATENT OFFICE DECISIONS: COURT OF CUSTOMS
AND PATENT APPEALS, VOLUMES
TICE SERIES

By

4 & 4A
DONALD

OF PATENT LAW AND PRAC-

R.

DUNNER

New York: Matthew Bender Co., 1973. Volume 4: Pp. xxxiv, 481;
$50.00; Volume 4A: Pp. x, 645; $50.00.
Volumes 4 and 4A, Court Review of Patent Office Decisions,
were first conceived in a limited-enrollment, intensive seminar
sponsored by the National Law Center of the George Washington
University, and were designed to provide the patent practitioner
with a comprehensive and practical view of the formalized procedures involved in patent office decisions from the decision of the
Board to the final decision in the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. The author has provided the specialized practitioner in
patents and trademarks law with one of the most detailed and
explicit collections of substantive and adjectival presentations it
has been the pleasure of this writer to read and review.
Layout of the Volumes 4 and 4A exemplify the concern and
sympathetic dedication of the author to the pressing needs of that
select group of practitioners before the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. The author exhaustively surveyed and sorted the
most varied and effective documents and pleadings with the assistance and cooperation of practicing attorneys, judges, and
other officials of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals; the
distillation of what amounts to a formidable total of manhours
and assiduous research and effort has been sorted, capsulized,
and reproduced in a narrative and positive way.
For example, the lead pages of Volume 4 provide the practitioner with a correlation table between CCPA rules revised as of
May 18, 1972 and the new rules effective January 1, 1974. In and
of itself, such a table is rather plodding and mechanical. The
table, though, is followed by a commentary on the new rules,
which is valuable in updating those practitioners accustomed to
the 1972 rules by pointing out at each step of the way the expansion effected by the 1974 rules and the detailed effects of such
expansion. The commentary is exceptionally clear and complete,

and is indeed a model of the kind of legal literature that lawyers
could and should expect when substantial changes in substantive
law or procedure come into being, and are superimposed upon the
basic purview of knowledge that a professional of average skill in
the field is supposed to have mastered.
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The works restrict themselves to practices and procedures on
appeals from patent office decisions in (1) Ex parte patent decisions of the Board of Appeals of the Patent Office, 35 U.S.C. §
141-145; 28 U.S.C. § 1542; P.O. Rules 301-304; (2) Inter partes
Patent Decisions of the Board of Patent Interferences, 35 U.S.C.
§ 141-144, 146; 28 U.S.C. § 1542; P.O. Rules 301-304, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2182, 2457; and (3) Ex parte and inter partes trademark decisions of the Commissioner and Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board, 15 U.S.C. § 1071; T.M. Rules 2.145, 2.119; 28 U.S.C. §
1361, 1542.
Volumes 4 and 4A are obviously designed for those members
of the profession who are presently engaged in, or by necessity
compelled to, practice before the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals. The volumes' orientation towards and value to the
pressed and harried practitioner can perhaps be best exemplified
by the arrangement of the volumes: Substantive comment is followed immediately in each chapter by a complete collection of
exceptionally well drafted forms for the execution and implementation of the substantive points discussed. In Volume 4 for example, the table of forms itself occupies 17 pages. If one pursues this
table to a particular form one finds a complete and impressively
concise legal document for almost any situation one can imagine
that might arise in a CCPA appeals situation.
Volume 4 initially discusses ex parte patent appeals, and
discusses in detail the procedures of the patent office, including
step by step chronologies, pleadings, documents, and fees. The
next chapter reviews ex parte patent appeals and preliminary
procedures in the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and covers, once again, the kinds of details, such as forms, fees, printing,
and the like, that many attorneys have, hat in hand, sought ad
hoc from the ministerial functionaries of the multitudinous courts
of record throughout the land.
Chapter 4 commences with a rather concise substantive discussion of motions practice, followed by some extensive motions
documents illustrating the substantive introduction. Chapter 5
deals with the hearing and decision elements of ex parte patents
appeals.
The denouement of this esoteric but delightful insight into a
very sophisticated and unique area of practice continues in
Volume 4A with chapter 6 where the inter partes appeals and the
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Board of Patent Interferences is illustrated and described in an
unusually thorough appraisal. Chapter 7, entitled "Appeals in
Trademark Cases," may have an appeal to members of our profession who are not members of the Patent Bar, but who have
developed or have been visited with a number of clients in the less
scientific and more pragmatic field of unfair trade practices. In
this chapter once again, the author has assembled a remarkable
and admirable sequence of substantive narrative followed by
crisp and detailed examples of practice documentation. Chapter
8 has the delightful title of "Miscellaneous Matters" and presents
practical solutions for clients' problems and settlement negotiations, including comparative factors such as costs, time delays,
ease of presentation, the effect of res judicata, and, not to be
totally ignored, fees. The final chapter of Volume 4A sets forth
the texts of statutory provisions and patent office and court rules
relating to review of patent office decisions.
The sequence of matters presented in these two volumes is
well arranged in a logical scheme, well indexed and explained,
with a minimum of "fog count." The author has demonstrated
unusual concern and scholarship in providing a reference work so
complete and detailed that it would appear to constitute both an
advanced primer for the infrequent petitioner before the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and a reliable refresher and reference source for the professional who appears before that body
with regularity.
ChristopherH. Munch

• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Denver.
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